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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

TURKEY.

PART VI.

OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1923.

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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

Part VI.

[P 1367/1/150] No. 1.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 2.)

(No. 600.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 26, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to acknowlege the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 760 of the 17th September in regard to the reception and distribution of British official wireless messages after the evacuation of Constantinople.

2. So long as H.M.S. "Comus" or any other British warship remains in the Bosphorus it should not be difficult to arrange for the continued distribution as heretofore of the Leafield messages which it picks up. This procedure can be continued till the Treaty of Lausanne is ratified and the last British warship withdrawn from Turkish waters.

3. Once normal conditions are re-established, the problem is a double one, and concerns (*a*) reception and (*b*) distribution.

4. Distribution should afford no insuperable difficulty. The sources of information of the Turkish newspapers are so scanty and meagre that news of any kind, especially if supplied gratuitously or at a nominal price, would in all probability be welcomed and published without hesitation. It is likely that an agreement in this respect will be concluded between the Turkish Anatolian agency in Angora and the Havas-Reuter agency here. According to Reuter's correspondent, negotiations have already been begun with the Turkish agency on a basis whereby the latter will join the Havas-Reuter group on payment of an annual subscription. I gather that if it is not found possible to reach an agreement in this respect the Havas-Reuter agency here will be obliged by the Turkish authorities to close down, and a monopoly for news will be granted to the Anatolian agency. Seeing that the latter has no organisation capable of supplying it with world news, I can scarcely believe that this alternative would prove gratifying to the Turkish press. If, on the other hand, an agreement be arrived at, it should not be difficult for Reuter's to supply the agency here with purely British news, instead of, as at present, with news almost exclusively compiled in Paris.

5. There are, however, two obstacles which may upset a suitable arrangement in this respect. First, the Turks may prefer to count on getting all their news by intercepting wireless messages without payment rather than to pay a subscription to Havas-Reuter in order to receive news over the cables. Secondly, purely British messages cannot be sent by telegraph without cost. The French Government consider the Havas messages of sufficient value to them for propaganda and other purposes to subscribe a considerable sum, varying from 30*l.* to 50*l.* a month, to make good the losses incurred at present by the Havas-Reuter agency in receiving, printing and distributing the telegraphic news supplied to it from Paris. We should have to do the same in respect of purely British messages sent out by Reuter. In fact, none of the Turkish newspapers are affluent enough to pay a sufficient sum to agencies for their news to enable them to be run on a profit-making basis.

6. Nor do I think that it will ever be easy to arrange for the distribution in Turkey of British news from British sources except at a financial loss. There is but one

purely British newspaper in Constantinople, the "Orient News," which has eked out a precarious existence on its circulation to the British forces of occupation. Even with that support it has only just managed to keep its head above water, and it is most doubtful whether it can long be maintained in its present form. It is true that it has been to some extent handicapped owing to the very fact that the Army Signal Corps has published broadcast its leaflets of British news, but the English reading public of Constantinople is never likely to be large enough to make of an English newspaper a paying proposition. The alternative for the "Orient News" is a bilingual production, Anglo-French or Anglo-Turkish, but in such I have uncommonly little faith, nor do I believe that they are ever really successful. Of course, if His Majesty's Government were prepared to subsidise it on the same lines as those on which the French propagandist newspaper, the "Stamboul," has to be subsidised—though I am unaware to what extent—in spite of the extensive French-reading Turkish population of Constantinople, the continued existence of the "Orient News" might be assured, especially if it were possible to give it exclusive rights to British wireless news. Otherwise, I fear that it is doomed in a little while to extinction.

7. The question of exclusive rights is connected with the second aspect of this problem, namely (*a*) the continued reception of the British official wireless messages. Would His Majesty's Government be prepared to authorise the installation of a receiving wireless set on the roof of His Majesty's Embassy in Constantinople? Its initial cost would not be great, but its working would entail the upkeep of one or two wireless operators. There is, I believe, a wireless installation on the American Embassy, and the French Embassy has followed this example and engaged for the purpose three of the French operators who have hitherto been employed at the Osmanieh station.

8. Were a similar receiving set installed on the Embassy, it should not be found difficult to arrange for the distribution of the news so received, and in this respect it might perhaps be found feasible to give a certain preference to the "Orient News" in so far as social, financial and other matters are concerned, which are essentially of interest to British readers and of minor value to the general public.

9. There is, of course, a political consideration involved in the installation of wireless on an Embassy. It could scarcely be done without the knowledge of the Turks, and presumably their consent. I am unaware whether foreign Embassies in London are authorised to have their own receiving sets. I presume that they are, in which case the question of that reciprocity on which the Turks would be certain at least to insist would be solved.

10. Another possibility would be open for me, and that is on the ground of general interest to the Turkish public, to ask the Turkish Government to allow their wireless to take in the British Leafield and to communicate copies daily to this Embassy. The disadvantages of this course would be, first, the incompetency of the Turkish operators, who would probably mutilate, wittingly or unwittingly, the messages so received in English; secondly, the certainty that the Turks would ask for reciprocity. I am not in a position to judge here how far that reciprocity would be prejudicial to British interests elsewhere. If Great Britain alone be contemplated I should imagine such prejudice to be negligible, but this would probably not be the case if reciprocity were demanded in certain British dominions or mandated territories. Thirdly, the Turks would request some financial return for this concession. Though this might possibly be partly defrayed by a British chamber of commerce anxious to obtain reliable and purely British news, it is doubtful whether such an arrangement could be made without some charge falling on public funds.

11. To sum up—

(1.) I can probably, and am endeavouring to, make a temporary arrangement without cost whereby the Leafield press will continue to be distributed so long as a British warship remains stationed here, say, till the end of the year.

(2.) When this is no longer possible the alternatives would seem to be either (*a*) the installation of a wireless receiving set on the Embassy or (*b*) an arrangement with the Turks for the reception at one of their wireless stations of the British Leafield messages. Of these two alternatives (*a*) would be the most satisfactory, if it were feasible and His Majesty's Government sanctioned the inevitable expense; (*b*) would be less expensive, but is open to greater objections.

12. Generally speaking, I do not believe that any practicable method can be evolved that will not entail a charge on public funds. It is a question of the value of

propaganda. The benefits of propaganda are undoubted, but how far those benefits in Turkey are commensurate with the sums of money disbursed is disputable. During the early days of the occupation vast quantities of British periodicals and literature were unloaded on this High Commission for distribution. My personal opinion is that the outlay here was entirely wasted. The French, it is true, devote large sums on propaganda in the Near East, but they are particularly favoured in this respect since French is the language of culture in Turkey and there are few educated Turks who cannot read and speak it. The only foreign newspaper in Constantinople that is either a credit to its producers or widely read is the "Stamboul." But by far the most effective form of French propaganda is exercised through the French educational and religious establishments. French propaganda for these reasons will always be a potential danger to British interests in Turkey, nor do I think that this can be altered so long as France remains the spiritual home of the educated Turk.

13. Nevertheless, it is clearly undesirable that there should be no restriction on undiluted French propaganda. In the past the principal check has been, and in the future will continue to be, the British individual. The Turk is essentially liable to personal influence, and I regard the British subject as Great Britain's best propaganda. Still, it cannot be doubted that the continued distribution of British news in Turkey would be of considerable benefit, both as a means to counteract French and other propaganda and to give the Turk a better understanding of British aims and policy. If such a theory is worth supporting some charge must be allowed to fall on public funds. If this be sanctioned, the course which I would recommend would be establishment of a wireless receiving set on His Majesty's Embassy, provided I be first authorised to arrange with the Turkish Government that the reception of wireless messages by such an installation would be facilitated and no objection raised to the distribution of the news received thereat.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner

[**E 9774/199/44**] No. 2.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 601.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September 25 1923.*

WITH the approach of the date for the final evacuation of Turkish territory by the Allied forces, the situation at Angora has become pregnant with possibilities.

2. Most of the newspapers on the 23rd instant published telegrams from their Angora correspondents indicating that Cabinet dissensions had arisen and that certain resignations were pending. Only one Turkish and one French newspaper, however, reproduced a declaration (the French text of which I have the honour to enclose), which Mustafa Kemal Pasha was stated to have made to the Angora correspondent of the "Neue Freie Presse," to the effect that the only word in the dictionary which could be applied to the form of government existing at Angora, where all executive and legislative power was concentrated in one Assembly, was the word "republic"; that the future Government of Turkey would be a democratic republic, and that "the centre of "the Turkish Republic is Angora."

3. The logical inference to be drawn from this statement is that the President of that Assembly is *ipso facto* the President of that republic.

4. Apart from one press telegram yesterday, which stated that nothing was known at Angora regarding the supposed interview, all subsequent reports from the capital are confirmatory of its accuracy, and it has been freely commented on in the local Turkish press. The latter incline for the moment to adopt an attitude of reserved approval, pointing out that for all practical purposes the proposed change will be merely one of form. Nevertheless, it seems to be realised that considerable opposition will be encountered. Of this opposition, the independent "Tewhid," which has of late become increasingly critical of the present Administration and its methods, has made itself the mouthpiece by pointing out that the present Assembly was elected on a definite mandate in which no fresh constitutional convulsion was contemplated.

5. Meanwhile it seems that no time is to be lost in putting the proposed changes into execution. An important conference of the People's party, which amounts to a secret meeting of the Assembly, has been announced for to-day, when the reforms

will be discussed. The nature of the latter have almost certainly been already decided, but there is some speculation as to the exact designation of the future State. "The State of the Turkish People," "The Republic of the Turkish People," and, more simply, "The Turkish Republic," are all canvassed, but, in order to emphasise the democratic nature of the Government of the new Turkey, it seems probable that either the first or second of these will be selected. The name is, however, immaterial. The importance of the change lies in the fact that Kemal has apparently at last judged the moment to be ripe for asserting his ascendancy in form as well as in practice. Such a development has for a long time past seemed inevitable, and I reported, in fact, some months ago that Mustafa Kemal would probably select the moment of the final liberation of Constantinople as a suitable occasion. Diplomatic relations with foreign countries are also on the eve of being restored, and the failure of the Persian Ambassador's recent mission to Angora has shown to Mustafa Kemal that his position as the Head of the State cannot be taken for granted by foreign Powers.

6. Whatever opposition may be subsequently encountered in the country, and it will certainly be strong in Constantinople, it is already evident that the new proposals have not even the approval of all the members of the present Cabinet. One member, Mahmoud Essad Bey, Minister for Economic Affairs, has already resigned according to some reports for reasons of fatigue, and, according to others, on account of the criticism to which he had been subjected at recent party meetings. Other resignations reported to be imminent are those of the Ministers of Public Instruction, of Finance and of Justice, the last of whom was only appointed six weeks ago.

7. The vacant place in the Ministry has been filled by the election yesterday of Hassan Bey, who, as Turkish financial expert at the Conference of Lausanne, is known to your Lordship. A native of Trebizond, which he represents in the Assembly, Hassan Bey was successively Minister of Finance and of Economic Affairs during 1921 and 1922. On his failure to secure re-election when the Angora Cabinet collectively resigned in July of last year, he was replaced by Mahmoud Essad Bey, whom he now succeeds. It is interesting to note, as a symptom of the control still exercised by Mustafa Kemal over his followers, that at the party meeting Hassan Bey received only 96 votes against 56 cast for a rival candidate, while in the subsequent public sitting of the Assembly he received the support of 154 Deputies.

8. In previous despatches I have referred to the formal nature of the Assembly's meetings, which are merely held to confirm decisions already arrived at by the party meeting *in camerâ*. During the last week these secret meetings have, it is reported, been the occasion of heated discussions on a project for the imposition of a veto against the future employment in any official capacity of officers, diplomats and other public servants who before the signature of the Mudania Convention had not accorded their support to the Nationalist cause. No decision on this point has yet been reached, but the Constantinople press in general has signified its disapproval of a proposal which would inevitably strengthen the existing opposition elements, and would at the same time arbitrarily deprive the State of the services of experienced officials at a time when the co-operation of the whole Turkish people is so essential.

9. In connection with the above, and the probable imminence of constitutional developments, it is interesting to note the reports which have reached me from various sources in regard to the renewed activity of the Unionist organisation, which, as your Lordship is aware, has for some time had its headquarters at Smyrna, and is said to be preparing the ground for its emergence as an active opposition. With this end in view, Dr. Nazim Bey, one of its leading members, has recently come to Constantinople and got into touch with certain ex-Kemalist Ministers and others who are ready to work against Kemal Pasha. On the 16th instant a meeting was held at which it was understood that, with the alleged cognisance of Reouf Bey, Nazim Bey suggested that all the oppositionist groups should co-ordinate their activities and draw up a common programme. As an incentive he stated that the funds of the old Unionist party would be put at the disposal of the new group. After considerable discussion it was decided that Nazim Bey's proposal should be examined, and that, if common ground for co-operation could be found, the local oppositionists would give their support. In the meantime Nazim Bey remains here, and it is not inconceivable, in view of the raising of the republican issue, which has coincided with the reception by the Caliph, formerly an ardent partisan of the Committee of Union and Progress, of several members of the former Constantinople Government and of others, such as Refet Pasha, whose loyalty to Kemal can no longer be relied upon, that a counter-*coup* may at least be under consideration in Constantinople itself.

10. From the Presidency of the Turkish Republic and thence to Sultan of the

Turks and the creation of a new dynasty are shorter steps than some of those which Mustafa Kemal has already taken. In this connection I hear that there is a prospect that Latife Hanoum may before long present him with an heir to the throne to which he is possibly aspiring. But it remains to be seen whether the House of Osman will submit without a struggle and be content with the retention for itself of an impotent Caliphate. Once Turkish territory is finally freed from all external pressure, there are many elements which might combine against the pretensions of an usurper and in support of a dynasty which, in spite of all its degeneracy during the past two centuries, must still command many loyal and devoted adherents among the Turkish nation. Any attempt on these lines which might be made now would, however, appear to be ill-advised. As soon as the Allied forces of occupation have departed, Kemal will doubtless send a considerable force of his troops into Constantinople. The key of the situation is the army, and his main object in so doing would be to overawe the dissatisfaction which he has seen growing in Constantinople against the Kemalist organisation and to check any possibility of its becoming dangerous. His alleged motive will be a triumphal liberation, which is so indisputable that it cannot fail to be popularly welcomed. Were an anti-Kemalist *coup* contemplated, it would seem a mistake not to wait till the influences of Constantinople had had time to work not only on the loyalty and discipline of the Kemalist troops, but also on the Deputies and officials who will probably flock here from the Anatolian backwoods. The future struggle will lie not merely between Ottomans—the word which Kemal has endeavoured, with some success, to eradicate from the Turkish language—and Kemalists, but between Constantinople and Angora. There can neither be two Kings nor two Brentfords in Turkey.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of September 23, 1923.

IMPORTANTES DÉCLARATIONS DE GHAZI KÉMAL PACHA.

LE parti populaire commencera dans une quinzaine de jours la discussion de la loi sur la Charte constitutionnelle, à laquelle d'importantes modifications seront apportées. Son Excellence Ghazi Moustafa Kémal Pacha, dans une interview accordée aujourd'hui au correspondant de la "Neue Freie Presse," en réponse à la question posée par ce dernier tendant à savoir si la loi de statut organique a été entièrement élaborée et si les affaires intérieures continuent à se développer de façon satisfaisante, a fait les déclarations suivantes :

"Les dispositions de notre statut organique stipulent que la souveraineté "appartient sans réserve au peuple.

"Il y est clairement stipulé que le pouvoir d'exécution, le droit de législation "sont concentrés dans l'Assemblée, qui est l'unique et la vraie représentante de la "nation. Pour exprimer ces deux termes en un seul mot dans quelque dictionnaire "que l'on cherche on trouvera le mot 'république.'

"Par conséquent, le développement intérieur de la Turquie n'a pas encore pris "fin. Il y aura encore des modifications et des perfectionnements. Tous ces "perfectionnements et modifications vont aboutir aux principes régissant la "république. Il y aura en Turquie une république démocratique peut-être encore "plus prononcée que celle d'aujourd'hui. Celle-ci ne différera en aucune façon des "principes ayant cours dans les républiques d'Occident."

Le correspondant de la "Neue Freie Presse" ayant voulu savoir quelle serait la future capitale de la Turquie, Ghazi Moustafa Kémal Pacha a répondu comme suit :

"Les événements se sont chargés de déterminer eux-mêmes notre capitale. "Il n'y a plus une question de chef-lieu de Gouvernement. Angora est le centre "de la République turque."

[E 9804/1019/65] No. 3.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 301.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 2, 1923.

UNDER article 7 of the evacuation protocol, negotiations for the frontier between Turkey and Irak should open as soon as the evacuation operations are complete, namely, at the end of six weeks from the date of the ratification of the Treaty of Angora. Under the same article, the nine months' period is to date from the day on which negotiations are opened. The Colonial Office Air Ministry and High Commissioner at Bagdad are anxious that period of nine months should begin to run at earliest possible date, as question of reducing garrison will arise after the nine months have elapsed. It is therefore essential that some communication should be made to Adnan Bey at once, to which we could later refer as amounting to the opening of negotiations in the sense of article 7.

My present idea is that actual discussions with Turkish representatives should take place in London, and I am considering the appointment of Sir H. Rumbold to conduct them on the British side He will not, however, be back from Ceylon until 15th December, and in the meanwhile written or verbal communications between you and Adnan Bey will have to take place in order to keep negotiations in being until Sir H. Rumbold's return.

Please, therefore, send a formal written note on 4th October to Adnan Bey, simply stating that His Majesty's Government are opening negotiations on the question of the Turco-Irak frontier and will be glad to learn whether the Turkish Government wish to present a written statement of their case and to exchange notes upon it before verbal discussions take place, or whether they would prefer latter alone. In the latter case His Majesty's Government will be glad to learn in what place and on what date the Turkish Government wish them to begin. Note should be carefully framed to constitute opening of negotiations without actually stating that His Majesty's Government regard it as a formal opening of negotiations in the sense of the last paragraph of article 7 of the evacuation protocol. This will, however, be our tacit contention.

[E 9860/7734/44] No. 4.

Extract from Despatch No. 3174 to Paris.

Foreign Office, October 3, 1923.

THE French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon on a visit, as he described it, of courtesy. He went on to say that there were two subjects on which he desired to say a word.

The first was the action to be taken by the Allied Governments with regard to appointing Ambassadors at the future Turkish capital. This was a question which I had raised a little while ago, when I had asked the French, assuming that all the great Powers would have Ambassadors, what we should do if the Turkish Government ignored Constantinople, made, as they were believed likely to make, Angora their capital, and asked that the Ambassadors, if appointed, should go there.

I had pointed out that the total absence of convenience, and indeed the almost savage barbarity of Angora, rendered it out of the question that foreign representatives of high rank should go to a place where there were not even residences in which they could dwell; and I had raised the question whether, in the circumstances, we should send Ambassadors to Constantinople, declining to allow them to go to Angora, or only have some representative of lower rank in their place. The French Government had now apparently come round to my way of thinking. The Ambassador told me that in no circumstances would they dream of sending an Ambassador to Angora, and that if the latter was chosen as the capital they thought that the whole question ought to be reopened. I concurred in this view, and said that I should be happy to discuss the question again when the moment arrived.

[E 9796/7781/44] No. 5.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 5, 1923.

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Army Council, the accompanying copy of a telegram from the Acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople reporting the completion of the evacuation of Constantinople.

2. The Secretary of State has read with pleasure Mr. Henderson's tribute to Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington, and he will be glad, in view of the close relations which have prevailed between the diplomatic and military authorities at Constantinople, if the Army Council will be so good as to convey an expression of his cordial congratulations and thanks to Sir C. Harington and to the forces under his command for the admirable manner in which they have met the vicissitudes of the long and trying period of the occupation of Constantinople and the Straits and for the successful completion of their task.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 485.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 2, 1923.

GENERAL HARINGTON and last contingent of British forces in Turkey left this afternoon at 3 P.M. on steamship "Arabic," followed by Admiral Watson on H.M.S. "Marlborough." French and Italian generals left at the same time.

Whole evacuation of Constantinople has been carried out without hitch or incident of any kind, and reflects greatest credit on General Harington and all officers and men under his command.

Please inform War Office.

No. 6.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 447.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 6, 1923.

MY telegram No. 445.

My Italian colleague has now received instructions to act with his colleagues in sense of your telegram No. 341 to Paris. My French colleague has received no such instructions, but understands that League of Nations commissioner has already been appointed.

As matter seems now to be settling itself there appears to us now to be no need to take any action in the sense of your telegram to Paris.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 102, and Constantinople, No. 187.)

[E 9950/7781/44] No. 7.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 608.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 30, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief the British Forces in Turkey expressing his appreciation of the assistance rendered to him by the British High Commission during the past three years, together with copy of the reply which I have returned to Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Harington.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to Mr. Henderson.

Constantinople, September 26, 1923.

Your Excellency,

BEFORE leaving Constantinople I should like to express to you and to your staff my sincere gratitude for all the unfailing help which has been extended to myself and to the British corps of occupation during the past three years.

I feel myself that our work together and the work between our respective staffs has not only been a pleasure, but it has also been of great use to both services, as it has enabled us each to learn the other's point of view and difficulties. It has been an unique experience for us all, and I do not think such another example can be found of the diplomatic, naval, military and air forces working in such close relation. Considering the difficulties with which we have been faced at times of almost every question, requiring three Allied Governments or three Allied admirals or generals to agree upon it, I think we have reason to be glad that we have managed to steer through to the present situation. I am quite sure that it is only the goodwill shown on all sides which has enabled us to do so.

I shall always be mindful of the many kindnesses and firm support given to me both by his Excellency Sir Horace Rumbold, Bt., G.C.M.G., M.V.O., and by yourself. I recall many instances of prompt intervention and action being taken by you both in order to help me. I consider our work together will always form a good example of the importance of policy and strategy working hand in hand.

Thank you again so much for all your help. I shall always look back with pleasure on our time here together.

I have, &c.

C. H. HARINGTON, *Lieutenant-General,*
Commanding-in-chief the British Forces in Turkey.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

Mr. Henderson to Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington.

Constantinople, September 29, 1923.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th instant, in which you were good enough to express your thanks for such assistance as this High Commission has been able to afford to you personally, to your staff and to the army under your command.

2. In expressing to you my most sincere thanks for your appreciation of those services, I desire to say that they have been more than repaid by the assistance and cordial co-operation on which the High Commission has so consistently been able to rely on the part of yourself and your staff in all questions which have been of joint interest to us.

3. I should like also to take this opportunity of conveying to you an expression of our admiration of the behaviour of the British forces here during the many trying periods through which they have passed during the occupation of Constantinople.

4. The conduct of the British army during this period will, I feel sure, long be remembered in Turkey, and I cannot but feel that many will look back with regret upon its final evacuation, and will miss the presence of troops whose conduct has so worthily upheld our national prestige in these parts.

I am sending a copy of your letter to Sir Horace Rumbold.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[**E 9961/7781/44**] No. 8.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 8.)

(No 622.)

Constantinople, October 2, 1923.

My Lord,

AS I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my telegram No. 485, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Harington and his staff and the last contingent of the British forces in Turkey left Constantinople on board the steamship "Arabic" this afternoon. The "Arabic" was followed by the "Graz" and the "Medie II," with Generals Mombelli and Charpy and the last Italian and French contingents, and escorted by H.M.S. "Marlborough" flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Watson. Their departure constituted the final act in the evacuation of the Allied forces, which has been carried out without a hitch or incident of any kind—a satisfactory consummation which reflects the highest credit on General Harington and all the officers and men under his command.

2. The final proceedings on shore took the form of a short but impressive military parade, the details of which are described in the programme attached to this despatch.* British, French, Italian and Turkish detachments took part, the colours of each being saluted in turn, in the presence of the Allied generals, Allied High Commissioners, Turkish civil and military representatives, the diplomatic representatives of neutral Powers and a very dense crowd of Turks.

3. The British guard of honour was furnished by 100 men from the 2nd battalion of the Grenadier Guards and the 3rd battalion of the Coldstream, together with a colour party of the Irish Guards. The Turks could not resist the impression given by the magnificent appearance, bearing and drill of the British detachment, which alone was cheered by the Turks themselves as it marched off the ground and all through the streets to the quay, where it embarked about a mile away. I do not think that this last impression will be easily forgotten.

4. Immediately on the close of this parade, which took place on the square by the Dolma Baghtche Quay, Sir Charles Harington and his Allied colleagues proceeded to the vessels which were to convey them to their respective destinations. About an hour later I followed Sir Charles Harington on board the steamship "Arabic" in order officially to wish him good-bye and to express to him my personal appreciation of the very generous help and consideration which I have never failed to experience at his hands during the various periods that I have had the honour to be in charge of His Majesty's High Commission.

5. It only remains for me now to report officially to your Lordship my deep acknowledgment of that help, as well as my sense of appreciation of the very valuable services which Sir Charles Harington has rendered to His Majesty's Government during the tenure of his appointment at Constantinople.

6. In their larger sense these services are of course already well known to your Lordship, but I refer here to those connected with the solution, often with consummate tact and patience, of the many local difficulties and delicate situations, the details of which must be unknown to your Lordship with which he has had to deal under the very abnormal conditions which have obtained here during the last twelve months. By the force of his own personality General Harington succeeded in winning the complete confidence and respect of the Turks. This was conspicuously apparent during the final six weeks' period of the evacuation, which was carried out in a manner which has greatly enhanced British prestige in this country.

7. Nor can I omit to bring to your Lordship's notice the cordial co-operation of the army staff, which has done much to simplify our common task in Turkey.

8. I should be grateful if your Lordship would see fit to convey to the Army Council an expression of your Lordship's thanks for the great assistance and loyal support which has invariably been rendered to this High Commission by General Harington and the forces under his command. The close relations between us has enormously facilitated my own task, and in this respect I am under a deep personal as well as official obligation.

9. It would also be fitting if a similar appreciation were addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for the help and support accorded no less constantly and willingly to the High Commission throughout the long period of nearly five years' occupation by the Commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean station and the officers and men of His Majesty's ships here. The presence at Constantinople and in Turkish

* Not printed.

waters of this fleet has been a factor in the situation which cannot be too greatly emphasised and which has very largely contributed to the maintenance of British prestige in the Near East.

10. Nor can I end this despatch without a reference to the very efficient air force here under the command of Group-Captain Fellowes, which in this respect has also done its valuable share.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 9963/199/44] No. 9.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 8.)

(No. 624.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 2, 1923.

IN the course of the last week the official text was issued of the statement made by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the correspondent of the "Neue Freie Presse" regarding the impending constitutional changes. It does not differ in any essential particular from the French text enclosed in my despatch No. 601 of the 25th ultimo.

2. In the meantime Angora is in the pangs of child-birth and the deliberations on the constitutional question are continuing, but without any definite decision having yet been reached. This delay is due to differences of opinion within the National Assembly as to the exact form the proposed changes should take. That a republican form of Government is desirable seems to be almost generally accepted, but it is evident that Mustafa Kemal has much opposition in respect of his personal position to contend with. He is doubtless determined to retain his ascendancy whatever the form of Government, and it is probably with this end in view that his warmest supporters are canvassing the proposal that the head of the new State should, lest he lose his control of party politics, at the same time be President of the Cabinet, as well as of the Assembly. Nor are there wanting those who go so far as to suggest that Mustafa Kemal should have the dignity of President conferred on him for life. It must, however, be admitted that the latter are in the minority, and unless Kemal feels himself strong enough to disregard the opposition it appears improbable that such a proposition will yet be put into effect.

3. The alternative to the complete ascendancy such as Mustafa Kemal would enjoy under the above scheme would be a republic somewhat on French lines, and it is in favour of this that moderate opinion would appear to be hardening. There are, however, also varying views as to the manner in which the Cabinet should be appointed. Some favour the nomination of its head by the President of the Republic, the former being given the right to select his colleagues either from the members of the Assembly or from outside, while others prefer that the President of the Council as well as the other Ministers should be elected by, and directly responsible to, the Assembly, as in the case at present. The existing system has, however, proved so unsatisfactory, even with an Assembly thoroughly under control, that it is not likely to command much support in the future.

4. In the meanwhile the postponement of definite action has afforded an opportunity for somewhat freer press criticism than was possible a week ago, and this all indicates that, whatever final proposals may be made, they can only be accepted after heated debate. Several of the organs of the Constantinople press are showing Unionist rather than Kemalist leanings, and, while the creation of a republic is favourably viewed in the abstract, the opportunity is seized by such papers as the "Tevhid," "Tanin" and "Ikdam" to direct attacks against the present Administration. One of these published in the "Ikdam" was of a particularly bitter nature. The internal situation, it stated, was growing steadily worse, while the fault lay entirely with the Turks themselves, who only know despotism and slavery, and are incapable of appreciating liberty.

5. Criticism of the manner in which the recent elections were carried out also continues. Reouf Bey has, I learn, been approached several times recently by the emissaries of Mustafa Kemal with a view to a working arrangement being reached, but on each occasion the ex-President of the Council advised the dissolution of the Assembly and the holding of fresh elections at which the people could be at liberty to signify their wishes. Refet Pasha, and even Ismet, are stated to be of the same

opinion, but for the present at least Mustafa Kemal shows no sign of accepting their advice.

6. Owing to the failure of Mustafa Kemal to clinch matters, the expected Cabinet crisis has been delayed, and no further resignations have as yet been announced. In the meantime, Ali Fuad Pasha, who, as reported in my despatch No. 533, was appointed to a military inspectorate, has been succeeded as Vice-President of the Assembly by Yussuf Kemal Bey, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, who played such a prominent part in Anatolian politics up to the Conference of Mudania.

7. In connection with the appointment of Hassan Bey, as Minister of Economic Affairs, one interesting fact is reported, namely, that he made it a condition of his acceptance of the portfolio that he should be allowed to introduce a foreign expert into every section of his Department. This information has been universally welcomed by the Constantinople press, which has for some time been drawing attention to the country's need of foreign assistance. The same line has also been taken by the President of the Council in a statement regarding Austro-Turkish relations, which he has just made to a press correspondent. Turkey had, he said, much undeveloped wealth, but she had need of the assistance of the West to exploit it.

8. Perhaps the most significant feature of the last week has been a pronounced revulsion of feeling in favour of Constantinople as capital. This was first referred to in the press telegrams three days ago from Angora, and has since been confirmed by the receipt yesterday of the report of a debate which has just been concluded on a Bill for supplementary credits. Among these figured one of £T. 110,000 for the construction of a new Legislative Assembly at Angora. Such a proposal has raised the question of the capital in an acute form. After some debate this credit was dropped and referred to the Budget Commission, where it will rest until the moment is judged opportune for again raising the matter either on its own merits or as a part of the constitutional issue. The assumption by the Turks of undisputed control over Constantinople may, however, mark the point at which the tide will turn, and it is therefore possible that the seat of the Government may be transferred to the former capital earlier than at one time seemed probable. If, however, I be permitted to hazard a guess, I am inclined to think myself that the money will be voted but never disbursed.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 10.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 8.)

(No. 489.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 7, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 305.

I am taking up question with Adnan, who will probably reply that details are required before authority for return can be granted.

I suspect stowaways to be Armenians liable for military service. If so their forcible return here will amount, if not to condemnation to death, to something not very different therefrom. Moreover, if I furnish details and names it may recoil on their families.

However inconvenient and costly it may be to make other arrangements, I deprecate, therefore, their return on the grounds of humanity.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 12.)

No. 11.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 8.)

(No. 490.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 7, 1923.

TURKISH troops entered Constantinople yesterday amidst scenes of much enthusiasm.

Good order was maintained and I have heard of no incidents. So far, word of command is clearly that there should be none.

The previous night, however, thieves entered Crimean cemetery, apparently to steal verdure for street decoration, and broke several of marble tombstones. Adnan has expressed deep regret and has undertaken to take vigorous measures for protection of cemetery. I have asked that offenders be caught and punished as well as police if found guilty of negligence, and will visit cemetery myself to-morrow to estimate exact extent of damage. According to guardian, act was work of hooligans.

I do not anticipate trouble of serious nature as a result of entry of Turkish troops, but authorities are acting in other ways in manner which is not encouraging. Municipality has again seized bridge tolls (see my telegram No. 336), and I have addressed strong protest by letter to Adnan and also officially.

Twenty-four hours' notice was also given on 3rd October to representatives of Armstrong Vickers to evacuate arsenal on the ground that since company was put in possession by Allied High Commissioners and admirals, its present tenure ceased with termination of occupation. I have obtained fifteen days' delay from 5th October, but representatives had already left and are now awaiting instructions from their company.

[E 10068/1019/65] No. 12.

Memorandum on the Assyro-Chaldean Situation.

THE problem of dealing with the Assyro-Chaldeans at the present time is twofold. In the first place, the question of the disposal of a large number of refugees expatriated since the beginning of the war in various parts of the Near East requires attention, while, in the second place, the re-establishment of a community in Northern Irak, or even an autonomous Assyro-Chaldean State under British protection, still requires consideration, more especially in connection with the settlement of the Mosul boundary. The last of these questions will be dealt with first.

I.

The conclusion of the war saw some 35,000 Assyrian refugees in camps in Irak requiring repatriation either to their original homes or to a zone which had been proposed for them in the district of Amadiyah. In the absence of a decision by the home Government prior to the evacuation of the area by British troops, the latter scheme had to be dropped. The difficulties of settling the Assyro-Chaldean refugees rested in the main on their division into two bodies: the Persian subjects, who were plainsmen from the Urumia district, and the Turkish subjects, who were mountaineers of Hakkiari. The only desire which united these two elements was to remain under British protection.

In the spring of 1920, Aga Petros, an Assyrian mountaineer, came forward with a plan for the disposal of his nation, which consisted in occupying an area in the lower hill district on the Turco-Persian boundary. He believed that with 8,000 armed men he could occupy the district and allow the people from Urumia to return to their homes, while such mountaineers as would not accept settlement in the area itself might in time filter back to their mountain homes in Hakkiari. The Assyrians would thus constitute a buffer State between Turkey, Persia and Irak. The scheme was not impossible despite the objections which would be raised by the hostile Kurds, whom we had no reason then to befriend, and an effort was consequently made to carry it out. By April 1920 three-quarters of the nation had accepted the plan, the remainder hanging back under the leadership of the Patriarchal house headed by Benjamin Mar Shimun.

The Arab rising of 1920 caused the plan to be postponed, and it was accordingly only in October that Aga Petros's army, comprising 4,000 armed men with several mountain guns, was despatched. He was accompanied by three British officers, and food had been collected in the rear to provide for the women and children, who were to follow later, while the army itself was to live on the country. The arrangements which Petros was understood to have made with the Kurdish leaders did not prevent them from offering opposition to his advance. This resistance was overcome, but in the pursuit which Petros ordered two of his principal clans abandoned their leader and moved off in the direction of their own mountains with the object of raiding certain hereditary enemies. The balance of the force, consisting of people from Urumia, were deprived of their best fighting material and came to a halt in

unfamiliar country. They then gradually dispersed and drifted back to the base from which they had started. The two clans which had broken away were eventually checked on their career by tribesmen who had been urged to take action by the British political officers. The scheme ended in a complete fiasco, increased Kurdish distrust, entailed compensation of the friendly Kurds and other tribes who had been raided, and engendered misgivings among the Assyro-Chaldeans themselves born as to Aga Petros's capabilities and regarding British intentions.

By the beginning of 1921 some 20,000 refugees had again been collected, though the prospects of successful repatriation appeared further off than ever. The cost of maintaining them in a refugee camp was prohibitive, and a scheme for repatriation by infiltration was accordingly prepared. Money for the purpose was provided, but further difficulties arose upon the refusal of the Urumian section to participate. They left the refugee camp with the object of returning to their homes in Persia; some reached Tabriz, while others drifted back to find occupation in Irak. The mountaineers, on the other hand, were despatched in batches from the refugee camp to their own country. This process of dispersal was carried out on the assumption that the case of these Christian populations would be favourably considered by His Majesty's Government when the settlement of the Irak boundary was decided, and that they would not be handed over to the tender mercies of the Turks, in whose territory, however, much of their country was actually situated.

The whole question was extremely difficult to deal with, since, quite apart from the differences of opinion between the Urumian and mountaineer Assyrians, considerable dissension had been caused by the rivalry which existed between Aga Petros and the Lady Surma, a sister of Patriarch Benjamin, who had been murdered and replaced by a child patriarch under the tutelage of this lady and the Metropolitan of India and Malabar, one Mar Timotheus. This faction, representing the Nestorian Church, was completely antagonised by Aga Petros, himself a Roman Catholic, and throughout the question the religious differences and the rival pretensions of various Churches have added to the difficulties by mendacity and intrigue. The Nestorians under the Lady Surma have always been most sympathetically supported by the Archbishop of Canterbury's Assyrian Mission, to the members of which the name of Aga Petros is anathema. It is understood that some of the criticism which has been directed against the latter is due to the inability experienced by enthusiastic missionaries in securing converts to the Church of England from among his followers.

There is no doubt, however, that, after the failure of his scheme, Aga Petros did seek—or, at any rate, succumb to—French offers of assistance. The French were then in control of the mountainous area north of Mardin, which fell within Syria under the Treaty of Sèvres boundaries. They were anxious to use the Assyro-Chaldeans as a kind of frontier force in this area. It is understood that it was the discovery of these relations with the French which largely contributed to Aga Petros's departure or expulsion from Irak. He went to France, and was—at any rate, until the middle of the Lausanne Conference—living at Marseilles, subsidised by the French Government.

It was the French delegation at Lausanne, and particularly M. Bompard, who did all they could to effect a reconciliation between the British authorities and Aga Petros.

With the breakdown of Aga Petros's scheme, and for the above reasons, he fell out of favour with Sir P. Z. Cox in Bagdad and with the Colonial Office. He has, however, not been daunted, and has returned to the charge again and again both last year and this year with a view to secure support for the scheme, which he at least has not abandoned, of forming an autonomous Assyrian community under British protection. In particular, he was given an extended hearing by the Minorities Sub-Commission during the first phase of the Lausanne Conference. Unfortunately, in the belief (mistaken, but for which there was some technical justification) that he and his people were not going to receive proper treatment either at the hands of the conference or of His Majesty's Government, Aga Petros then opened negotiations with the Turkish delegation without warning the British delegation, with whom he was in close touch. It must be remembered that in doing so he was influenced partly by his failure in obtaining any assistance from His Majesty's Government since the fiasco of 1921, for the full effects of which he was perhaps not entirely responsible, partly by his desire (into which no doubt personal motives entered to some extent) to help his own people, and partly through rather stupid pique at not being received by the Secretary of State and Sir H. Rumbold at Lausanne. That he should seek to secure the best treatment he could for his people from the Turks is both reasonable

and desirable if His Majesty's Government are unwilling or unable to do anything more, despite the general assurances of help which have been given since 1917, when the Assyrians first took sides against the Turks and suffered dispersion and massacre for their decision. Nevertheless, Aga Petros has since repented of his negotiations with the Turks, and, while explaining his motives for approaching them, avers that he still would prefer, on which there appears to be unanimity among his people, among the Nestorian section and among the Persian refugees, to remain under British protection. Such a scheme, or at least adequate protection for as many Christians as possible on the Mosul frontier, will require consideration in the immediate future in view of the opening of the Mosul negotiations. Whatever may be the vices and failings of Aga Petros, he seems to command greater support than the Lady Surma, and is a man who could probably be utilised if properly kept in hand. He is something of an adventurer, and no diplomat or politician, but for the kind of task to which the character of the locality and people will give rise, he seems probably more suited than any other Assyrian leader. But it would, of course, be essential that he should be accompanied and controlled by a political officer who understood him and in whom he had confidence.

II.

The numbers of Assyrian refugees expatriated from their original homes cannot be ascertained. There are probably in the neighbourhood of 15,000 in Russia and in the Caucasus, who have repeatedly applied to all British authorities, in addition to the International Red Cross, for repatriation. In addition to these, batches have been reported in Greece and in Syria. These last are parties from the South Russian groups who succeeded in leaving the Caucasus either at their own expense or in the company of Greek refugees who were being evacuated in the course of this year. Considerable correspondence has passed between His Majesty's High Commissioner in Constantinople, His Majesty's representative in Moscow and the Colonial Office on the subject of the refugees in the Caucasus. The general attitude of the High Commissioner in Bagdad to the repatriation of these refugees was encouraging up till July of this year. Sir P. Cox had been consulted regarding the various schemes suggested for repatriating these people. While he replied that he was in general in favour of such repatriation, it became clear that he was gradually getting more and more opposed to the original decision. On the 7th July he finally wrote to the Colonial Office stating that the news of the signature of a protocol reducing the period of the treaty with Irak to four years had temporarily produced a panic among the Assyrians, who, he reported, would consider the withdrawal of British troops disastrous to their interests and the safeguards which the treaty contained as entirely inadequate. "The question, therefore, whether there is to be an autonomous "Christian buffer State or whether their administration is to be merged in that of "the neighbouring tracts of Irak has for the moment lost interest in their eyes. "Their belief is that they have finally embroiled themselves with Islam by their "attitude during the war, and that if they stay in Asia after the withdrawal of "British troops they will be exterminated"

Throughout the correspondence regarding their repatriation only one thing stands out clearly, and that is the definite refusal on the part of the Irak authorities to bear any expense whatsoever either for the Assyrians who might properly be considered to have had their permanent homes within the boundaries of Irak as well as for those who had originally resided in Turkey and in Persia. The Colonial Office and this Department were equally emphatic on the point, while the Archbishop of Canterbury's fund was totally inadequate to bear the expense of repatriation. Such amounts as the Archbishop of Canterbury could at any time have provided, and on one occasion did provide, would never have amounted to more than a few hundred pounds.

The intervention of the International Red Cross on behalf of some refugees in the Caucasus eventually rendered it possible for a certain number of these, a few hundreds only, to find their way to Syria. Those at Salonica, Athens and near Athens remain completely stranded, the expense of their maintenance being borne by the Greek Government, which can ill afford to look after even its own nationals. This situation led Mr. Bentinck to protest in a vigorous manner against what he considered a most undignified situation for His Majesty's Government, who were morally, and to a certain extent practically, responsible for these people.

In the meanwhile, as a result of the High Commissioner's conclusion, to which he had come during a visit to Mosul, it became apparent that the Irak authorities

not only declined to pay for the expense of repatriation, but were also seeking to prevent their return. The effect of this was an attempt to stop some of the batch which had reached Syria from making their way, even at their own expense, to Mosul. The motives for this have never been stated, but may be attributed to a desire in all young States to secure uniformity of population and avoid responsibility for extraneous elements. The subsequent strife between the Assyrians and Arabs had not then broken out. The High Commissioner's decision was so far rescinded as to allow of those actually on their way to proceed, on the understanding that His Majesty's consular officers would refuse visas to any others who might desire to go. After a certain correspondence, it was decided, at the request of the Colonial Office, to circularise to His Majesty's representatives and consuls instructing them to withhold all visas for the future except to such persons who had been residents within the presumed boundaries of Irak and who had sufficient funds in their possession to support themselves upon arrival, in addition, of course, to the monies which would be required by them for their journey.

We are in consequence now faced with the prospect of several hundred refugees in Europe in the Near East being permanently and completely stranded in addition to many thousands in Russia who are believed to be starving, and who are equally unable to find their way back. As an instance of the confusion and lack of co-ordination which has prevailed in dealing with these refugees may be cited the fate of one party of about 200 whom the acting consul-general at Salonica had despatched on a ship to Egypt provided with sufficient money to find their way by way of Syria to Irak. Owing to a misunderstanding, on arrival in Egypt they were shipped back to Greece at the expense of the Egyptian Government, having wasted the passage money entailed by their first journey. On returning, they were found to be still in possession of sufficient money to have justified their continuing their journey, which, in point of fact, they did by taking another ship to Syria direct, whence they are now on their way on foot to Irak.

It is clear that before anything can be done to solve the question the decision of the High Commissioner for Irak will require to be rescinded in the matter of allowing them to return to the Mosul area. With these people it was impossible to differentiate between those who lived in what is clearly Irak and those whose homes were on the other side of the border. It would be only just to allow them all to return to Irak and settle in that country or move into Turkey if they so desired. It is far from clear whether the temporary panic which prevailed when the news that the treaty with Irak would come to an end in four years' time will ever be a lasting factor or one which would deter refugees who have suffered great privations in the course of the last years from attempting to return to their own country. The second consideration which arises is that of money, and it is more difficult to solve, but one thing is clear—that it is both undignified and worse than inconsiderate to allow these persons to be completely stranded all over the Near East for the sole offence of having fought on the side of the Allies, and having then migrated elsewhere.

The question of their expatriation to Canada or Australia arose when the panic referred to seized the Assyrians in Irak in the course of this summer. Apart from the question of expense, which alone would have rendered such a scheme impossible, it is understood that the Australian and Canadian authorities would not consent to receive these people. Latterly the Colonial Office have suggested that they might be expatriated *en masse* and settled in Albania, the Argentine or Mexico, but, with the exception of one mention of the latter country, where four or five Assyrians desired to go on the grounds that they had relatives who would provide for them, there is no trace in the voluminous correspondence of any previous suggestion either that the refugees desire to settle in Latin America nor yet that those countries would be willing to receive them.

III.

The ultimate disposal both of the refugees and of the Assyrians who are still living in and north of Irak is a matter of some difficulty. The genesis of the suggestion that they should be expatriated to Australia or to some British colony apparently occurred, as has been stated, in July last, when the Assyrians in Irak became nervous of their fate at the end of the period of validity of the treaty with Irak. It has been impossible to ascertain whether such a scheme was proposed after mature consideration or whether it was an inspiration of the moment. The expatriation of a mass of people in this manner presents certain aspects which appear to have been disregarded. It has been explained that the difficulty of dealing with the refugees is the lack of funds; *à fortiori* it is out of the question to expatriate a

nation from its home to foreign countries on the grounds that the people were suffering from perhaps only temporary, and probably quite unjustifiable, nervousness as to their ultimate fate. British colonies are not anxious to receive a large native element of this description. There is no more reason to suppose that either Albania, Argentine or Mexico would hold different views. The willingness of the people themselves to leave when the time came is more than doubtful as they seem to have displayed in the past a singular attachment to their own country. While the difficulties from the practical point of view appear to be insuperable, the political considerations are, if anything, even more weighty. One of the principal grounds for our demands from Turkey in regard to the settlement of the Mosul frontier reposes upon the presence of Christians in the area which we desire shall be brought within the frontiers of Irak. To expatriate them is a contradiction of our policy and deprives us of the principal argument which we would use in forthcoming negotiations. Rather would it be logical to hasten the repatriation of the refugees from abroad in order to increase the numbers present than to diminish them in the manner suggested by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak. There is one other argument of practical importance in the almost universal consensus of opinion in Irak that the Assyrians provide the best fighting material in the country. The Assyrian levies have done good service for the Irak Government, probably better than any other personnel among the local military forces in that country. They are stated to be a manly and virile race, amenable to discipline and good leadership and likely to provide a factor on which a constitutional Government that treated them properly could rely in almost any eventuality except that contemplated in dispossessing them of their homes. To deprive the Irak Government, whatever may be their momentary feelings on the subject, of so valuable an ally would materially weaken the position of that Government.

That there is ill-feeling originating from jealousy between the Arab and the Assyrian element in Mosul Province is undeniable, and it found effect in a recent riot in which the Assyrian levies at Mosul were involved. The feeling of an Arab Government of annoyance at the presence of non-Arab people in its administrative sphere is natural at the present stage, but it is equally the responsibility of a Government which Great Britain has set up to take thought for minorities of other races within its borders. The ideal solution to which efforts should be directed appears, in the first place, to secure the repatriation to Northern Irak of all the Assyrian refugees at present in Russia and in the Near East. Having secured a large Christian element of a distinctly favourable type, the question of their ultimate administration arises, and, so far, no more practical solution than that of incorporation in an autonomous State under British protection, which would attract the totality of the Nestorian and Assyro-Chaldean elements in the inner parts of Anatolia, Persia and Irak, has been proposed. It is difficult to see the theoretical objections to Aga Petros's scheme provided it were carried out under proper supervision and under the control of a British official or officials, who would have sufficient influence both over the leaders and over the people to ensure its success. The financial difficulty might, it is tentatively suggested, be overcome by gradual work and infiltration in stages rather than by the formation of armies and jejune expeditions under extravagant schemes such as failed in 1921.

Foreign Office, October 11, 1923.

[**E 10036/5545/44**] No. 13.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 307.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 12, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 490 of the 7th October: Seizure by municipality of Galata bridge tolls.

Your action is approved. You should give such vigorous support as may be possible to protest lodged by the National Bank of Turkey against breach of contract.

No. 14.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 495.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 12, 1923.

FOLLOWING from military attaché for War Office:—

"My French colleague informs me that reports from reliable source state that train exclusively loaded with artillery passed through Konia country 6th October coming from Afion Kara Hissar, destination Eljezireh front.

"Another report says that artillery of 14th division recently disbanded is being sent to Diarbekir. This report presumably refers to the same movement in another French report saying that 14th cavalry division recently at Djihan, on Syrian front, has moved to [group undecypherable]a with regiments at Urf, Orterek, Viran, Chehir and Aintab.

"French report general indications of an important movement of troops, material and irregular cavalry towards Eljezireh front.

No. 15.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 496.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 13, 1923.

FOLLOWING from military attaché for War Office:—

"Greek and Turkish papers have commenced publication of what is claimed to be and has, I fear, every appearance of being genuine reproduction of General Harington's general despatch covering period of his command here. Nothing can be done to stop publication here, nor can *démenti* regarding genuineness of document well be issued in the absence of proof to that effect."

[**E 10148/9922/44**] No. 16.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 639.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 9, 1923.

AS I have reported in other despatches, the Turkish authorities have converted the Greek Patriarchate into a Turkish Orthodox institution, have again seized the Galata Bridge tolls, and have taken over the docks and arsenal from the representatives of Armstrong and Vickers, and the Haidar Pasha–Guebze branch of the railway from the Anatolian Railway Company. Chauvinism is rampant, and its object is to turkify everything. I should not be surprised if the next step was an attempt to take over the Administration of the Public Debt, which has been the subject of much recent criticism in the press. The "dry" régime was imposed on Constantinople without any previous warning as from yesterday morning. The Turks are in fact determined to show to the world and to prove to themselves that they are, after five years of an Allied occupation, masters once more in their own house, that Islam has triumphed over Christianity, and that Constantinople is for the Turks and not for the foreigners.

2. The "Tanin" published a few days ago a list of measures the application of which had hitherto been suspended, but which would now be enforced in Constantinople. Some of these, such as the deportation into the interior of all Turkish women who during the armistice period have had relations with foreigners, are likely to remain a dead letter. Others, such as the trial of persons for political offences committed during the same period, are contrary to the Lausanne Treaty. Others again, such as the "dry" régime, have come into force since the publication by the "Tanin."

3. The list of the remainder, some of which have already been partially applied, is illuminating. They are as follows:—

(1.) All notices and signs in a foreign language will be removed by the police.
(2.) Turkish is to be exclusively used for all advertisements, prospectus, programmes, bills of theatres, cinemas, &c.

(3.) The regulations respecting the flying of foreign flags by private persons and establishments are to be rigorously enforced.
(4.) All foreigners who have not yet obtained their "permits de séjour" are to be prosecuted.
(5.) Non-Turkish employees in any concessionary companies are to be dismissed and replaced by Turks. Companies which do not conform to this regulation will be severely dealt with.
(6.) All newspapers which have been anti-Nationalist during the armistice period are to be suppressed.
(7.) The regulations respecting the control of non-Moslem schools are to be rigorously enforced.
(8.) The Greeks of Constantinople will be subject to reprisals if the persecution of Moslems in Western Thrace is not stopped.
(9.) Immediate application in general to Constantinople of all regulations arising out of the new form of Government.

4. Although it is not in the "Tanin" list, Friday closing is another measure which is likely shortly to be put into full force by law. There are variations also, and more irksome ones, of the Turkish language regulations. The Turks will probably invent other measures of a similar nature. It is for them a novel game, and their zeal for it is very great and their sense of proportion correspondingly small. Some of their new rules are those in force in other countries, and are comparatively harmless if not pushed to excess. Others, it is true, are illogical and absurd, and will have to be ultimately reversed if conditions here are to be rendered supportable. All will afford a rich harvest of "backsheesh" for the functionary and the policeman, and are consequently very popular with those whose opportunity it is to see to their enforcement.

5. Undoubtedly for some time everything will be chaotic; but the habits of centuries will eventually reassert themselves, perhaps even too quickly and thoroughly for those who would like to see Turkey really work out her own salvation. Things will then find their own level. For the moment the less the Turk is thwarted in matters of comparative unimportance the sooner will he tire of his new game, much of the zest for which comes from the fact that it has hitherto been forbidden. At present the situation may be likened to a champagne bottle the cork of which has just been drawn. For the moment it is frothing over, but in a little while it will subside and become flat.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10152/9922/44] No. 17.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 15.)

(No. 645.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 10, 1923.

A WEEK has elapsed since the departure of the last of the Allied troops from Constantinople, and the gloomy forebodings of those who prophesied immediate disorders and persecutions have so far fortunately not been realised. For the moment, at any rate, the command has clearly gone forth that order is to be maintained.

2. On the other hand, however, anticipating by one day their freedom from the verbal undertaking in respect of articles contrary to the prestige of the occupying forces, given to me by Refet Pasha on the abolition of the Allied press censorship nearly a year ago, and on the whole, until then, loyally observed, the Turkish newspapers on the 2nd October greeted the day of liberation with a flood of vituperative and malevolent articles directed against the behaviour of the Allied troops, and especially the British, during the period of occupation.

3. The Greek press also distinguished itself by outvying the Turkish in the bitterness of its attacks on the Allies. The Allied Police Commission was selected as the chief target for abuse, while certain British officers were accused by name of having enriched themselves at the expense of the unfortunate Christian population whom they had professed to protect. The proprietors of these journals doubtless hoped in this manner to ingratiate themselves with their new Turkish masters, but I doubt whether this servile subservience, much of which has recently been seen and heard in Constantinople, is calculated to profit them much.

4. These attacks continued for two or three days, but, having relieved itself of its bile, the attention of the press was soon diverted to another subject. The Anatolian army had at last commenced its march on Constantinople and all efforts were directed towards according it a fitting reception. Tenants of shops and private houses were ordered to have their premises beflagged and forced contributions were levied on shopkeepers for the decoration of the main streets. Triumphal arches were erected at frequent intervals, the Turkish star and crescent were everywhere in evidence, and tent poles, recently purchased from the British military authorities, were employed for the purpose of supporting chains of greenery and flowers along the line of the procession.

5. The entry of the troops into the city has been described by Colonel Baird in the report enclosed in my despatch No. 644 of the 9th instant. In spite of the hurricanes of apprehension on the part of the Christian population, it passed off without incident. Even in the evening, when accidents might have been expected to happen, excellent order was maintained, though there were a certain number of cases of European headgear having been forcibly removed. The French first dragoman was a victim in this respect. As, however, the majority of the male Christian population had either provided themselves with fezzes or preferred to remain peacefully at home, such incidents were reduced to a minimum and the police behaved well. I am not aware of any British subject having been molested.

6. The various organs of the local press naturally seized this opportunity to surpass one another in fulsome glorification of the Turkish army. The event was universally hailed as the second Turkish conquest of Constantinople and its significance stated to be incomparably greater than the earlier one of 1453, in that it had been accomplished in spite of opposition far superior to that with which Mahomed II had to deal. "Inside the country," wrote the "Vatan," "the army had to face the enmity of the "Sultan, the Grand Vizier and the Cabinet, while outside was a Great Power famous "for its supremacy on the seas and many other Powers besides." The pan-Islamic and xenophobe "Tevhid-i-Efkiar" regarded the new conquest as a victory of the Crescent over the Cross and, profiting from the Greek press articles already referred to, drew attention to the fact that the Christians were cursing their so-called protectors of yesterday. "Is not the abandonment of the Christian elements in our hands by Europe," asked the "Tevhid," "a convincing proof that the Cross has bowed before "the Crescent?"

7. The triumphal march of the army, the administrative and other measures with which I have dealt in my despatch No. 639, the passage through Constantinople *en route* for Salonica of the Turkish delegates charged with the execution of the convention for the exchange of populations, and the calling to the colours of the recruits of the 1898–1902 classes, have fully occupied the attention of the Constantinople authorities during the past week. They were, however, guilty of at least one serious oversight. This arose in connection with the arrival of the delegation consisting of fourteen Deputies sent by the Angora Assembly to represent it at the Constantinople celebrations. For some reason the local authorities had assumed that the delegation would arrive by ship in the company of Shukri Naili Pasha, with the result that nobody was present to greet the Deputies on their arrival at Haidar Pasha station. As the delegation had been directly invited by the local Defence of Right Committee, and as, even during the events of Saturday, the Deputies were not accorded the precedence and attention which they regarded as their due, their treatment has created something of a sensation at Angora The sovereignty and majesty of the people as vested in the Grand National Assembly was regarded as outraged, and a motion supported by forty signatures was submitted to the Assembly on the 8th instant, demanding that punishment be meted out to the responsible officials. As this interpellation was not accepted by the President, the forty Deputies withdrew, and the sitting had to be adjourned for lack of a quorum. Later, however, eighty other Deputies having joined in supporting the motion, the discussion was resumed and a heated debate ensued. The attack itself was principally directed against Haidar Bey, vali and acting prefect of Constantinople. The latter found, however, a warm advocate in the President of the Council, and the discussion was ultimately adjourned on an assurance being given that an immediate and searching enquiry would be made into the cause of, and motives for, the lack of respect shown to the delegation. The incident is of interest as illustrating the sensitiveness of the Assembly in regard to its own importance and as not likely to diminish the hostility between Constantinople and Angora.

8. The latter is still labouring in its efforts to produce a new constitutional charter. The Republican issue and the question of the capital have been the subject of continued

discussion by the People's party. As soon as the final scheme is evolved it will be submitted to and discussed by the Grand National Assembly in a plenary session. The decision of the Assembly will be final. There can be little doubt that it will be in the sense that Turkey is a republic and that its capital is at Angora. Mustafa Kemal will, of course, be proclaimed its first President. All that remains in doubt is the attributions of the President and the special régime, if any, to be conferred on Constantinople.

9. The situation in the Smyrna hinterland has considerably improved, as is evident from the fact that Fethi Bey, when questioned regarding the continuance of martial law in the vilayet of Aidin, was able to announce that, as a result of the energetic measures taken and of the capture of Hodja Mustafa, the leading bandit, the Government has been able to raise the state of siege in that district. Nevertheless, brigandage has not yet been stamped out, and the Government has asked for power to deal with it in a draft law which is at present under the consideration of the Assembly.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[**E 10126/95/65**] No. 18.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 15.)

(No. 2362.)
My Lord, *Paris, October* 13, 1923.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 3218 of the 9th October, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I instructed a member of my staff to make discreet enquiries of M. Bargeton, of the Département d'Asie at the Quai d'Orsay, relative to reconstruction work on the Osmanieh-Nisibin Railway.

M. Bargeton stated that the French group, which had been formed under the Tripartite Agreement to work the former Bagdad Railway in so far as the latter is under French control, had started a company entitled "Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de Cilicie et Nord Syrie," with a capital of 1,000,000 fr., for the purpose of working temporarily the railway in Cilicia and Northern Syria. The Turkish Government had, however, threatened to remove the railway from the control of this company if repairs were not executed and the line were not put in proper working order, for which purpose that Government advanced certain sums of money. The line is understood to be in working order from Aleppo to Mersina, and the Turkish Government are reported to be pressing the company to repair the bridge over the Euphrates at Djerabulus in order that the line between Nisibin and Aleppo should be available for traffic. The French company has objected that they have insufficient capital, and the Turkish Government are stated to be threatening to take the line out of the control of the company if this section is not repaired.

M. Bargeton stated that the present position as regards the working of the Bagdad Railway seems to the French Government highly unsatisfactory, as the line cannot be put into proper working order and no large sums of capital can be expended thereon until the whole question of the control of the railway lines in Asia Minor is definitely settled between the three principal Allied Powers. The French company at present controlling the Bagdad Railway in Cilicia and Northern Syria are between the devil and the deep sea, as, on the one hand, they do not desire to give the Turkish Government an excuse to take over the railway, whilst, on the other hand, they cannot expend large sums thereon pending definite settlement of the status and control of the whole of the Bagdad Railway. M. Bargeton added that it is vital for the existence of Aleppo that the railway lines to the north-east and north-west of that town should be properly repaired, as, without the use of these lines and with the present continual obstructions to traffic on the part of the Turkish frontier authorities, the trade of that city is steadily dying.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

[**E 10210/95/65**] No. 19.

Acting Consul-General Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 132. Secret.)
My Lord, *Beirout, October* 3, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a secret report received from the British liaison officer at Beirout regarding the Bagdad Railway.

I have the honour to enclose a copy for His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople, as, since the evacuation, the British liaison officer sends no reports to Constantinople.

I presume that, as the post in Turkey is now in Turkish hands, it would be unwise to entrust to the ordinary post any confidential matter destined for Constantinople. I have, therefore, the honour to enquire whether in future the usual copies of my confidential despatches to your Lordship should be sent to Constantinople viâ Cairo or London, for despatch thence by safe opportunity.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

Enclosure in No. 19.

Report by British Liaison Officer, Beirout, on the Bagdad Railway.

(Secret.)

THE latest reliable reports which have been received concerning the Bagdad Railway are as follows:—

(*a.*) The line is now working from Adana to Alexandretta and from Adana to Islahie.

(*b.*) Great activity is being carried on in both the French and Turkish zones south of Islahie in order to have the line repaired through to Aleppo.

(c.) In an interview which I had with the French officer who has been detached to the railways as manager of that part of the Bagdad Railway now being worked by the French company, "Chemin de Fer de Cilicie et Nord Syrie," on the 1st July, he told me that he hoped to have the railway through between Adana and Aleppo by the second week of this month (September). I now learn, however, that there are still two bridges to be repaired before the section of the line is through, between Islahie and Katma. They are (1) the steel bridge at Eredere [?] and (2) the masonry bridge over the Afrin Su. It is hoped to complete these two bridges in the course of the next few weeks.

(*d.*) The above-mentioned officer also told me that as soon as peace with the Turks was signed and ratified he would proceed with the repairs to the blown-up railway bridge over the Euphrates at Jerablus. He expected to be able to erect temporary wooden structures within four months of commencing work on the repairs, and then to put in two new steel spans at his leisure, after the line was working again. He also stated that within a month of the bridge being repaired he would have the line working as far east as Nisibin, as the repairs to the permanent way east of Jerablus should not take more than a month to effect.

(*e.*) Complications with the repairs to Jerablus bridge have, however, set in. According to the arrangements concluded in the Angora accord of 1921, M. Franklin-Bouillon agreed that, although a French company should have the working of this railway, the permanent way should be considered Turkish, *i.e.*, on Turkish soil. Consequently, when the other day the French brought up a detachment of military engineers to commence work on the bridge, the Turkish authorities refused to allow them to proceed on the grounds that, as the permanent way was Turkish, it would be against international law for French military troops to be working on or under Turkish territory. Result: the French are once again regretting the

meddling of Franklin-Bouillon in Franco-Turkish affairs, and are suffering from still another of those "pin-prick" rebuffs which the Turk nowadays seems to persist in heaping on the French.

It is hoped that a way out of the present *impasse* will soon be found.

I enclose herewith a copy of a photograph taken this year showing the present condition of the Jerablus bridge.*

D. McCALLUM, *Major*,
British Liaison Officer.

French Army of the Levant, Beirout, Syria,
September 27, 1923.

[E 10092/1482/44] No. 20.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquis della Torretta.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1923.

IN your note of the 9th June you informed me that a British group—comprising Messrs. Rothschild and Sons, Schroeder and Sons, the National Provincial and Union Bank of England, the Westminster Bank (Limited) and Lloyd's Bank (Limited)—which has recently acquired the Bank of Zurich's holding in the Anatolian Railway, the Haidar Port and the Mersina–Adana Railway, had offered to discuss with French and Italian groups participation in these undertakings on the basis of 12½ per cent. each, while reserving 52½ per cent. as the British share; your Excellency added that the scheme communicated by the British group conceded certain rights to German interests, and was unsatisfactory to the Italian Government as being contrary to the fundamental principle of equality of participation incorporated in previous treaties and conventions regarding Anatolia.

2. Your letter has been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, who find, to their regret, that they are unable either to accept its premises or, consequently, to accede to the request which is based upon them.

3. Firstly, as regards the rights said to have been conceded to German interests by the British group's proposals, I can only assume that there must be some misapprehension, since I am assured by the latter that an important object and result of their purchase has been the effective elimination of German control from the undertakings in question.

4. I am unable to agree with you that all treaty and other negotiations concerning Anatolia since the armistice have assumed or accepted Allied equality of participation as a fundamental principle. Even the Tripartite Agreement, which, together with the Treaty of Sèvres and the Accord particulier, is now a dead letter, did not provide for equality of participation of the three allied groups in the proposed company which was to exploit the Anatolian, Bagdad and Mersina-Adana Railways, but, on the contrary, allotted a definite proportion of shares to the French group in consideration of its pre-war holding in the Bagdad Railway, the remainder only to be subject to equal participation.

5. As regards the Lausanne negotiations, you will, I think, admit that it was never intended to secure under the treaty equal Allied participation in the railways in Asia Minor formerly controlled by the Germans. Article 95 of the original draft, which was not included in the final treaty, was based on the hypothesis that the Turkish Government would seek to nationalise the Anatolian railways, and consequently that Allied interests would be involved in their exploitation only, as distinct from their ownership. But the article in question does not appear to have contemplated equal Allied participation in the exploiting company, nor does the treaty itself contain any provision as to the future participation of Allied capital in Turkish transport undertakings.

6. His Majesty's Government do not consider that they are under any obligation, contractual or moral, to urge the British group to assure to the Italian group equal participation in the interest in Anatolian undertakings which they have acquired on their own initiative. You will recall that, in my note of the 12th March last on the subject of the Italian-French Agreement, I informed you that "it is the established "practice of His Majesty's Government to allow British financial and industrial firms

* Not enclosed.

"and groups complete freedom to make their own combinations and arrangements and "to choose their own spheres of activity," and there appears to be no obligation of principle in the present case that would require a departure from this practice.

7. I have, however, intimated to the British group that His Majesty's Government expect them to assure equitable participation in their enterprise to the allied groups, and I trust that the Italian group will be encouraged to open negotiations at an early date and that the negotiations will result in an arrangement satisfactory alike to the Italian group and to your Government.

I have, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[P 1367/1/150] No. 21.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 899.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1923.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 600 of the 26th September relative to the arrangements for the reception and distribution of British official wireless messages in Constantinople.

2. It is satisfactory that there is a likelihood of continuing the distribution of this news for the time being, but it is desirable that in the interval before the final withdrawal of British warships from Turkish waters the question should be examined as to whether some definite arrangement could not be arrived at for maintaining the distribution of British news to the Turkish press under normal conditions.

3. The question of subsidising Reuters in the same way as the French Government subsidises Havas is not a practicable method. You are doubtless aware that the Havas Agency receives a large general subsidy from the French Government, and that it has an arrangement with Reuters Agency whereby the distribution of all news in Constantinople is reserved to itself. This alone appears to rule out the possibility of British distribution of British news in Turkey, and even if in some way this objection could be overcome there would still remain two other important obstacles, namely, the impossibility of securing the concurrence of the Treasury in the large expenditure which would be inevitably entailed and the extreme difficulty of setting up any official control, either of the kind of news sent or of the manner of its distribution.

4. It follows that if, in your opinion, the supply of impartial British news to the Turkish press is desirable, attention must primarily be directed to the wireless service compiled in this Department, and the problem resolves itself into securing effective distribution for these messages. There would, I think, be no difficulty of principle in authorising your suggestion to instal a receiving wireless set on the roof of His Majesty's Embassy in Constantinople, provided this were permitted by the Turkish authorities. The possible counter-demand by the Turkish Government for erecting a wireless receiving set on their Embassy in London would not entail serious consequences and the matter, therefore, becomes mainly one of cost I should be glad, therefore, if you would ascertain what would be the probable cost of installing a wireless receiving set capable of receiving Leafield wireless efficiently; further, what, in your judgment, would be the maximum annual expenditure in connection with the employment of the two wireless operators necessary to the working of the apparatus.

5. There is one further suggestion on which I should like to invite your opinion, namely, that British commercial or financial organisations in Constantinople, such as the Chamber of Commerce or the banks, might themselves, in view of the commercial value of unbiassed British news in the Turkish press, arrange for the reception and distribution of the messages. I am aware that this course may easily prove to be impracticable, and even open to certain objections. It would, however, be useful if the views of prominent members of the British financial and commercial community in Constantinople could be ascertained, both in regard to this suggestion and to the question of the value of British official wireless news in general.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 10146/7734/44] No. 22.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 315.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1923.

YOUR despatch No. 637.

We prefer that you should continue to be called Acting High Commissioner. If this is impossible "representative of His Majesty's Government" would be better than designation proposed. Of course your diplomatic privileges must be preserved.

If Turkish Government send a consul here he will be allowed to use cyphers and communicate direct with Foreign Office, but he cannot receive diplomatic privilege.

Mustafa Reshid, who used to be here, had no official designation or position. He enjoyed above-mentioned rights and by courtesy was granted certain diplomatic privileges. We could do the same for any representative Turkish Government may now send.

[E 10276/7862/44] No. 23.

Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck to Mr. Forbes Adam.—(Received October 18.)

My dear Forbes Adam, *Paris, October* 17, 1923.

I REGRET that, owing to an oversight, the enclosure was omitted from our despatch No. 2378 of the 13th October regarding the Inter-Allied Turkish Reparation Convention. I transmit this enclosure herewith.

Waley has written to me that he is very anxious to obtain a copy of this draft convention for translation with a view to presentation to Parliament in due course, so would you send him a copy if you wish him to make this translation?

Yours ever,
V. C. BENTINCK

Enclosure 1 in No. 23.

M. Poincaré to the Marquess of Crewe.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 11 octobre* 1923.

L'AMBASSADEUR de la République à Londres m'a transmis, dans la forme où il a reçu l'adhésion des Gouvernements britannique et italien, le projet de convention relative à la réparation des dommages subis en Turquie par les ressortissants alliés.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français donne également son adhésion à ce projet. Le texte ci-joint a été adressé par mes soins aux représentants à Paris du Japon et de la Roumanie, dont l'attention a été appelée sur la nécessité d'aboutir le plus tôt possible à la conclusion de cette convention.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
R. POINCARÉ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23.

Convention relative à l'Évaluation et à la Réparation des Dommages subis en Turquie par les Ressortissants des Gouvernements alliés autres que la Grèce.

L'EMPIRE britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon et la Roumanie,

Désireux d'affecter à la réparation des dommages subis par leurs ressortissants les sommes rendues disponibles en vertu du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie signé à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923,

Ont résolu de conclure une convention à cette fin et ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Les Puissances contractantes conviennent d'affecter en commun à la réparation des dommages subis par leurs ressortissants :

1. Les sommes en or visées à l'article 58 du Traité de Lausanne.
2. Les Bons du Trésor 5 pour cent 1911, du montant nominal de 846,100 livres sterling, que le Gouvernement britannique consent à affecter à la réparation desdits dommages.

Ce fonds sera administré par la commission prévue à l'article 2 de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 2.

Une commission dénommée "Commission d'Évaluation" sera instituée dans un délai d'un mois après la mise en vigueur du traité avec la Turquie pour évaluer les dommages subis par les ressortissants des Gouvernements alliés (autres que la Grèce) tels qu'ils sont définis ci-dessous.

ARTICLE 3.

Cette commission se composera de trois membres, nommés respectivement par les Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie. Dans le cas où le dommage intéresserait un ressortissant d'un autre Gouvernement signataire, il serait adjoint à la commission pour l'évaluation de ce dommage un membre additionnel nommé par ce Gouvernement. En cas d'égalité de voix, celle du président sera prépondérante.

ARTICLE 4.

La commission établira sa procédure dans les termes assurant le prompt règlement des dommages.

La présidence sera tenue successivement par les représentants de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie.

Les décisions seront prises à la majorité des voix.

Les décisions de la commission seront sans appel.

Le budget de la commission et de son personnel sera soumis à l'approbation des Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie.

Les dépenses de la commission seront prélevées sur le fonds de réparations.

ARTICLE 5.

Les demandes des intéressés devront être introduites dans le délai d'une année à dater de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Lausanne.

ARTICLE 6.

1. La commission devra évaluer et indemniser, dans les conditions prévues à la présente convention, les dommages ci-après définis :

(*a.*) Les dommages directs (autres que ceux visés au paragraphe 2 de cet article) subis sur les territoires qui étaient ottomans au 1er août 1914 ou sur mer par les ressortissants des Gouvernements signataires de cette convention, dans leurs personnes ou dans leurs biens, pendant la période comprise entre le 1er août 1914 et la mise en vigueur du traité avec la Turquie, par suite de tout acte ou négligence du Gouvernement turc, y compris les dommages résultant de mesures de réquisition, de séquestre ou de confiscation, ainsi que les dommages directs subis sur les mêmes territoires par lesdits ressortissants pendant la même période par suite de tous faits de guerre quel qu'en soit l'auteur.

(*b.*) Les dommages directs causés par l'incendie de Smyrne aux biens et propriétés des ressortissants des Gouvernements signataires.

La commission aura pouvoir de déduire de l'indemnité attribuée à ce titre les sommes que le réclamant aurait obtenues par ailleurs ; elle aura également pouvoir d'écarter les réclamations au cas où elle estime que le réclamant n'a pas fait toute diligence utile pour obtenir une indemnité à laquelle il aurait eu droit par d'autres voies.

(*c.*) Les dommages visés aux alinéas (*a*) et (*b*) qui ont été subis par les protégés des Gouvernements signataires dont la patente de protection ressort à une date antérieure au 1er août 1914.

(*d.*) Les dommages visés aux alinéas (*a*) et (*b*) qui ont été subis sur les territoires restés turcs à la date de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Lausanne par les sociétés ottomanes dans lesquelles les ressortissants des Puissances signataires avaient un intérêt prépondérant au 1er août 1914.

2. La commission tiendra compte des avantages d'ordre économique accordés à ces sociétés par le Gouvernement turc en raison des dommages subis par elles. La valeur desdits avantages devra être évaluée en espèces et sera déduite du montant revenant aux sociétés en vertu de la présente convention. En aucun cas la totalité des indemnités à payer à ces sociétés ne pourra excéder la valeur nominale des bons du Trésor visés au paragraphe 2 de l'article 1er.

Seront hors de la compétence de la commission et non indemnisés par elles :

(*a.*) Les dommages indirects, y compris la privation de jouissance et le manque à gagner.

(*b.*) Les réclamations relatives aux sommes à payer par le Gouvernement hellénique en vertu de la convention, en date du 24 juillet 1923, réglant le remboursement des dettes résultant des actes par des autorités helléniques en Turquie.

(*c.*) Les réclamations des sociétés concessionnaires, à raison de l'utilisation par le Gouvernement turc de leur propriété ou de leurs services, qui devront être réglés par ledit Gouvernement en vertu du protocole relatif à certaines concessions accordées dans l'Empire ottoman, du 24 juillet 1923, et de la déclaration y annexée, ou en vertu des arrangements intervenus entre le Gouvernement turc et lesdites sociétés.

ARTICLE 7.

La commission distribuera le fonds de réparation aux intéressés proportionnellement à la valeur des dommages subis par eux. Les indemnités accordés par la commission seront versées aux intéressés par l'entremise de celui des Gouvernements alliés dont ils sont les ressortissants.

ARTICLE 8.

La présente convention sera ratifiée.

Les ratifications en seront déposées à Paris en même temps que les ratifications du Traité de Lausanne.

Elle entrera en vigueur pour chaque Puissance contractante en même temps que ledit Traité de Paix.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente convention.

Fait à Paris en un seul exemplaire, qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française, qui en délivrera des expéditions authentiques à chacune des Puissances signataires.

[**E 10368/199/44**] No. 24.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October 22.*)

(No. 663.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 17, 1923.

THE outstanding event of the past week has been the acceptance by the Grand National Assembly of a motion submitted by Ismet Pasha for the inclusion in the Constitutional Charter of a special clause fixing Angora as the seat of the Government of the new Turkey. After having been fully discussed in committee and at secret party meetings, the draft clause was finally submitted at a plenary session of the Assembly on the 13th instant. Few voices were raised in favour of Constantinople, and the speakers who did so were subjected to frequent interruption. The debate was therefore brought to a speedy conclusion, and, though some twenty Deputies abstained from voting, the motion was accepted by a large majority. It may, however, be noted as one more proof of the control still exercised by Mustafa Kemal over the present Assembly, that at the close of the sitting one of the Deputies who had declared himself opposed to

the return of the capital to Constantinople is reported in the press as having announced that at heart everyone was in favour of the former capital, but that they had to conform to the decision taken at the secret party meeting.

2. The Assembly's decision was greeted with scenes of great rejoicing in the new capital. The town was beflagged, and torchlight processions took place. In honour of the occasion the 15th October has been created a public holiday and is to be known as "Angora Day." In Constantinople, on the other hand, the decision is not regarded as final since the Constitutional Charter as a whole has still to be submitted to and accepted by the Assembly.

3. Although undoubtedly growing bolder, the Opposition groups are, however, still walking with considerable wariness. Reouf Bey, around whom so much interest and mystery centres, has arrived in Constantinople from Smyrna, and is at present the guest of Refet Pasha. Both are stated to be closely watched by Government agents. Nevertheless, Reouf is reported to be about to proceed to Angora, and since his arrival here has been received by the leading officials. He has abstained from making any public declaration, and no reliable estimate can yet be formed as to the rôle which he may play in the future.

4. Rumour continues to play with the idea of co-operation between Mustafa Kemal and the remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress, with whom Reouf is supposed to be closely in touch. Much interest has been aroused in this connection by an article published some days ago in the Angora newspaper "Yeni Gyun," from the pen of Yunus Nadi Bey, stating that no difference exists between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Popular party, and that Mustafa Kemal is the greatest and the leader of the Unionists. This article, which was possibly nothing more than a *ballon d'essai*, has, if so, achieved its object, as it has been taken up by the entire Turkish political world. The reception accorded to it by the local press has of course varied according to the particular complexion of each newspaper, but in general the comments tend to demonstrate that a reconciliation is regarded by both parties as a very remote possibility. Indeed, the general secretary of the Popular party in Constantinople went so far as to state publicly that, if Mustafa Kemal was in fact a Unionist, he would at once completely sever his connection with the Popular party.

5. Meanwhile, as a result of the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by both Greece and Turkey, diplomatic relations are about to be re-established between the two countries. This will be done by means of Chargés d'Affaires, but it is announced that as the Greek Government have expressed the desire that their representative should reside at Constantinople, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires will establish himself at Salonica.

6. The resumption of direct diplomatic relations will facilitate the arrangements for the exchange of the Greek and Moslem populations of Turkey and Greece. This operation actually commenced with the despatch, on the 14th instant, from Mitylene to Aivali of 1,000 Moslems, and with the release yesterday from Constantinople of ships which had arrived here some days ago from the Black Sea ports with some 3,000 Greek refugees on board. The transfer is being effected under the supervision of the international commission appointed for the purpose, assisted by the personnel of the American Near East Relief Commission.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[**E 10370/199/44**] No. 25.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 22.)

(No. 665.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 17, 1923.

THE Bill, presented by Ismet Pasha and eleven other Deputies, and dated the 9th October, to the effect that the town of Angora was the administrative capital of the Turkish State was discussed in the Grand National Assembly on the 14th October. In the preamble it was stated that the application of the protocol of evacuation annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne having been completed, Turkey had been entirely freed from foreign occupation. The position of Constantinople as the seat of the Moslem Caliphate and one of the most precious possessions of the Turks would be eternally preserved, and would remain under the exclusive protection of the Turkish

nation. On the other hand, the time had now come for the Grand National Assembly to decide on the seat of the Administration of the Turkish State. Reasons resulting from the clauses in the Treaty of Peace relating to the Straits and based on past experience necessitated the establishment of Turkey's administrative centre in Anatolia and in the town of Angora.

2. Zeki Bey, Deputy of Gumush-khaneh, who urged the superior claims of Constantinople to be the capital, met with considerable interruption. He was followed by Jelal Nuri Bey, Deputy of Gallipoli, who stated that the course of events had marked out Angora as capital of the Turkish Free State. After the armistice, Constantinople was unable to save Anatolia. It was the movement from Constantinople to the eastern portions of the country which gradually resulted in Angora becoming the capital. He reminded the Assembly of Mr. Lloyd George's statement in the House of Commons at the end of 1918 to the effect that "a Turkish capital under "the guns of His Majesty's dreadnoughts is better than a Government which has with-"drawn to the Taurus Mountains." This statement was, according to Jelal Nuri, most important, for the one thing desired by their enemies was a Turkish capital within range of their guns. The situation of Constantinople from a military point of view excluded it from being the capital of the Turkish Free State. It was in the interest of the State and of the nation that they should govern from Angora. They must resist and endure the mud of Angora in winter and its dust in summer in order to work for the welfare of Anatolia. Jelal Nuri Bey continued that, with Constantinople as capital, little thought was given to Anatolia, and instanced the construction of railways, not to meet local requirements, but as a result of Anglo-German relations. With Angora as capital there would be no panic as to the passage of an enemy through the Straits. From the economic point of view there was no need for the chief centre of trade of a country to be the capital; for example, Washington, and not New York, was the capital of America. The interests of Constantinople, which had a great transit trade, would, however, not be neglected, and a Bill was being drafted to that end. Jelal Nuri Bey concluded by stating that Constantinople had been the capital of the International Ottoman Empire, while Angora was the capital of a free State, and asked the Assembly to accept the Bill, which, as I have elsewhere reported to your Lordship, it did by a large majority of votes.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[**E 10353/7862/44**]

No. 26.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 22.)

PAR une communication en date du 17 septembre dernier, Sir William Tyrrell aviat bien voulu adresser à M. de Montille un mémorandum et le projet de convention concernant les réparations turques.

Le projet en question et les suggestions contenues dans la note du Gouvernement britannique, aussitôt transmis à Paris, ont été approuvés par le Gouvernement français.

M. Poincaré s'est empressé de communiquer le projet de la convention aux représentants roumain et japonais à Paris, en vue d'obtenir la signature de leurs Gouvernements respectifs dans le plus bref délai possible.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit,&c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 20 *octobre* 1923.

No. 27.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (*Paris*) (*by bag*), *No.* 358; *and to Sir R. Graham* (*Rome*), *No.* 266 (*D*); *Mr. Chilton* (*Washington*), *No.* 308 (*D*); *and Mr. Palairet* (*Tokyo*), *No.* 113 (*D*), mutatis mutandis.

Foreign Office, October 24, 1923.

MY despatch No. 3174 of 3rd October.

The definite selection of Angora as the capital of Turkey renders it necessary for Allied Governments, with which the American Government have expressed their desire to act, to reconsider the question of diplomatic representation in Turkey.

His Majesty's Government are ready to send an Ambassador to Constantinople after ratification of the treaty if facilities are afforded to him for treating with the Turkish Government through a representative of the latter at Constantinople as well as through a representative of his own at Angora. But they are determined in no circumstances to send an Ambassador to the latter place.

Please enquire of Government to which you are accredited whether they share the views of His Majesty's Government, and, if so, whether they consider it desirable to make this known to the Turkish Government at once or to wait until the latter take the first step.

So long as the Allied and United States Governments are agreed on the principle it might be preferable to leave to the Turks the onus of opening the subject, which they will probably do in officially notifying the selection of Angora.

No. 28.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 501.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 27, 1923.

PRIVATE telegram to Turkish newspaper "Aksham" from Angora reports that Government resigned this afternoon at party meeting under presidency of Mustafa Kemal.

If this is confirmed it looks as if it has been impossible to reach an agreement with regard to proclamation of republic and powers to be given to President.

As ministerial responsibility is individual, report may only be true in so far as regards resignation of President of the Council, which was anticipated.

[**P 1479/1/150**]

No. 29.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 673.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 22, 1923.

I HAD the honour, in my despatch No. 600 of the 26th September, to report on the position of the Havas-Reuter Agency in Constantinople, in relation to the distribution of British wireless news.

2. Since that date an agreement has been reached by which the news received by this group is now distributed under the name of the Anatolian Agency. Havas-Reuter, however, apart from submission to a nominal censorship, retain control of their service and receive subscriptions as heretofore.

3. The French propaganda messages, as well as the British "Leafield press," are communicated to them by the French High Commission, which receives these on its own wireless telegraph installation. The British press messages, taken in by H.M.S. "Comus," are also posted daily on the notice-board of His Majesty's consulate-general, where they are accessible to the public and to any pressmen who wish to copy them. This arrangement gives general satisfaction.

4. The present fusion of these press agencies is, I understand, merely a temporary arrangement pending the adhesion, on a proper basis, of the Anatolian Agency to the Havas-Reuter group. The management of the Turkish official agency is, however, said to be most unbusinesslike and corrupt, and, in spite of strong backing by the Turkish Government, which recently granted it a subsidy of £T. 150,000, its financial position appears so weak as to render its future solvency problematic.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10549/21/44] No. 30.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 676.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 23, 1923.

PRESS telegrams from Angora, dated the 19th instant, report the Turkish Minister of Public Works to have made the following declaration in the course of a statement regarding the employees of foreign companies operating in Turkey :—

> "According to the arrangements concluded with the foreign companies, the "latter must engage Turkish employees only. This does not mean that they can "employ all subjects of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey indiscriminately. "They must employ Moslem Turks only. If the foreign companies do not shortly "dismiss their Greek, Armenian and Jewish servants, I shall be compelled to "cancel the privileges under which they are authorised to function in Turkey. "This decision is irrevocable."

2. Persistent unofficial pressure has for some time past been brought to bear on foreign companies and institutions to put this policy into effect, and the declaration reflects, of course, the views of ultra-nationalist circles at Angora. Since its publication I have not had an opportunity of seeing Adnan Bey, but I propose on the first suitable occasion to ask him for explanations regarding Feizi Bey's statement, which is in flagrant contradiction with the minority clauses of the Lausanne Treaty.

3. Meanwhile, when it would have been thought that the attention of the Government should have been already sufficiently occupied with internal and external difficulties, the present time has been chosen to launch a fresh propaganda campaign regarding the ill-treatment of Moslems in Greece. For some days lengthy telegrams emanating from Angora have been published in the local press reporting alleged wholesale murders and tortures in the Drama and other areas, where the Moslems are stated to be reduced to a state of despair, while once again endeavours are apparently being made to incite public opinion to press for reprisals on the Greek population of Turkey. I myself find it difficult to account for this fresh campaign. The Turkish Commission for the Exchange of Populations has already commenced operations in Greece, and the American Near East Relief Workers, under whose supervision the departure of the Moslems from Mitylene was carried out, have unanimously testified to the excellent behaviour of the Greek officials concerned, and expressed the hope that the Turkish authorities will in turn afford facilities on similar lines when the evacuation of the Greek population from the Black Sea ports commences. In face of such conduct on the part of the Greek authorities at Mitylene, it appears to me improbable that a wholly different line of policy should have been adopted in other parts of Greece.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10553/1019/65] No. 31.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 681.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 23, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the further note which, on receipt of your telegram No. 316 of the 19th instant, I handed to Dr. Adnan Bey in regard to the negotiations for the settlement of the frontier between Turkey and Irak.

2. I have now made it plain that His Majesty's Government regard these negotiations as having commenced from the 5th October, the date of my previous note to Adnan Bey on the subject. I regret that I did not do so on the first occasion, but I found it somewhat difficult to reconcile clarity in this respect with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 301, in which I was instructed to be careful to avoid mentioning that His Majesty's Government, though such was their tacit intention, considered my note as constituting the formal opening of the negotiations in the sense of article 7 of the evacuation protocol

3. In communicating the accompanying note to Adnan Bey I explained to him verbally that the middle of December would be the most convenient date for His

Majesty's Government for the opening of the discussions in London. Adnan Bey made a note of this, though he did not offer any comment as to the locality selected nor was he able to tell me who would probably be the Turkish representative.

4. He did, however, ask me whether I had received the note which he said that he had addressed to me several days previously in reply to my communication of the 5th October. I told him that I had not. Nor has it been possible to trace it. Adnan had accordingly a duplicate prepared and handed to me while I waited.

5. This reply, which is in Turkish, states, on instructions from Ismet Pasha, that the point of view of the Turkish Government in regard to the Irak boundaries was explained in detail during the Lausanne Conference, that the Turkish Government has at the moment no observations to add on the matter, but that, if His Majesty's Government before the opening of the verbal negotiations desire to make any communication on the subject, for example, by means of written notes, such communications will be examined with the utmost care and early replies will be given thereto.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 31.

Mr Henderson to Dr. Adnan Bey.

M. le Représentant, *Constantinople, October* 19, 1923.

IN my note of the 5th instant I enquired from your Excellency whether the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey desired to present a written statement of the Turkish point of view on the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak or whether it would prefer to confine the negotiations to verbal discussions only.

2. I am now directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to state that His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive at an early date the reply of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to my enquiry, inasmuch as they regard the period of nine months during which the negotiations are to take place in accordance with the second paragraph of article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol, as having commenced from the 5th October, namely, from the date of my previous note on this subject which opened the negotiations.

3. His Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the most suitable locality for the actual discussions, and hope that the Government of the Grand National Assembly will share their view that London would be the most convenient for both parties. His Majesty's Government would welcome the visit to London of the Turkish delegate who will be appointed to conduct the main stages of the negotiations, as soon as the preliminary arrangements, which, it may be assumed, will take several weeks, arising out of my note of the 5th October shall have been concluded.

I avail, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10556/8496/44] No. 32.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 685.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 23, 1923.

DR. ADNAN BEY tells me that he has received a communication from Ismet Pasha, in which the latter expresses himself as entirely opposed to the constitution here of special corps, of the nature indicated in your Lordship's telegram No. 272 of the 7th September, to deal with even minor matters connected with the boundary commissions to be set up under the Lausanne Treaty.

2. Adnan Bey could not explain to me very clearly the grounds for Ismet Pasha's objections, though he said that the Turkish Government found the creation of such a corps unnecessary since provision was made in the treaty itself for the settlement of major issues, and matters of less importance could easily be arranged without the intervention of a special commission set up *ad hoc*.

3. I think that the Turks are nervous of the establishment of any body which might savour of interference by the Great Powers acting together, and that the motive of their objection is the dread of united pressure, which, when it is attainable, is the most effective means of inducing them to listen to reason.

4. Nevertheless it seems to me that some confusion has arisen in regard to your Lordship's original proposal. I observe from the verbal note, enclosed in Sir Ronald Graham's despatch No. 872 of the 3rd October, that the Italian Government concur in the creation of such a corps, the competence of which shall be limited to minor matters but the presidency of which should be held in turn by the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives in Constantinople and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. I presume that "representative of" the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs is intended, but, in any case, if minor matters are only to be dealt with, the members of this corps will not be the Allied representatives themselves but rather their delegates.

5. In your Lordship's telegram No. 272 the points specially mentioned as coming within the terms of reference of this corps would be the fixation by joint agreement of the salaries and expenses of the boundary commissioners and the supervision of dates and time limits. Incidentally, Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwall, who has been designated as British representative on the Thracian Commission, informs me that his salary has already been fixed. It is impossible to believe that the Turks will be able to pay their commissioners on the same scale as the Allies, and agreement in regard to this seems scarcely attainable. It should not, moreover, be difficult to make representations to one or other of one's colleagues or in conjunction with them to the Turkish Government in the event of the limits laid down in the treaty for the appointment of the commissions and the completion of their work not being adhered to.

6. Until the necessity therefor has been proved, I am not inclined to recommend that the proposal for the institution of a special corps for this purpose be persisted in, and would prefer to wait till a concrete case arises before pressing it upon the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10557/199/44] No. 33.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 688.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 23, 1923.

THE fundamental question of the revision of the Turkish Constitution seems to be hanging fire. On the other hand, the Turkish Assembly has shown during the past week considerable legislative activity. The Bill to deal with brigandage has become law, the organisation of the Constantinople vilayet has been settled and the Government's proposals for the grant of increased pay and allowances to army officers and commanders have been accepted by the Assembly.

2. Of the three questions, the last is by far the most important, if only because of the personal intervention of Mustafa Kemal on behalf of the officers. Some days ago an Anatolian Agency telegram reported that Kemal was dissatisfied with the draft proposals which had been prepared, and that he was taking up the question with the competent authorities. The result was seen in the course of the public debate on the 22nd instant, at which, after the Government's proposals, which involve an increased annual expenditure of £T. 5,000,000, had been subjected to considerable criticism, Kemal Pasha adopted the unusual course of addressing the House in the middle of the debate. He took pains to explain that he did so in his capacity of Commander-in-chief, a post which, he said, had been provisionally vested in him by the Grand National Assembly. When first produced, the draft scheme drawn up by the Council of Ministers had, he said, appeared to him so completely unsatisfactory that he had refused to accept it. He had therefore, in conjunction with the Minister of National Defence and the General Staff, drawn up a fresh scheme, which the Council of Ministers had approved. He explained that the only excuse offered by the Ministers for the inadequacy of their original proposals was the necessity of balancing the national budget, and he ridiculed the idea that this should be done at the expense of the saviours of the Fatherland. The new proposals were those now before the

Assembly, and, as the representative of the army, which had so freely shed its blood in the national cause, he begged that they should forthwith be integrally accepted.

3. In face of such an appeal, which, coming whence it did, amounted almost to an order, no alternative was left to the Assembly, and the draft proposals were adopted by an overwhelming majority. Mustafa Kemal thereupon again mounted the tribune and thanked the Assembly for its decision, which he undertook to communicate to the army. "The army," he concluded, "will be happy in the future as it has been in the "past to seek to merit the appreciation of your august Assembly in the defence of the "high interests of the country and of the nation."

4. Mustafa Kemal's intervention in this matter is worthy of close attention. A decision of the Council of Ministers has been arbitrarily overridden, the balancing of the budget has been made subordinate to the demands of the army, and Kemal's action appears to be a definite bid for the support of the military party. Some such tendency was, indeed, indicated in the speech which he delivered at the opening of the Assembly (see my despatch No. 490 of 18th August). As the proposals for the proclamation of a republic, with himself as a scarcely disguised autocrat, did not receive the cordial reception which he had perhaps anticipated, Kemal may have decided that only by means of a military dictatorship can he hope to achieve and retain the complete ascendancy which will alone satisfy him.

5. The commission engaged on the preparation of the constitutional reforms meanwhile continues its labours, but such information as is available shows that acute dissensions have arisen even in the midst of this specially selected body. It seems, for instance, that the draft clause conferring on the President the right to dissolve the Assembly at will was only carried by a majority of one vote.

6. Other signs of administrative difficulties at Angora are not lacking, and in this connection reference may be made to the constitution of a special Ministry to deal with the double problem of exchange of populations and reconstruction. In view of its importance, it was for some time expected that Fethi Bey would resign from the Ministry of Interior in order to take up the new portfolio. This expectation has not, however, been realised, and the Assembly was invited to appoint the new Minister. The portfolio was offered by the Council of Ministers to three different Deputies, but each in turn declined the honour, and for some days the Government was in a dilemma. Eventually, as a result of much pressure, Nejati Bey, a Deputy of Smyrna, signified his willingness to accept the post, and he received the unanimous vote of the Assembly. Owing to the lack of funds, it is difficult to see what the new Ministry is expected to accomplish, but, like the recently elected Minister of Economy, Nejati Bey has announced his intention of sending parties of students to Europe and of engaging European experts to assist him in his task.

7. Meanwhile, in Constantinople increased resentment has been caused by the official announcement of the new organisation of the Constantinople vilayet, whereby the Central Government reserves to itself the nomination of the higher officials, both of the vilayet and of the municipality. A certain amount of satisfaction has, on the other hand, resulted from the Government's decision to re-establish here the central Customs Administration.

8. Considerable importance has been attached to an audience which the Caliph recently gave to Refet Pasha and Adnan and Reouf Beys, all of whom he received together. It was generally assumed that this collective audience had been due to the publication in the local press of extracts from the "Daily Telegraph" article, in which references were made to the alleged political intrigues of His Majesty with Reouf and Refet against the Government at Angora (please see my despatch No. 669 of the 21st October). As a matter of fact, the "Daily Telegraph" article did but repeat rumours which have for some time past been current here, and it is quite likely that the object of the Caliph's summons was to make his own position in this respect clear.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

No. 34.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 503.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 28, 1923.

MY telegram No. 501.

Resignation of entire Cabinet is confirmed. Election of new Ministers is fixed for 29th October.

Ismet and Fevzi Pashas seem most probable candidates for Presidency of the Council.

No. 35.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 506.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 29, 1923.

MY telegram No. 503.

I anticipate that Government crisis at Angora will be settled by proclamation of republic and nomination of Kemal as President with the right to select his own Prime Minister.

No. 36.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 507.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 30, 1923.

MY telegram No. 506.

Grand National Assembly elected last night Mustafa Kemal President of the Republic by a unanimous vote of 158 Deputies present.

It seems probable that he will appoint Ismet Prime Minister.

No. 37.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 508.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 31, 1923.

MY telegram No. 507.

I have received official notification of proclamation of republic by Assembly and election of Mustafa Kemal as President.

No. 38.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 510.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 31, 1923.

MY telegram No. 507.

Ismet succeeded in forming Cabinet yesterday. Only new appointments are Ferid, Refik, Mukhtar Beys, who replace Fethi, Riza Nour, Feizi, as Ministers of Interior, Health and Public Works.

[E 10556/8496/44] No. 39.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 979.)

Foreign Office, November 2, 1923.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 685 of the 23rd ultimo relative to the proposed arrangements for dealing with minor matters arising out of the Lausanne Treaty, and I agree that, in view of the considerations urged therein, nothing would be gained by further pressing the Turkish Government to agree to this proposal.

2. You should, however, take an early opportunity to explain informally to Adnan Bey that the proposal of His Majesty's Government had no political intention, but was merely designed to suit the general convenience of the Governments and authorities concerned, and that it did not contemplate the institution of a special body or corps with any political power but merely the occasional meeting of the local representatives of the Governments concerned with representatives of the Turkish Government for the purpose of discussing and agreeing on points of detail such as salaries, appointments, &c.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[A 6178/1252/95] No. 40.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (*No.* 3472), *Paris; and to Sir R. Graham* (*No.* 1408), *Rome; Sir C. Eliot* (*No.* 415), *Tokyo; and Sir G. Grahame* (*No.* 1135), *Brussels*, mutatis mutandis.

Foreign Office, November 2, 1923

My Lord,

SINCE peace between Turkey and Greece was concluded by the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, His Majesty's Government have been in receipt of applications for licences to export to Turkey arms and war material generally, and for support in obtaining concessions from the Turkish Government for the erection in Turkey of plant for the manufacture of munitions.

2. As your Lordship is aware, the whole of Turkey, except European Turkey, lies within the prohibited zone as defined in article 6 of the Arms Traffic Convention of the 10th September, 1919. It was so included because it was generally agreed that, if Turkey could become an arms exporting State, such arms would inevitably reach Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia and other countries from which the Arms Traffic Convention was especially designed to exclude them. Though the convention has not been ratified, it is, as you are aware, in force so far as the prohibited zone is concerned, by informal agreement between His Majesty's and the French, Italian, Belgian and Japanese Governments, all of which are interested in areas where the importation of arms would be bound to prove a source of trouble (see Lord Derby's telegram No 884 of the 29th July, 1920). It is, therefore, the present policy of His Majesty's Government to refuse applications for the export of arms to the region of the former Ottoman Empire, though, if Turkey were to accede to the Arms Traffic Convention, a new situation would arise which would require careful consideration by the five Governments.

3. In bringing the above to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, I should be glad if you would endeavour to obtain from them an assurance that they will continue to observe the spirit of this informal agreement in the future with the same loyalty with which they have observed it in the past.

4. The United States Government are not included in the informal agreement mentioned above, but it is the policy of that Government to discourage the export of arms and war material to countries where disturbed conditions prevail, and I am instructing His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Washington to make similar representations to the United States Government. A copy of my despatch to Mr. Chilton is enclosed herewith,* together with a copy of his despatch No. 1187 of the 28th September last.†

5. I am addressing similar instructions to His Majesty's representatives at Rome, Tokyo and Brussels.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

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* See No. 39.

† See No. 9.

[**E 10729/199/44**] No. 41.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 3.)

(No. 512.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 3, 1923.

MY despatch No. 700, paragraph 9.

I have confined myself to simple acknowledgment of note of Turkish Government announcing election of Mustafa Kemal as President of the Republic.

[**E 10757/199/44**] No. 42.

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 700 A.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 30, 1923.

DURING the last three days events at Angora have marched with great rapidity. The resignation of the Government, reported in my telegram No. 501 of the 27th instant, resulted in a deadlock, and by deft handling provided Mustafa Kemal with the awaited opportunity for a settlement of the much-discussed constitutional question. The people of Turkey awoke this morning to find their country a republic and Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha its first President.

2. For some time it has been obvious that the Government, so unanimously elected just over two months ago, was losing the support of the Assembly. Heated party debates had become increasingly frequent, and one or two leading Ministers had tendered their resignations, while those of others were confidently anticipated. Attacks on individual Ministers were of almost daily occurrence, though the general tendency was to concentrate against Fethi Bey in his dual rôle of President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior. A case in point was the incident, reported in previous despatches, in connection with the failure of the municipal authorities of Constantinople to pay proper respect to the Assembly's delegation on the occasion of the entry of the Nationalist troops into this city. There is no doubt that the attempt to obtain the dismissal of the Vali was in reality a direct attack on Fethi Bey himself.

3. Various causes combined, in fact, to weaken the position of the Government. On his accession to power, Fethi Bey made the maintenance of internal order a cardinal point of his policy. Though a law against brigandage was passed and stringent measures to extirpate the brigands were adopted with a certain success in the Smyrna hinterland, where I hear that five divisions were employed for the purpose, internal conditions in this respect have not improved. Brigands continue to infest even the outskirts of the larger towns, and the authorities seem incapable of coping effectively with them. Externally also discontent has been caused by the attitude of the Government in regard to the Erivan incident reported in my despatch No. 678.

4. The constitutional issue, moreover, provoked unexpectedly serious opposition and threatened to split the country. A large party held the view that the Assembly was not competent to deal with the issue, and that, even if it were, a matter of such importance should only be undertaken after some of the more pressing internal problems had been solved. The situation was aggravated by the reference of the question to a special commission which met in secret and whose decisions only became known to the remainder of the Assembly through the columns of the press.

5. The sympathy of the Assembly was in fact alienated by the inclination of the Government to arrogate to itself full powers and to expect automatic approval of all its actions by the Assembly. The latter was jealous of its prerogatives and began to show itself capable of independent action. In face of the disapproval of the Government, it insisted on the creation of a Ministry of Reconstruction, and when the Government was at last ready to bow to the popular feeling to the extent of seeking the appointment of their nominee, the Assembly refused to accept him, and finally secured the election of its own candidate. The same factors were at work in the case of Ali Fuad Pasha, the Vice-President of the Assembly, who it was prematurely reported a month ago had been succeeded by Yussuf Kemal Bey. Later information showed that though Ali Fuad did in fact resign, the Assembly refused to accept the Government's proposal for the nomination of the former Foreign Minister as his successor, and the Vice-President was accordingly induced temporarily to withdraw his resignation.

6. Matters were, however, brought to a head on the 24th instant, when Ali Fuad tendered his resignation for the second time, and Fethi Bey, on the plea of overwork, asked to be relieved of his duties of Minister of Interior while retaining the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Both resignations were at once accepted and, though it was generally felt that Fethi Bey should have withdrawn completely from the Government, the selection of candidates for the vacant posts was begun. Once more, however, the Assembly refused to accept the Government's nominees, namely, Yussuf Kemal for the Vice-Presidency and Ferid Bey for the Ministry of Interior, and in their stead put forward the names of Sabit and Reouf Beys respectively. This was the position on the morning of the 27th instant, when a definite decision had to be taken. The crux of the situation seems to have been the Vice-Presidency—a post to which Reouf in conversation with an English friend a few days ago referred as the "Vice-"royalty"—and as both sides remained adamant, the Government decided to resign in a body.

7. The letter of resignation was read in the Assembly the same afternoon. It stated that in order to deal with the existing internal and external problems, which were of supreme difficulty and importance, the country had need of a strong Government enjoying the complete confidence of the Assembly. The Administration had therefore decided to make way for such a Government. The letter of resignation was accepted almost unanimously and the election of the new Council of Ministers was fixed for the 29th instant.

8. On the 28th instant a preliminary meeting of the People's party was held in order to prepare the ground for the proceedings of the following day. When the Government fell, either Ismet or Fevzi Pasha seemed indicated for the Premiership. It was found impossible, however, to obtain unanimity, and an alternative was put forward in the shape of a Cabinet presided over by Ali Fuad Pasha with Reouf Bey as Vice-President of the Assembly and Adnan Bey as Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was clear, however, that none of the ex-Ministers were prepared to join such a Cabinet, and the difficult task of preparing a final list was delegated to a committee which was instructed to furnish its report to a full meeting of the party on the morning of the 29th.

9. The committee met and reported, but its suggestions proved inacceptable. Opinion was divided, and it was decided as a compromise to refer the whole matter to the mediation of Mustafa Kemal. There can be no doubt that this decision was anticipated and had been engineered. The Ghazi Pasha's response was ready and promptly given. He intimated that he was only prepared to mediate on condition that his proposals for the proclamation of a republic were accepted forthwith. These proposals, the French text of which is enclosed herein, were those which had already been discussed by the special commission on the constitutional question. They were submitted to and at once voted by the Assembly, which at a late hour proceeded to complete its task by electing Mustafa Kemal Pasha first President of the Turkish Republic by the unanimous vote of the 158 Deputies present. I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the note which I have received from Adnan Bey officially notifying me of this decision and of Kemal's election to the Presidency.

10. Apart from the fact that a constitutional change of such magnitude should once again have been made after a minimum of debate and in the presence of less than two-thirds of the Assembly, the new modifications of the Turkish Fundamental Law are deserving of close attention. The original text of that law was enclosed in Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No. 180 of the 16th July, 1921, and laid great emphasis on the sovereignty of the people. By the decisions of yesterday, however, the office of President is invested with such extended and diverse powers that they amount practically to a Kemalist dictatorship.

11. A new article has been introduced whereby Islam is officially defined as the religion and Turkish as the language of the Turkish State. It is, nevertheless, interesting that the one clause of the new Constitution which had been debated in the Assembly and in regard to which a decision had been taken, namely, the transfer of the capital to Angora, does not appear in these modifications. This is the more significant as, while the Turkish press a week ago predicted, almost textually, the changes which have now been made, its forecasts contained a separate clause embodying the Assembly's decision. It may be that Mustafa Kemal, realising that he was already putting the Assembly to a severe test, deemed it wiser not to raise at this stage a controversial point, the acceptance or rejection of which would not materially affect his own position, while its omission would leave him liberty of action in the future should he decide to make a bid for the support of Constantinople.

12. The proclamation of the republic has, of course, been greeted with the firing of salutes and with the usual signs of national rejoicing-to-order, but it is too early yet to estimate the effect of the latest *coup d'État* or the nature or extent of the opposition to which it will give rise. Reouf Bey is generally regarded as the central figure of that opposition, though it is not clear to what extent he was himself associated in the efforts of his supporters to impose their will at Angora. In this connection much interest has been aroused by an announcement in the press that, on the 27th instant, he and Rafet Pasha had a long interview with Marshal Izzet Pasha, the former Grand Vizier, and, like Rafet Pasha, in close touch with the Caliph. Another interesting alleged addition to this group is Ali Fuad Pasha, who, instead of proceeding to his military inspectorate at Konia as had been expected, arrived in Constantinople on the day of the Government's fall, and was met at the station by Rafet Pasha and Reouf and Adnan Beys, with whom he had a prolonged conference the same afternoon.

13. The continued presence of these and other leading personalities in Constantinople has given rise to much talk of a scheme for the establishment of a rival Government at Constantinople and the possible restoration of the Sultanate. Such rumours are undoubtedly premature. But the opposition will wait on events, and, if a favourable opportunity occur, the possibility of a reactionary movement being attempted cannot be excluded.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 42.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of October 30, 1923.

FRENCH TEXT OF GHAZI PASHA'S PROPOSALS.

ARTICLE 1er. La souveraineté appartient absolument à la nation. La forme d'administration repose sur le principe de la gérance par le peuple de ses propres destinées. Le régime de l'État turc est républicain.

Article 2. La religion de l'État turc est la religion musulmane ; la langue officielle est le turc.

Article 4. L'État turc est administré par la grande Assemblée nationale. Celle-ci administre les départements d'État par l'entremise des délégués de l'Exécutif.

Article 10. Le Président de la République turque est élu par l'Assemblée générale de la grande Assemblée nationale, parmi ses membres et pour une session. Le Président continue ses fonctions jusqu'à l'élection de son successeur.

Le Président sortant est rééligible.

Article 11. Le Président de la République turque est le chef de l'État. En cette qualité, il préside l'Assemblée nationale ou le Conseil des Ministres chaque fois qu'il en voit la nécessité.

Article 12. Le Président du Conseil désigné par le Président de la République parmi les membres de l'Assemblée. Les autres Ministres sont choisis par le Premier Ministre parmi les membres de l'Assemblée et l'ensemble du Cabinet est soumis par le Président de la République à l'approbation de la grande Assemblée nationale. Si cette dernière n'est pas en session, la question de l'approbation est ajournée jusqu'à la réouverture.

Enclosure 2 in No. 42.

Adnan Bey to Mr. Henderson.

M. le Représentant, *Constantinople, le 30 octobre* 1923.

D'ORDRE de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie a, dans sa séance de l'après-midi du 29 octobre 1923, décidé à l'unanimité des voix ce qui suit :

1. La forme de l'État turc est républicaine, l'islamisme est sa religion et le turc sa langue officielle. Le Président de la République, qui est le chef d'État, est élu par la grande Assemblée nationale parmi ses membres pour la période pour laquelle les membres de l'Assemblée sont élus ; et, en cette qualité, il préside, lorsqu'il le juge nécessaire, à l'Assemblée et au Conseil des Ministres. Le Premier Ministre est choisi

parmi les membres de la grande Assemblée nationale par le Président de la République ; il choisit les autres Ministres également parmi les membres de la même Assemblée. Le Conseil des Ministres ainsi constitué est présenté par le Président de la République à l'approbation de l'Assemblée. Cette approbation est ajournée à la réunion de l'Assemblée nationale si celle-ci n'est pas en session.

2. Son Excellence Ghazi Moustafa Kémal Pacha a été élu à la même séance à l'unanimité le Président de la République.

Veuillez, &c.
DR. ADNAN.

[E 10758/10145/44] No. 43.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 702.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October 31, 1923.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 636 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that the local Turkish paper "Aksham" published in its issue of the 25th instant an inspired statement to the effect that the Red Crescent Commission, formed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to collect subscriptions on behalf of the Greek Mussulmans, who are to be exchanged for Turkish Christians, has decided to send a delegation to all Moslem countries.

2. For the present, however, only one delegation, composed of members of the Red Crescent Society, and "probably accompanied by hodjas," will be despatched to India and Java. Subscriptions from Moslem countries, such as Morocco, Lybia, Egypt, Turkestan, Persia and Afghanistan will be solicited through the local Red Crescent or Red Cross Societies. The co-operation of the International Red Cross Society will also be invited.

3. The statement adds that the permission of the Governments of the countries to be visited will be obtained beforehand, and that the Turkish Government has been asked to take the necessary action to this end.

4. One of the members of the Red Crescent Commission in question is Dr. Adnan Bey.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10760/199/34] No. 44.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 705.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October 31, 1923.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 700 A of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, by virtue of the powers conferred on him under the revised Constitution, Mustafa Kemal Pasha entrusted Ismet Pasha with the task of forming a Ministry. The new Cabinet was completed yesterday morning, and the list of Ministers, accompanied by a letter from the President of the Republic, submitted to the approval of the Assembly. This was accorded by the unanimous vote of the 166 Deputies present.

2. Ismet Pasha's Cabinet is constituted as follows :—

Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs ...	Ismet Pasha.
Religious Affairs	Mustafa Fevzi Effendi.
Chief of General Staff	Fevzi Pasha.
Interior	Ferid Bey.
National Defence	Kiazim Pasha.
National Economy	Hassan Bey.
Justice	Seyyid Bey.
Public Instruction	Ismail Sefa Bey.
Public Works	Mukhtar Bey.
Public Health	Refik Bey.
Exchange and Reconstruction	Nejati Bey.

3. For the moment there seems to be some doubt regarding the Ministry of Finance, as, while some reports state that this portfolio is to be filled temporarily by Ferid Bey, others state that Hassan Fehmi Bey has been reappointed. The latter has, however, for the last fortnight been absent from Angora on leave, so that there probably has not been time for the Prime Minister to obtain his acceptance.

4. Apart possibly from the Finance Ministry, there are only three changes in the Cabinet. Fethi Bey has been replaced at the Ministry of Interior by Ferid Bey Deputy for Kutahia, while Fevzi and Riza Nour Beys have been succeeded as Minister of Public Works and Public Health respectively by Mukhtar and Refik Beys. Little is known here regarding the two latter, who are respectively Deputies for Trebizond and Constantinople. Mukhtar Bey, who is an engineer, was formerly an official in the Ministry of Public Works in Constantinople, and is stated to be thoroughly Unionist in sympathy.

5. Your Lordship is already familiar with the activities and intrigues of Ferid Bey, the new Minister of Interior. A former Minister of Finance at Angora, he resigned in October 1921 to take up the post of Nationalist representative at Paris. He remained there till February of the present year, when he was recalled as a result of certain offensive remarks made by him regarding the Allies when financial questions were under discussion at Lausanne.

6. On receiving the vote of confidence, Ismet Pasha, in a short speech, expressed his thanks to the Assembly, whose confidence he said he would strive to retain. No details of policy were expounded. Internally, he said, the Government would work resolutely and energetically to assure the well-being, the progress and the development of the country. Externally, if goodwill were shown to Turkey, it would be met with even greater goodwill, and every effort would be made to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Republic and, on the basis of treaties concluded or to be concluded, to cultivate peaceful and friendly relations with all foreign States so long as the vital interests of the country were not endangered.

7. The composition of the new Cabinet must, I think, be considered as the natural sequel to Mustafa Kemal's triumph and as the defeat of the dissentient group in the Assembly which a week ago refused to accept Ferid Bey as Minister of the Interior. It may also be regarded as a set-back for the pro-Russian party, which has lost a champion in Fethi Bey, though one report states that the latter will be offered the vice-presidency of the Assembly.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 10761/10120/44**] No. 45.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 707.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of report No. 3 from His Majesty's military attaché at Constantinople, dated the 31st October, 1923, respecting the reduction of the Turkish army to peace establishment.

Constantinople, October 31, 1923.

Enclosure 1 in No. 45.

Colonel Baird to Mr. Henderson.

(No. 3.) *British High Commission,*
Constantinople, October 31, 1923.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to attach a note dealing with the reduction of the Turkish army to peace establishment and questions cognate thereto.

2. These questions have recently formed the subject of considerable discussion in the Turkish press, and, if reports be true, of somewhat heated debates in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

3. Though primarily of military concern, they may perhaps have some bearing on the development of the political situation in Turkey, where the support of the army counts for much in a political crisis. Unfortunately, it is too early to say how far the solution of the questions involved has given satisfaction or otherwise.

I have, &c.
A. W. F. BAIRD, *Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 45.

Reduction of the Turkish Army to Peace Establishment and Questions cognate thereto.

THE conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne enabled the Turkish Government to proceed at once with the reduction of their army to a peace establishment. Both on political and financial grounds it had already become eminently desirable to do so without delay. A partial demobilisation had indeed already been carried out, but the outbreaks of brigandage in Anatolia, the situation on the Syrian, Mosul and eastern fronts, and, generally, the possibility of a breakdown of the peace negotiations at the eleventh hour had made it necessary to go slow.

This demobilisation, so far as the rank and file were concerned, had no embarrassing aspects from a political point of view. On the contrary, it carried with it an immediate decrease in the strain on the public purse and the return to their homes of men who were already tired of service, and who desired, or at least expected, no other reward at the hands of a grateful country. But the question of the commissioned ranks immediately gave rise to difficulties. A large number of officers had to be disposed of, to the bulk of whom military service was their bread and butter, nor were they likely to be satisfied as in the case of the rank and file by the mere announcement that they could now go home.

The questions to be dealt with as far as the officers were concerned were roughly as follows:—

(A.) Treatment of demobilised reserve officers.
(B.) System to be adopted for the reduction of officers on the active list who would become surplus to establishment on a peace footing—and more particularly the pecuniary treatment of such officers.
(C.) Scale of pay and allowances for officers to be retained on the peace establishment.

Each of these questions appears to have been dealt with by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and settled on the following lines:—

(A.) *Treatment of Demobilised Officers.*

1. Gratuity of four months' pay on demobilisation is to be granted to all reserve officers who have served in the Nationalist army up till the end of the Battle of Sakaria (September 1921).
2. Gratuity of three months' pay to reserve officers who have served in the Nationalist army since the end of the Battle of Sakaria.

In both cases search for civil employment is to be facilitated by preference being given to them over all other competitors for State employment.

The above provisions are said to affect some 8,000 reserve officers who belong to the class concerned, and who had already taken the precaution to form themselves into a special association ("Iktiat Zabitan Gemieti") with the object of protecting their interests. To what extent this Association is satisfied with the Government's decisions is not yet known.

(B.) *System to be adopted for the Reduction of Officers to Peace Establishment.*

The present uncertainty as to the eventual form which the peace establishment of the Turkish army will take added to the complications in this case, but it was obvious that considerable reductions would be entailed. According to laws passed on the 21st September and the 6th October, the following system is to be adopted:—

(*a.*) All active list officers who served in the Nationalist army during the War of Independence (1921–23) will remain on the active list on full pay and allowances until the close of the present financial year, whether they be

actively employed or not Steps will be taken before the close of the financial year (30th March) to provide a definite solution of the cases of officers thus retained on the active list, but unemployed, owing to the reduction of establishment.

(*b.*) Officers on the active list who did not serve in the Nationalist army and fail to justify their failure to do so will be struck off the establishment and forfeit all pay and pension.

Officers of the same category who can justify their failure to serve will be put on the unemployed list, or, if already entitled to a pension, will be retired.

Those placed on the unemployed list will be treated as those under (*a*) above.

(*c.*) Officers who actively opposed the Nationalist movement will be tried by court martial. The court martial will appraise the amount of their activities. Those found guilty will be struck off the establishment, and, besides forfeiting all pension, will be permanently debarred from State employment in any capacity.

(C.) *Scale of Pay and Allowances for Officers.*

The Government appears to have been forced to deal with this question for two reasons. In the first place, it was realised that the existing rates of pay and allowances were really insufficient to meet present-day requirements. In the second place, it was politically indispensable to conciliate the army as represented by its officers.

Two solutions appear to have been discussed :—

(*a.*) Amelioration of officers' situations by a more liberal issue in kind of rations, clothing, equipment, &c.

(*b.*) A simple increase of pay and allowances.

The commission appointed to deal with this question decided on (*b*) above, with, it is said, the warm support of Mustafa Kemal, who appears to have taken some personal part in the discussions.

A law embodying the commission's recommendations as to a new rate of pay and allowances was duly presented to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for approval. Here it gave rise to a stormy debate, in which Mustafa Kemal was obliged to intervene, and, posing, conveniently enough no doubt, as the army's champion, silenced the opposition.

The new rates of pay and allowances, details of which are given below, are said to involve an addition of £T. 5,000,000 to the military budget.

Naval officers are to benefit by the new rates.

Pensioned officers are also to receive an increase in their allowances, but the details of these are not yet fixed.

New Rates of Pay and Allowances for Army Officers.

	Monthly Pay. £T.	Monthly Allowance. £T.
Warrant officer	8	42
Second lieutenant	10	50
Lieutenant	15	55
Captain	20	60
Senior captain	25	65
Major	35	85
Lieutenant-colonel	40	90
Colonel	50	100
Brigadier-general	60	140
Divisional-general	80	170
Senior divisional-general	100	200
Field-marshal	150	200

Note.—The combined remuneration at present rates of exchange ranges approximately from 7*l.* 10*s.* per month in the case of a second lieutenant to 40*l.* per month in the case of a field-marshal.

[E 10795/1019/65] No. 46.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 6.)

(No. 513.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 6, 1923.

MY despatch No. 681 of 23rd October.

Adnan Bey yesterday presented note stating that Turkish Government is desirous that negotiations should take place at Constantinople, where representatives of both parties would be on an equal footing as regards correspondence with their Governments.

He added in conversation that Turkish Government would prefer that negotiations should not be opened until after ratification of treaty by Great Britain.

[E 10802/7734/44] No. 47.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 7.)

(No. 514.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 6, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 315.

Under instructions from President of the Council, Adnan Bey informs me that Turkish Government proposes forthwith to appoint Yussuf Kemal Bey, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, as its representative in London and to nominate him Minister for Foreign Affairs, as its representative in London and to nominate him definitely to post as soon as Treaty of Lausanne comes into force.

Turkish Government would be glad to learn as soon as possible whether this appointment meets with approval.

[E 10807/199/44] No. 48.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 7.)

(No. 515. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 6, 1923.

I AM informed that on instructions from Angora Adnan Bey visited Caliph to-day and invited His Majesty to proceed forthwith either to Brussa or Konia. Caliph is said to have refused, stating that he preferred to abdicate.

Intimacy of relations with Caliph of Refet, Reouf and other leaders of Opposition has been much commented upon lately, and there have been indications in the press that some step of this nature was contemplated. I had already written despatch for bag to-morrow anticipating some such move on the part of Kemal with a view to stifling possibility of reactionary movement in Constantinople.

Information may therefore be correct. It is also reported in press that Refet and Reouf have been recalled to Angora to attend to their duties as Deputies. Signs are in fact not wanting that Kemal intends to crush Opposition by forcible measures, and I do not think that Opposition are capable of effective resistance.

[E 10819/7734/44] No. 49.

Sir C. Eliot to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 7.)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Tokyo, November* 7, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 113.

Japanese Government share views of His Majesty's Government and agree that it would be preferable to await notification from Turkish Government of selection of Angora as capital before informing them of those views.

[E 11861/7734/44] No. 50.

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 9.)

(No. 450.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Washington, November* 8, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 308.

United States Government inform me that upon resumption of diplomatic relations with Turkey they would not be opposed to sending an Ambassador to Constantinople on the understanding that appropriate facilities would be accorded him by Turkish Government.

While appointment of Ambassador to reside at Angora is not contemplated at present, United States Government consider it may be expedient to re-examine question if and when Turkey definitely decides upon Angora as capital. Meanwhile United States Government are of the opinion that onus of opening subject should be left to Turks.

(Private.)

View of State Department is that even if Turks now decide on Angora as their capital, they will in a few years find it quite impracticable and revert to Constantinople. United States Government will also act in conformity with other Powers in regard to rank of their representative in Turkey.

[E 10923/199/44] No. 51.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 711. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 4, 1923.

I HAVE referred in previous despatches to the growing intimacy of His Majesty the Caliph with Reouf Bey, Refet Pasha and others who are popularly regarded as the leaders of the Opposition.

2. In the early days after the abolition of the sultanate, the flight of Mehmed VI and his own election as Caliph, Abdul Mejid's attitude was extremely non-committal. He even stated to an English acquaintance who visited him that he had given an undertaking not to interfere in politics. He was closely watched and chaperoned by Refet Pasha, who was at that time busy conquering Constantinople for the Nationalist Government. Though possibly irksome at first, neither the warder nor the warded found the time pass unpleasantly The Caliph occupied it in painting a portrait of Refet, which he subsequently presented to that general.

3. His Majesty must have never given, or has freed himself from, such an undertaking. He certainly no longer abides by it. It may be that it was given personally to Refet Pasha and that the latter has released His Majesty from it either in return for the portrait or in consequence of his own fall from grace in the eyes of, or defection from, Mustafa Kemal.

4. This intimacy of the Caliph with the Opposition and its possible consequences have for some time past been the subject of much rumour and report. The relations between His Majesty and Kemal were never more than barely correct. They are now openly hostile, and if any public proof were needed it could be found in the congratulatory telegram addressed by the Caliph to the Ghazi Pasha on the occasion of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic and Kemal's election as its first President.

5. The telegram in question was worded textually as follows: "I pray the Almighty that the new form of Government which has just been established will prove beneficial to the State and the nation." It could scarcely have been briefer or more sceptical and it carefully omitted any reference to the new President himself. The latter's own reply was an equally brief expression of thanks for his Caliphial Majesty's amiable wishes concerning the Republic of Turkey.

6. But what is probably the President's real retort is a statement which was published in a prominent position in this morning's "Ileri," the principal Kemalist organ in Constantinople, under the heading, "His Majesty the Caliph. The News of his Abdication is without Foundation."

7. It was to the effect that there were persistent rumours at the Sublime Porte yesterday that the Caliph intended to abdicate and to retire to Brusa, but that careful enquiries at the Porte had elicited the reply from official sources that they had no knowledge on the subject and at the Palace that the report was untrue.

8. Incidentally the use of the expression of Sublime Porte is curious. Such terms, which savour of the old régime, have fallen into disuse since the remodelling of Turkey a year ago. But the unexpected publication of such a statement is stranger still, and, in view of the newspaper by which it was published, one may well ask oneself whether it has been done with an ulterior motive, as a *ballon d'essai* to prepare the way for a compulsory abdication, or at least an equally forced retirement to Brusa.

9. In this connection I heard some weeks ago through two different channels, though they may well have had one source, that the Nationalist Government (*videlicet* Mustafa Kemal) intended to remove the seat of the Caliphate from Constantinople to Brusa. The reason given was that Kemal's position in Constantinople would be difficult if the Caliph was living in the same city. A more plausible reason would be that the Ghazi Pasha is nervous of the growing popularity of the Caliph, and, being convinced of the danger of allowing him to remain in a disaffected Constantinople, is seriously considering the measures to be taken to counteract the possibility of any reactionary movement organised here on his behalf or the house of Osman in general.

10. It is probably not a mere coincidence that a second article in to-day's "Ileri" delivered a direct attack on the old dynasty. It is contained in the reproduction of an article published by the "Yeni Gun," the extreme Nationalist organ in Angora, and criticising the declaration recently given by Reouf Bey to the press in regard to the undue abruptness of the decision taken by the Grand National Assembly respecting the republic. The article after observing that it could not conceive that Reouf Bey is weak enough to believe in the chances of a restoration of the sultanate, denounced as utterly worthless all the surviving members of the dynasty of Oman After stating that the nation has won its sovereignty by its own arms, soul and blood, and that the palaces of the disaffected in Constantinople will sooner or later be pulled down over their heads, the article reminded Reouf that he himself after visiting Mehmed VI for the last time in March 1920 had emphatically informed the writer that the descendants of Osman had joined the British and that the nation must seek its own salvation.

11. The publications of the "Ileri" in this respect are significant, and in view of the enigmatic attitude of Mustafa Kemal and the uncertainty as to future developments in Turkey it is difficult to refrain from being speculative.

12. The Caliph is undoubtedly a rival and a complication in the path of Kemal, and consequently an obstacle to be removed, either altogether therefrom or to a distance where he will be comparatively harmless. Some Turks believe that it is the intention of Kemal to suppress the Caliphate altogether and to establish a lay republic. Such a course would seem contrary to the whole principle of a Turkish hegemony in a pan-Islamic union with the seat of the caliphate in Turkey as one of its foundations. It would seem more probable that Kemal may aim at creating for himself a sort of Turkish "shogunate," with the Caliph at Brusa, instead of an Emperor at Kyoto.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10926/7734/44] No. 52.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 715.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 6, 1923.

I TOOK the opportunity of a visit which I received from Adnan Bey on the 3rd instant to enquire whether it was by accident or design that no mention had been made of Angora as the capital of new Turkey in the communication which he had recently addressed to the foreign representatives here officially notifying them that the language of the new Turkish State was Turkish, its religion that of Islam, its form of government a republic and its first President, Mustafa Kemal. If Angora

was really to be the future seat of government, it would have seemed natural to include the fact in such a general notification. I also said that I had also noticed a recent statement in the press to the effect that the Government proposed to send "Ministers of the first class" to London, Paris, &c., and Ministers of the second class to minor capitals, for instance, Kabul. Such at least was the French translation, though in the Turkish original the words used for first-class Ministers might equally well apply to Ambassadors. I asked him whether his Government was in fact contemplating the appointment of Ministers only.

2. Adnan Bey replied that the French translation was incorrect, and that the Turkish Government proposed to send Ambassadors as their representatives to the capitals of the Great Powers. He explained the omission of the question of the capital from the notification respecting the new form of government in Turkey by the fact that the decision in respect of the capital had been taken previously to that of the 29th October regarding the republic. He appeared, however, to think that he had been guilty of an oversight in not making an official communication concerning the new capital—which, he added, was definitely established for all time at Angora—and hurriedly made a note of it with a view, as he said, to notifying me without further delay.

3. I told Adnan that I could not share his conviction as to the permanency of the capital at Angora. What one Grand National Assembly had decreed might easily be reversed by another. Moreover, while I agreed that an official notification on a matter of such importance was indispensable, I advised him in making it to state clearly at the same time exactly what régime it was proposed to institute at Constantinople to facilitate the work of the foreign missions here. Their transfer to Angora was physically impossible under present conditions. It would be practically impossible to find accommodation there to-day even for a single consular agent. As for a Minister or the staff of a Legation, it was entirely out of all consideration and absolutely inconceivable so far as an Ambassador or his staff were concerned.

4. Adnan Bey confessed that accommodation was lacking, but expressed the pious hope that Great Britain at any rate would build the necessary accommodation. The Turkish Government was, he said, prepared to give the land for the purpose and there was excellent building stone available on the spot. (I understand from the American military attaché, who recently visited Angora, that this is in fact the case.) He even recommended that someone should be sent early to Angora in order to select the most suitable position, and enquired as to the exact size of the present staff of the High Commission with a view to having some idea of the space which would be required.

5. I informed Adnan Bey that I considered it most unlikely that His Majesty's Government would consent to start building even the smallest house until the Turks themselves had equipped their new capital with all the Government institutions and buildings which were a primary necessity for the seat of any Government. He recognised the justice of this consideration and admitted that his Government, which had no money, could not hope to construct such buildings within the next year or so.

6. I said that this made it all the more necessary to institute a special régime in order to permit the suitable conduct of foreign relations at Constantinople, and I asked him if he was aware of the intentions of his Government in that respect. Adnan gave me to understand in his reply that they were most anxious to abolish as soon as possible the Delegation for Foreign Affairs in Constantinople. As Adnan seemed to contemplate a maximum period of six months in this respect, I told him that its abolition seemed to me utterly impracticable. Not only was a special régime a necessity, but the head of the delegation here would have to be an official of sufficient importance and independence to make it worth while for foreign Powers to send representatives of the rank of Ambassador or Minister to Turkey at all. No first-class representative could reside at Angora until accommodation suitable to his rank had been provided; no such accommodation existed at Angora; it would have to be specially constructed; no Government would proceed to construct until the stability of Turkey in her new form were more assured, and that, therefore, if Turkey set store on conducting her relations with foreign Powers in a fitting manner, she would be well advised to make adequate arrangements for this purpose in Constantinople.

7. My conversation with Adnan on this subject was of an entirely informal nature. He seemed, however, so confident that His Majesty's Government would be willing to build accommodation for their representative at Angora that I thought it as well to draw his attention to the difficulties of the proposition. He asked me whether His Majesty's Government had decided on the status of their future representative in

Turkey, and I told him that the matter was still under discussion and that presumably the ultimate decision would depend on the nature of the arrangements which the Turkish Government themselves proposed to make for the treatment of such representatives.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10929/199/44] No. 53.

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 720.) *Constantinople, November* 6, 1923.

My Lord,

THE Turkish Cabinet and constitutional crisis has been viewed very differently by the organs of public opinion in Angora and in Constantinople.

2. The Angora press has, as might have been expected, greeted the latest change with enthusiasm. The attitude of the Constantinople press towards the new Ministry has, on the other hand, either been reserved, even in the case of newspapers which have hitherto been more or less Kemalist, or else openly hostile. Little confidence is expressed in the ability of the Government to deal with the problems which brought their predecessors into discredit, and the fairly general conclusion appears to be that further Cabinet changes may be expected at no very distant date

3. The storm of criticism has, however, been directed against the new Ministry as a whole rather than against its distinguished head, to whose services to the State universal tribute is paid, and regret is expressed that Ismet Pasha has surrounded himself with assistants of such inferior quality. Much capital has been made of the fact that, though the former Ministers in their joint letter of resignation openly confessed their weakness, all but three have been retained in the new Cabinet. Moreover, since, after the constitution of the Ministry, Fethi Bey was elected pre-ident of the Assembly, while the election of Feizi Bey, the ex-Minister of Public Works, as first vice-president is confidently anticipated, thus leaving Riza Nour Bey alone unemployed, it is not surprising that the Opposition press has insinuated that the so-called Government crisis was merely a ruse employed by the Angora leaders for securing the adoption of the constitutional changes.

4. Apart from the Ministry itself, the principal criticism of the innovations has been on the ground of the undue haste with which they were effected. The change to a republic was merely one of form, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha still holds a commanding position in this country. Amid all the bitter attacks launched against Angora by the Constantinople press during the past week, no word of criticism has been directed against the President himself, and even such a thoroughly Opposition newspaper as the "Tanin" has not failed to do at least lip service to the past achievements of the national leader.

5. But it is already evident that Mustafa Kemal will not be content to rely on his past record alone, and is bent on consolidating his position in preparation for future eventualities. Although elected only for the duration of the present Assembly, he has now placed himself above party by tendering his resignation as leader of the Popular party, and has announced that, though he reserves his constitutional right of presiding over the Assembly and the Cabinet in case of need, he will only do so in very exceptional circumstances. A more important development in this direction, however, is the adoption by the Assembly of an additional article in the Press Law, whereby editors or managers of newspapers who publish defamatory articles against the President of the Republic will be liable to a term of imprisonment varying from three months to three years. The significance of this step, by which Mustafa Kemal is placed above newspaper criticism, has not been lost on the Constantinople press. Nor is it without interest to note that on the very day of the adoption of this important article the semi-official Kemalist organ at Angora violently attacked the Caliph and the House of Osman, as reported in my despatch No 711.

6. Freedom of speech and criticism has, in fact, become a question of the moment and for this Reouf Bey is mainly responsible. On the morrow of the proclamation of the republic he made to correspondents of certain local papers declarations implying grave disapproval of the proceedings at Angora. His declarations gave great offence at Angora, and provoked an angry retort from the "Hakimiet-i-Millie," which, in

demanding that steps should be taken to put an end to intrigue and disaffection, went so far as to state that it might be necessary to show greater resolution and energy in defending the successes gained within the country against absolutism and reaction than had been necessary for consolidating the position obtained as a result of the victories over the foreigners.

7. There are, in fact, indications that the Government has already decided on its course of action for dealing with these internal intrigues. In this connection much interest has been aroused by the announcement that legal proceedings are about to be commenced against Rahmi Bey, ex-Vali of Smyrna, in respect of his activities there during the European war. Rahmi Bey, who has for some time been in Constantinople, is in close touch with Reouf Bey, Refet Pasha and others. He is regarded as one of the leading spirits of the Committee of Union and Progress. He is, however, less well known to the general public than the others, and if Kemal Pasha intends to take the offensive by prosecuting the chief Committee of Union and Progress personalities for their war-time activities, Rahmi Bey would suit his purpose well as a first objective. The second might be Reouf Bey himself, who signed the Mudros Armistice. It is, at any rate, significant that Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff and a loyal henchman of Mustafa Kemal, is expected shortly to arrive in Constantinople, doubtless with a view to taking the measure of the Opposition and suggesting the means necessary for dealing with it.

8. But whatever be the outcome of events, the issues at least seem to be clearly defined. They lie between Constantinople and Angora, a constitutional Government and a Kemalist dictatorship. The circumstances recorded in my despatch No. 711 of the 4th instant and the definite manner in which the challenge was taken up by Hussein Djahid Bey, as reported in my despatch No. 724 of to-day's date, show that the position of the Caliph is also at stake. But the Caliphate question is in reality bound up in the major issues. The presence of His Majesty in this city serves inevitably to make him the focus of any reactionary movements and a rallying point for the Opposition. His removal therefrom both weakens that movement and diminishes the importance of a city whose reduction to a state of inferiority Angora seems bent on achieving.

9. To-day Angora is calling the tune and Constantinople is dancing with furious hostility. With the exception of the "Ileri," and to a lesser extent the "Vakit," the entire vernacular press of Constantinople is openly disaffected. Angora is equally outspoken, and the daily publications in the newspapers of the two rivals abound in mutual invective and abuse. The report in the press to-day that Reouf Bey and Refet have been recalled to Angora shows that matters have come to a head. I much doubt whether they are strong enough to resist such a summons, and, if they obey it, the first trick will clearly have been won by Angora.

10. In the meantime the decisions of the Grand National Assembly are subordinated to this rivalry and to considerations involved in the constitutional struggle. The amnesty declaration is held up probably lest its publication should deprive Kemal of a loophole for attack on his political enemies. No decision has been reached as to the arrangements for the conduct of diplomatic relations at Constantinople, est a special régime in this city add to its importance and detract from that of Angora. I would draw your Lordship's attention in this respect to the account of my conversation with Adnan Bey given in my despatch No. 715 of to-day's date. Adnan has himself, I am inclined to believe, leanings towards the Opposition. He is Deputy for Constantinople, as are Reouf Bey and Refet and Kiazim Karabekir Pashas. He told me that if he were to recommend a special diplomatic régime for Constantinople he would first have to resign, otherwise his motives would be misunderstood. Ismet was, he said, his friend and capable of appreciating facts, but the majority of the Deputies of the Grand National Assembly were neither. He was more outspoken and contemptuous in this respect than I have ever known him to be. He described the *amour-propre* of that Assembly as ferocious. I gave him a very clear warning that if, in the matter of the foreign representatives, the Assembly did not come off its high horse that *amour-propre* was likely to be very severely shaken. In the end he said that he would write privately and confidentially to Ismet what he did not dare to put in an official communication.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10932/199/44] No. 54.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 724.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 6, 1923.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 711, Confidential, of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that in to-day's issue of the "Tanin" Hussein Djahid Bey replies vigorously to the recent "Yeni Gyun" article in which the members of the House of Osman were classed as the basest persons in Turkey. Hussein Djahid Bey remarks that, if it had been desired to discredit the republic, better propaganda could not have been found, and, after referring to the failure of the ruling dynasty to take its part in the national struggle, the article concludes:—

> "Because of their behaviour the House of Osman lost the Sultanate. But it must not be forgotten that the dynasty of Osman is to-day the dynasty of the Caliphate. To-day the Caliph of the Moslem world belongs to the House of Osman, and the Caliph of to-morrow will be chosen from among the 'persons' whom the 'Yeni Gyun' considers 'the basest people of Turkey.'
>
> "There is either a Caliph or there is not. If there is, he must be respected, and the feelings of millions of Turks and Moslems who nourish sentiments of respect towards him must not be wounded. It was the Grand National Assembly of Turkey which maintained the House of Osman as the House of the Caliphate. It is also the Grand National Assembly which chooses the Caliph. In that case, what is the meaning of these attacks?
>
> "To-day we are going as far as India for subscriptions for the Turks who will arrive from Greece. What links Indians to us? Is there any other link than that of Islam and the presence of the Caliph in our country? If the Indians show the 'Yeni Gyun' article to our delegation and ask why they come to ask for money after such an insult to the Caliph and the Caliphial House, what shall we reply? It must not be forgotten that this attack does not come from an irresponsible person or journalist, but from the People's party, *i.e.*, from the politicians who administer Turkey. The conscience of this nation does not agree that the highest interests of this country and nation should be sacrificed to gratify the babbling of drunkenness.
>
> "For the establishment of the solidarity of Turkey with the Moslem world, the Turkish nation has made sacrifices for centuries, has protected the holy cities, has shed its blood and has poured out treasure. The 'Yeni Gyun,' thanks to the indulgence or consent of the People's party, has no right to destroy the moral force resulting from centuries of effort or to break the ties between Turkey and the Moslem world.
>
> "As soon as the republic was proclaimed, an article was added to the Press Law according to which persons guilty of defamation against the President of the Republic are liable to three years' imprisonment. Is it not necessary to have the same regulations for the protection of the dignity of the Caliphate? For those who had not this necessity in mind, are not the evil, harmful words of the 'Yeni Gyun' sufficient proofs? We are compelled, in the name of Turkish and Moslem public opinion, to show respect to him whom we know as our Caliph and to ensure that he is respected."

2. I have ventured to quote the above article at some length, partly because it comes from the pen of the leading Opposition writer in Turkey, and partly because it seems to me to afford definite proof that the Opposition will strive by every means in its power to counteract any efforts that Angora may make so to discredit the House of Osman as to ensure that its final disappearance be viewed with indifference.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON

[E 10933/343/44] No. 55.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 725. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 7, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to state that I have read with great interest the various reports which your Lordship has been good enough to transmit to me on the attitude of Moslems outside Turkey towards the present Caliph and their views regarding the abolition of the temporal power of the Caliphate as a consequence of the abolition of the Sultanate.

2. I am in full agreement with the statement on p. 4 of the report enclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 905, Confidential, of the 17th ultimo, dated the 11th September, from the Government of Bombay, to the effect that it is of the utmost importance that there should not even be the semblance of any outside interference for the present in the settlement of the Khilafat. I am inclined, however, to question the statement in the penultimate paragraph of the report from the agent to the Governor-General in Central India to the effect that Mustafa Kemal Pasha could not have held the position of Khalifa as well as that of Sultan. The claim of the Ottoman Sultans to the Caliphate was based primarily on the right of conquest. None of the Sultan-Caliphs were descendants of the Prophet, or even Arabs, and none of them were chosen by the "Community of Islam."

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 10802/7734/44] No. 56.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 325.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 514 of 6th November: Turkish representative in London.

You may inform Turkish Government of the King's *agrément* to the appointment of Yussuf Kemal as Turkish representative here.

[E 10971/199/44] No. 57.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 517. Private.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Constantinople, November* 12, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 324.

I have received private letter from Ismet Pasha expressing keen pleasure at the receipt of and sincere thanks for your personal message.

He begs me to assure your Lordship of the great satisfaction with which he looks back at the period of co-operation with you in restoring peace in the East, and of his deep conviction of valuable assistance which your Lordship, as His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, will afford him in consolidating good relations so happily established between the two countries.

[E 10994/8766/44] No. 58.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 518.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 13, 1923.

I AM forwarding by bag lengthy communication received from Turkish Government and addressed to all Lausanne signatory Powers protesting against alleged prosecution of Moslems in Thrace and systematic violation by Greece of engagements under Exchange of Populations Agreement.

Note in particular accuses Greece—

1. Of intimidating Moslems into abandoning their property;
2. Preventing them, except in the case of Mitylene, from removing their goods and live-stock;
3. Confiscating and destroying their title-deeds; and
4. Compelling them to leave in disorder without awaiting participation of Mixed Commission, *e.g.*, none of those who have reached Turkey have been provided with declaration stipulated in article 14 of convention.

Note, in asking Powers to use good offices at Athens, draws attention to menace to peace in Near East and to loss of confidence in and prejudice to authority of League of Nations as a result of Greek attitude.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 130.)

[E 10995/5766/44] No. 59.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 519.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 13, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Question of Greek ill-treatment of Moslems was the subject of heated debate in the Grand National Assembly on 10th November, during which several Deputies insisted on reprisals. Ismet Pasha declined to resort to reprisals, but undertook to make energetic protest.

Note is the outcome of debate which was possibly initiated with a view to weakening Ismet's position, but there has been violent outcry in the Turkish press both here and at Angora for some time past on the subject of these alleged persecutions.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 131.)

[E 11027/7862/44] No. 60.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 15.)

(No. 1014.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November* 14, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 396: Turkish Reparation Convention.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs agree regarding title, proposed description of nationals and amendment of article 2; they prefer that this amendment should read: ". . . . dommages ci-après définis subis par les ressortissants des Puissances contractantes."

Ministry for Foreign Affairs also agree that Serbia should be entitled to accede to the convention, but consider that provision should be made for this accession by the insertion of a sentence in article 8 of the convention, which would read:—

". . . . Elle entrera en vigueur pour chaque Puissance contractante en même temps que ledit traité de paix.

"Avant l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix de Lausanne, l'État serbe-croate-slovène aura la faculté d'adhérer à la présente convention, lorsqu'il aura signé ce traité de paix.

"En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires . . . ."

I shall be grateful for early information as to whether your Lordship agrees to this proposed amendment of article 8.

[E 11043/8766/44] No. 61.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 15.)

(No. 548.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November* 14, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 518.

Mr. Alexander Pallis, member of Mixed Commission, tells me that similar protest had been received by commission. With so many refugees in Macedonia there was naturally some confusion and disorder, but this, commission were trying to remedy. Until commission were organised Greek Government had purposely prohibited departure of Moslems, excepting those in Mitylene. A certain amount of live stock had been requisitioned, but by agreement reached in commission all live stock requisitioned since 7th October was to be restored.

As regards points 3 and 4, Turkish Government had evidently not taken the trouble to enquire into the matter. There were at Salonica about 2,500 Moslem families or about 10,000 souls on their way from Serbia to Turkey. These appeared to have left in some disorder, but they had nothing to do with Greek Government or Mixed Commission. Breaches of Lausanne Treaty had been committed by Turks in Constantinople, and Greek Government would have ground for protest about these.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 11072/8766/44] No. 62.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 16.)

(No. 551.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November* 15, 1923.

MY telegram No. 548.

Head of Political Bureau spoke to me to-day about this as Greek Government have received full text of complaint. He was very heated at levity of complaints when compared with horrors inflicted on Christians last year, and to which they are still exposed in Asia Minor. He wondered what was at the back of Turkish mind in making complaint, and he feared that they sought to excuse the getting rid of Greeks from Constantinople. Greek Government were preparing a counter-complaint, copy of which he would send to me.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 11027/7862/44] No. 63.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (*Paris*).

(No. 403.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 1014 of 14th November: Turkish Reparation Convention. We concur.

[E 10931/7734/44] No. 64.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 1028.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1923.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 715 of the 6th November reporting your conversation with Adnan Bey on the subject of Turkish representation in Europe, the intention of the Grand National Assembly to appoint Ambassadors to the capitals of the Great Powers, and their desire that His Majesty's Government should build an Embassy at Angora.

2. I note that Adnan Bey informed you, as reported in your despatch No. 723 of the 6th November, that until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lausanne, Yussuf Kemal Bey's status in this country will be that of "unofficial representative" In these

circumstances I am prepared to grant to him similar treatment to that accorded to you in Constantinople. In order, however, to avoid all misunderstanding, I desire to explain that I am not prepared to receive or treat Yussuf Kemal Bey as an Ambassador until such time as His Majesty's Government have taken a decision regarding His Majesty's representative at Constantinople. You will be aware that on the re-establishment of friendly relations between the Powers it is in any case not customary to appoint Ambassadors forthwith but only Ministers, as was done on the signature of peace with Germany.

3. With regard to Adnan Bey's remarks about Angora, I may add that I am not prepared to entertain the idea of building at Angora or of sending an Ambassador to that town.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11102/7734/44] No. 65.

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 17.)

(No. 1385.)
My Lord, *Washington, November* 9, 1923.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 450 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of note from the United States Government regarding the question of diplomatic representation in Turkey.

I have, &c.
H. G. CHILTON.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Mr. Hughes to Mr. Chilton.

Sir, *Department of State, Washington, November* 8, 1923.

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 25th October, 1923, referring to proposed British diplomatic representation in Turkey. You indicate that your Government is ready to send an Ambassador to Constantinople after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, on the understanding that facilities will be afforded to him for treating with the Turkish Government through a representative of the latter at Constantinople, as well as through a subordinate officer representing the Ambassador at Angora, but that your Government is determined in no circumstances to send an Ambassador to the latter place. You enquire whether the Government of the United States shares these views, and whether it concurs in the opinion that it would be preferable to leave to the Turks the onus of opening the subject.

While the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey is not, as in the case of the Allied Governments, dependent upon the ratification of a treaty, this fact in no way precludes consultation with a view to common action in the matter of the character and place of residence of their respective diplomatic representatives in Turkey.

This Government, upon the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Turkish Government, would not be opposed to the sending of an Ambassador to Constantinople on the understanding that proper facilities and courtesies would be accorded him by the Turkish Government. Under present circumstances the sending of an Ambassador to Angora is not contemplated.

In case it should later appear that the decision of the Turkish authorities to establish Angora as their capital is a definite one, a point which can hardly be ascertained at the moment, it may be expedient to re-examine the situation. Meanwhile it is felt that the initiative in raising the question of the place of residence of the foreign Diplomatic Corps in Turkey can properly be left to the Turkish Government and more definite decisions reached in the light of subsequent developments.

Accept, &c.
CHARLES E. HUGHES.

[E 11126/52/44]

No. 66.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 742.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 13, 1923.

SIX weeks have elapsed since the dramatic *coup* of Papa Eftim Effendi was effected at the Greek Patriarchate, but in the interval little real progress seems to have been made towards the establishment of official relations between the Patriarchate and the Turkish Government.

2. Once appointed representative of the Patriarchate at Angora, as reported in my despatch No. 635 of the 9th ultimo, Papa Eftim lost no time in returning to the capital. Before doing so, however, he took care to have his own salary fixed at the rate, an almost princely one for any Turkish official, of 450 Turkish liras monthly, and also extorted from the Patriarchate a grant ostensibly for the relief of Ottoman Greeks in Anatolia. On his arrival at Angora, the Turkish authorities proceeded to announce, through the semi-official press, that as the Patriarchate was entirely a religious institution it had no right of representation at the capital, and that, therefore, Papa Eftim could not be recognised in a representative capacity. He apparently succeeded, however, in establishing unofficial contact with the competent Government Department, and does, I am informed, periodically send colourless reports to the Patriarchate to the effect that the authorities are satisfied with the progress of events in Patriarchal circles. Nevertheless no direct communication has yet reached the Patriarchate from any Turkish authority in spite of the fact that several efforts have been made by the former to open official relations.

3. There has never been any doubt that Papa Eftim Effendi acted throughout as the unofficial agent of the Government, and it was with his approval that on the 16th October the Provisional Synod issued to all archbishops depending on the Œcumenical Patriarchate an encyclical inviting them to send, within a period of forty days, their votes for the appointment of a new Patriarch. On the receipt of these votes it was proposed to proceed with the election in the manner indicated in my despatch No. 616, but I understand that before his departure Papa Eftim made known his desire that the new Patriarch should be Kyril, Metropolitan of Rhodopolis, who, after the *coup* of the 2nd October, had been nominated President of the Provisional Synod, and who had only a short time before arrived in Constantinople from Anatolia.

4. Matters have now been somewhat simplified by the receipt from Mgr. Meletios of his official letter of resignation. This letter was read at the session of the Synod on the 10th instant, and the Patriarchal throne was thereupon declared canonically vacant. I learn, however, that the seven bishops, whose exclusion from the Synod was ordered by Papa Eftim, contend that the resignation is, according to the canons of the Church, invalid, as it could only be made effective as a result of its acceptance by the authorities who appointed the Patriarch, *i.e.*, by the Mixed Council of the Œcumenical Patriarchate. In this difference of opinion may well be the seeds of future dissension, but for the present Patriarchate affairs are being carried out in the manner suggested by Eftim. But thirty of the forty days, during which votes were to be recorded, have already passed, and as only four votes have so far reached the Patriarchate, it seems possible that the election of a new Patriarch will be delayed, and that matters will remain in their present unsatisfactory state for some time to come unless the Turkish authorities once more choose arbitrarily to impose their will on the Patriarchate and the Holy Synod.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Mr. Bentinck.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 11127/199/44]

No. 67.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 743.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 13, 1923.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 724 of the 6th instant, to acquaint your Lordship that the "Aksham" published a further article on the 9th instant insisting that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic had reopened the question of the Caliphate, and that, in spite of statements to the contrary, it was a fact

that His Majesty the Caliph wished to abdicate. In that event, the "Aksham" continued, the Caliphate, which, in its present form, could do no active work, would be remodelled, possibly by means of a Congress at Constantinople, at which all Moslem countries would be represented. The Congress would elect a Caliph, who, having the vote of the whole Moslem world, could carry out his duties more effectively than was at present possible.

2. The challenge of the "Aksham" was at once taken up by the other newspapers in Constantinople. The "Tevhid-i-Efkiar" and the "Vatan" published interviews with the Caliph, in which His Majesty is reported to have stated that his election had been regularly made, and had been approved by the whole Moslem world. He had no idea where the rumours respecting his abdication had originated. He paid no attention to such rumours. He occupied himself with affairs interesting Islam, and took no part in politics. With regard to the holding of a Moslem Congress in Constantinople to define the religious duties of the Caliphate, he stated that this matter would be kept in view, but the National Government, which was the support of the Caliphate, had been so absorbed with internal problems that it had hitherto been unable to deal with it.

3. The "Ileri" observed that it was strange to insist on the reports of the abdication of the Caliph, seeing that they had been authoritatively denied. It could see no connection between the proclamation of the republic and the creation of a question of the Caliphate. His Majesty Abdul Mejid had been regularly elected Caliph, and his election had been approved by all Moslem countries. The refusal of Morocco was of no importance, that country being under foreign protection, and being neither free nor independent. It concluded with a reference to the last Sultan of Turkey, British propaganda in favour of whom had been received with scorn in India, and to the King of the Hedjaz, "the Sherif Hussein," whose claims to the Caliphate had been rejected by every Moslem country. The enemies of Islam wished to sow discord among Mussulmans.

4. The "Ikdam" pointed out that even if certain persons found that it served their interests and designs to detach the Caliphate from the House of Osman, the sacred and sublime interests of Islam demanded that His Majesty Abdul Mejid should remain Caliph. The abdication of His Majesty would raise the question of the dynasty, which was eagerly awaited by certain persons. The detachment of the Caliphate from the dynasty of Osman might involve the passing of the Caliphate into the hands of persons of doubtful independence, and result in the destruction of the Caliphate. Consequently, the Moslem nations could not permit the Caliphate to pass into other hands.

5. The "Tanin" of the 9th instant was even more outspoken than the "Ikdam." After referring to the modification of the Constitution, the proclamation of the republic and the election of the first president, it stated that the Caliphate had been so vigorously attacked that doubts had arisen whether the object was not to add the office of Caliph to the other offices filled by the President of the Republic.

6. The "Aksham" of the following day reverted to the question of the Caliph's abdication, and stated that, "like the whole country," it had received the news that His Majesty had no intention of abdicating with great pleasure. It insisted, however, that if, in the course of events, the abdication were to take place, the form of the Caliphate and the mode of election of the Caliph would be altered. The Grand National Assembly had laid down the principle of electing as Caliph "the best and most worthy member of the House of the Sultanate." It would, however, be difficult to find in that House a suitable successor to the present Caliph, and it would be necessary to alter the mode of election. Future Caliphs might be elected by representatives of all Moslem countries, but this question could not be conveniently debated at present, although preliminary enquiries might be made.

7. As the first report of the impending resignation of the Caliph appeared in the "Ileri" of the 4th instant, and as it is notoriously the principal Kemalist organ in Constantinople, special interest attaches to the subsequent article published by that newspaper, which would indicate that, whatever may be his ulterior object, Mustafa Kemal is not prepared for the moment to push the matter further.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 11130/7734/44] No. 68.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 746.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the choice of Angora as the capital of Turkey.

Constantinople, November 14, 1923.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Henderson.

LA délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de son Excellence M. le représentant de Sa Majesté britannique que la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie a, dans sa séance du 13 octobre 1923, désigné la ville d'Angora comme capitale de la République turque.

Constantinople, le 12 *novembre* 1923.

[E 11168/11168/44] No. 69.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 521.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, November 19, 1923.

STRIKE has broken out on Turkish section of Orient Railway.

[E 11167/8766/44] No. 70.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 561.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Athens, November 19, 1923.

MY telegram No. 551.

Counter-complaint has been addressed to Governments signatories of Lausanne Treaty, and Greek Chargé d'Affaires in London has been instructed to present it to you. I will forward copy to Constantinople.

[E 11176/1019/65] No. 71.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 20.)

Sir,

Downing Street, November 19, 1923.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th November on the subject of the Irak frontier negotiations, and to state, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, that his Grace adheres to the views expressed in this Department letter of the 20th September as to the undesirability of holding these negotiations in Constantinople for the reasons therein stated.

2. His Grace observes that, in spite of the note handed to Dr. Adnan Bey, of which a copy was transmitted to this Department with your letter of the 2nd November, the Turkish Government profess to remain under the impression that the negotiations have not yet been opened. His Grace would be glad to learn whether his Lordship is satisfied that the contention advanced in the note referred to above is unassailable, and that the League of Nations will agree that the period of nine months during which the negotiations are to take place did in effect commence on the 5th October. It seems possible that the position may, in reality, be accepted by the Turkish Government in spite of their professions to the contrary, and if this is the case, it appears that insistence upon London, if coupled with a renewed intimation on the lines of the High Commissioner's note, might have the effect of overcoming the objections of the Turkish Government, who are possibly no less reluctant than are His Majesty's Government to see the frontier question submitted to the arbitration of the League.

3. If, however, insistence upon London as the venue for the negotiations is deemed impracticable, his Grace would be prepared to concur in a suggestion being made that Geneva or some other neutral locality should be selected for the purpose. It is perhaps to be inferred from the fact that the Turkish Government have selected Constantinople rather than Angora as their counter-proposal that they will be prepared to accept some such compromise.

I am, &c.
J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 11194/10121/44] No. 72.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 21.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

War Office, November 20, 1923.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to transmit, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, the accompanying copy of a report from Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Harington to the Secretary of State for War, dealing with the part played by the British forces in Turkey during the period from November 1920 until their withdrawal in October last, which they do not propose to publish.

I am, &c.
H. J. CREEDY.

Enclosure in No. 72.

Lieutenant-General Sir C. H. Harington to the Secretary of State for War.

(Confidential.)

My Lord,

General Headquarters, Constantinople, October 20, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to forward the following despatch dealing with the part played by the British forces in Turkey during the period between November 1920 and the end of the Allied occupation in 1923. This period covers many interesting phases of the Near East problem, during some of which the situation has been very acute and hostilities imminent, but I am happy to report that the British forces have come through a trying and difficult period with credit.

2. I will only deal briefly with the earlier period, which dates from a fateful week in November 1920, when the following events took place :—

(*a.*) The *débâcle* of General Wrangel's army, which was thrown into Constantinople in a deplorable state,
(*b.*) The fall of Kars,
(*c.*) The overthrow of Veniselos,

all of which had a great effect on the situation. The influx of this large number of Russians into Constantinople made the problem of maintenance a very difficult one. Although the responsibility for this fell mainly on the French, it was necessary, for humanitarian reasons, for all possible help to be given. The help given by the British sailors and soldiers at that time was typical of their generosity to those in distress.

3. At this time, by agreement with the Allies, the British forces had been reduced to one cavalry regiment, one brigade Royal Field Artillery, two British and four Indian battalions. I also had the 11th Greek division at Ismid under my command, and the 2/4th battalion Archipelago Regiment. The French troops consisted of six battalions, one brigade field artillery and two squadrons of cavalry, and the Italian troops of one battalion.

4. The military situation was as follows :—

General Paraskevopoulos had carried out a successful campaign in Asia Minor, which ended in the capture of Brusa and the occupation of Eastern Thrace by the Greek army.

The Kemalist army was at this time in its infancy. It consisted mainly of belligerent bands under certain energetic and patriotic leaders, with Mustafa Kemal at their head, and in no way could be considered a serious military factor. It may also be recorded that it was from this period that the Soviet influence began to make itself felt, both at Angora and in Constantinople. I found it necessary to carry out the arrest of certain people who were engaged in matters affecting the security of the Allied forces. These included certain Bolshevik agents, who were transported to South Russia.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

5. We were able, during the winter of 1920 and spring of 1921, to deal with the situation in Constantinople, but as the Kemalist army grew in strength and organisation, it was evident to me that the foundation was being laid at Angora of a weapon which was intended to drive the Greek army out of Anatolia and force the Allies to evacuate Constantinople. As I was not very sanguine of the reliability of the Greek army for serious operations, I asked for permission to go home and explain the situation—which I did—to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (the late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Bart., G.C.B., D.S.O.) and also to the late Cabinet. My views were contained in a memorandum (C.P. 2981 of the 26th May, 1921) in which I represented that the British forces in Constantinople appeared to be without a definite objective. In my opinion, the force was too small to impose its will and too large merely to hold up the flag, and from this opinion I have never wavered. Based on purely military reasons I recommended the withdrawal of the British force from Constantinople in the above paper.

6. In view of the constant changes in the Greek army, subsequent to the fall of Veniselos, I doubted the ability of that army to carry out serious operations. In my opinion the material was good, but I did not think that the Greek High Command and Staff—many of whom were untried—were capable of bringing large operations to a successful conclusion, especially if a check was received. The latter months of 1921 proved this to be correct. After an initial failure to capture Eskishehr, both this place and Afium Karahissar were subsequently captured by a well-conducted operation. After this, however, the Greek army embarked on further operations, having for their objective the capture of Angora. The plans for this were well conceived, but required a highly trained Higher Command and Staff to carry them out. The Greek army was, at this time, unbeaten, and, in my opinion, a serious mistake was made in attempting to carry out the capture of Angora, which, in itself, even if successful, would not have beaten the Kemalist army in the field; also, the problem of the maintenance of an army so far from its base was bound to be a difficult one, and one necessitating a highly trained Staff. The Greek plan, as I said above, was a brilliant one; but, as soon as checked east of the Sakaria River, the value of the Greek army was known to the Turks, and the Staff was not capable of carrying out the complicated manœuvres required. Troubles of supply set in, with the result that the Greek army was forced to come back to its original line. It was, however, able to beat off an attempt on the part of the Kemalists to capture Afium Karahissar.

7. This was followed by a stalemate. Both sides were about evenly balanced and neither appeared to have the power to force a decision. It became then a question of the *moral* of the two armies. The Greek army was naturally disappointed at its non-success, whilst the Kemalist army had made up its mind that, with further reorganisation, training and equipment, it would be able to defeat the Greek army. In other words, one army had an objective while the other had not.

8. Then followed a period during which the Kemalist authorities made strenuous efforts to equip their army, and there is no doubt that a large amount of equipment and arms was smuggled secretly to that army from various sources. The British remained strictly neutral throughout, giving no assistance of any kind to either side.

I would add that, before operations commenced, I had asked permission to hand back the 11th Greek Division and the 2/4th battalion of the Archipelago Regiment, in order that the British should not be involved. This request was granted.

9. I had also, in July 1921, been granted command of the Allied forces, the French contingent being about the same size as our own and the Italian contingent considerably less. From this time, with the help of my colleagues—Lieutenant-Colonel E. Mombelli, K.C.M.G., and Major-General Ch. Charpy, C.B.—I was able to initiate several Allied measures of administration which have been beneficial to the maintenance of law and order in Constantinople.

10. As time went on, it is safe to say that the initiative passed to the Turks. The Greek finance failed, and the army began to show signs of discontent. Many changes were made in the Greek army from time to time for political reasons, and that army in Anatolia never again settled down for serious traning for war.

11. In the spring of 1922 it became evident that the Greeks were having great difficulty in maintaining their army in the field, and in March 1922 they placed themselves in the hands of the Allied Powers with a view to a satisfactory settlement being reached. It was hoped that the decisions of the Allied Conference in Paris in March 1922 would lead to this result, but, as will be remembered, the Turks would not accept the conditions offered, although all plans had been made for the carrying out of the evacuation of the Greek army from Anatolia under Allied supervision. It

will always be a matter of regret to me that the Allied scheme for the evacuation of the Greek army and the installation of Turkish administration in Western Anatolia was never carried out. Had it been, Western Anatolia and Smyrna would not be a scene of devastation to-day.

12. The Greeks then appointed General Hadjianestis as Commander-in-chief, who, it is understood, when visiting his army, led them to believe that they would shortly be withdrawn to a more contracted front covering Smyrna. He, at the same time, conceived a plan for transferring a portion of his army to Eastern Thrace with a view to capturing Constantinople by a *coup de main*. This, in my opinion, was an ill-conceived scheme and never had any chance of success. At a certain moment, when I had definite information in my possession that this attack was to take place, I issued a communiqué warning the Greeks that any attempt to cross the neutral zone, as laid down by the Allied High Commissioners in May 1921, would be resisted by the Allied forces, and, at the same time, I transferred the bulk of the British troops on the Ismid Peninsula to the Chatalja lines, placing the same under the command of Major-General Ch. Charpy, C.B. The French at this time received reinforcements of three battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry. These measures proved to be successful, and the Greeks did not press their attack. The neutral line referred to ran from Kalikratia–Sinekli just west of Istranja to the Black Sea, some 40 miles west of Constantinople.

13. The Turks, however, took advantage of the transfer of Greek troops from Anatolia to launch an offensive. Their plan was a brilliant one, and was launched with great force in the neighbourhood of Afium Karahissar. It was known that the Turks were endeavouring to obtain a success, but it is doubtful whether they anticipated operations on the scale which followed. The southern group of the Greek army broke badly, as is well known, and never put up any serious resistance after the first day. It was eventually driven from Anatolia in one of the greatest *débâcles* in history. Credit must, however, be given to part of the northern group which extricated itself successfully to Thrace.

14. The Turks, naturally elated by their success, next turned their attention to the Allied forces in Anatolia. At that time these forces were wholly British, and at Chanak I only had one British battalion of the Loyal Regiment and two British battalions on the Ismid Peninsula. In order to show the Allied unity, I asked the French and Italian High Commissioners to assist me with French and Italian detachments at both Chanak and on the Ismid Peninsula, which request was readily granted, and I issued a communiqué exactly similar to the one referred to in paragraph 12. The French and Italian Governments, however, did not approve and ordered their detachments in Anatolia to be withdrawn. The true defence of Constantinople lies on the Asiatic side in the defence of the Maltepe–Dodulu–Chiboukli line, some 10 miles east of the Bosphorus, which had been prepared for defence by the Allied troops. The decision of the French and Italian Governments that none of their troops were to be employed on the Asiatic side made my position very difficult, as I had insufficient British troops with which to defend either the Ismid Peninsula or Chanak against a serious attack, and it soon became evident that the Turks were concentrating against both places. I reinforced Chanak from my local resources and withdrew all the troops which I had sent to the Chatalja lines. The British forces were certainly taken at a disadvantage, as, during the previous two years, I had spared no effort to effect reductions and a saving in the expense of the forces, and it is safe to say that, when these dangers came upon us, the forces were practically immobile. It required, therefore, great efforts to improvise the means by which we could carry on until reinforcements arrived.

15. On the 9th September, 1922, I sent Colonel Commandant D. I. Shuttleworth, C.B.E., D.S.O., to organise the defence of Chanak. The situation was rapidly becoming serious. He only had one battalion of infantry—the Loyals—one squadron 3rd Hussars, and one battery Royal Field Artillery. He was shortly afterwards reinforced by the 1st battalion the Gordon Highlanders and the 2nd battalion the Royal Sussex Regiment from Malta. The work of this little force, under the able and energetic direction of its commander—assisted by detachments landed by the Royal Navy to wire and dig trenches—is worthy of all praise. This force was threatened by very superior numbers. I directed all available reinforcements, including 1st battalion the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the 2nd battalion Sherwood Foresters, 2nd battalion the Highland Light Infantry, 17th and 19th brigades Royal Field Artillery, and 5th pack artillery brigade Royal Garrison Artillery to Chanak, and I was always comforted by the fact that each hour the position was being strengthened by all ranks of this stout-hearted little force.

On the 26th September, 1922, I sent Major-General T. O. Marden, C.B., C.M.G., to re-form the 28th Division at Chanak, and to receive the further reinforcements of artillery and infantry which were arriving, which included the 2nd battalion the Royal Fusiliers, the 2nd battalion the Rifle Brigade, and also units of the Royal Air Force. Major-General Marden at once pushed out his force to extend his perimeter. He took in further ground to the north covering Nagara Point, which proved of great value.

16. By this time, the Allied note of the 23rd September, 1922, had been presented and the Mudania Conference was in sight. I was, therefore, anxious to avoid any conflict if possible, and I issued instructions accordingly. The Turkish attitude, however, very nearly precipitated matters. Their object was to pin the British troops to their position. At first their troops, which were drawn from mounted units, did not appear to take the situation very seriously, but later these troops were replaced by infantry, who apparently had orders to provoke a conflict. The situation became extremely critical. Every officer and man in the British force was trying his utmost to carry out my wishes to reach the opening of the Mudania Conference without incident. Twice Major-General Marden, who was loyally carrying out my instructions, telegraphed to me to say that he feared the limit of human endurance and safety had been reached and operations were imminent. Twice I replied that I fully endorsed any action he thought fit to take, as I felt that everything possible had been done. Twice I expected to hear in the morning that operations had commenced. No words of mine can express my admiration of the way in which Major-General Marden and his subordinate commanders handled this very difficult situation, and it speaks volumes for the self-restraint, forbearance and discipline of the British troops.

17. I was forced to represent the seriousness of the situation to His Majesty's Government, from which I received every help and support, even to the extent of being authorised, for the protection and safety of the troops under my command, to inform the Kemalist commander that his troops must be withdrawn behind the neutral line—the line fixed by the Allied High Commissioners in May 1921—within a time limit or fire would be opened. All preparations were made for issuing this warning, but happily the necessity was avoided within hours of the close of the meeting at Mudania. I was convinced that I was acting in the interests of peace, and in accordance with what I felt would be the wishes of His Majesty's Government, in withholding the warning, as I alone was in a position to judge the situation on the spot.

I had found it necessary, just previous to this time, to order the evacuation of the British women and children.

In consultation with the War Office and the Eastern Telegraph Company, I had the cable connecting Constantinople with Europe led over from the Asiatic to the European side of the Dardanelles, to be out of the reach of Nationalist sabotage. This measure proved useful, as the instruments on the Asiatic side were actually destroyed by the Nationalists' agents forty-eight hours later.

18. The Mudania Conference opened on the 3rd October, 1922, and resulted in the convention being signed on the 11th October, 1922. During the conference, reinforcements of artillery and infantry were arriving daily; the fleet had been considerably reinforced and a substantial air force was being disembarked and in process of getting ready for action. I will not dwell on the details of this conference. It was, I understood, to be a military conference of Allied generals to settle with General Ismet Pasha, commanding the Turkish western army, a line in Thrace behind which the Greek army should withdraw. I soon found, however, on arrival, that General Ismet Pasha was accompanied by political representatives, and that it was intended to draw the Allied generals into a discussion of political questions outside the province of their instructions. I firmly resisted this attempt. After many long and arduous discussions, we eventually presented General Ismet Pasha with the draft convention on the 9th October, as the limit to which we could go within our instructions. General Ismet Pasha asked for an adjournment until the following afternoon in order to consult his Government. I then returned in H.M.S. "Iron Duke" to Constantinople to complete my plans in case of a rupture, which I anticipated. On my return to Mudania next day, in H.M.S. "Carysfort," I was met by my colleagues, who informed me that the general atmosphere had changed towards peace and that General Ismet Pasha would sign, subject to agreement being reached on a few outstanding points. I was not, however, very sanguine, as I had very definite orders from His Majesty's Government to obtain a line of safety for my force at Chanak and also for the Straits, and also to get a number fixed for the gendarmerie to be allowed in Eastern Thrace. After much discussion we reached agreement, and the convention was signed early on the 11th October, 1922. The Greek delegation were unable to sign, as they had not received instructions from their Government. These

were given shortly afterwards. I would like to mention the difficult position in which the Greek delegation, under General Mazarakis, found themselves at Mudania. The Allied generals fully appreciated the soldierlike way in which the Greek delegation faced these distressing circumstances.

I should like here to record the loyal assistance which I received throughout from my colleagues, Generals Mombelli and Charpy, and also the help and support given to me by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., who went to Paris during this critical period, and by the British Government.

I should like also to record my appreciation of the way in which General Ismet Pasha carried out the negotiations. Though reserved at first, from the moment his suspicions were removed our relations became quite friendly, and every request I have made to him since has been granted.

19. I returned from Mudania hoping that matters would remain quiet until the conference at Lausanne opened, and which, at that time, I was under the impression would assemble on the 20th October, 1922. In this, however, I was disappointed, and we were soon faced with another difficult period. General Rafet Pasha arrived in Constantinople from Angora as the representative of the Government of the Grand National Assembly and with a view to proceeding to Eastern Thrace as Military Governor. He had several meetings with the Allied generals for the purpose of making arrangements regarding the evacuation of Eastern Thrace. At one of these he announced to us that the Sultan's Government had been overthrown that day, and that he had taken over Constantinople on behalf of the Government of the Grand National Assembly. It certainly came as a surprise to us when we realised that we were passing through a revolution. The introduction of the new régime very soon brought with it several measures extremely distasteful to the Allied occupation. The point of view taken by the Government of the Grand National Assembly at Angora was that the Allied occupation was in no way recognised, but only the presence of Allied troops without control was recognised. This led to a series of difficulties between the Allied generals and General Rafet Pasha, and it was only after great difficulty and patience that the Lausanne Conference was enabled to open on the 20th November, 1922, without a rupture at Constantinople having taken place. This constituted one of the most difficult periods through which we have passed. The Allied High Commissioners were naturally much disturbed by the new regulations issued almost daily by General Rafet Pasha, in the name of the Government of the Grand National Assembly, such as the increasing of customs dues and prices generally (resulting in a shortage of bread), assumption of control of Turkish police and gendarmerie, the suppression of Mixed Courts, the suspension of officials of the Ottoman Public Debt, the prohibition of certain articles indispensable to foreigners, &c., and several meetings were held between the Allied High Commissioners and Allied generals on the subject. It was agreed that the Allies should show a united front, and the Allied generals were instructed to see General Rafet Pasha with a view to endeavouring to overcome the difficulties. It was agreed that, if these could not be overcome, a state of siege would have to be instituted, and the Allied Governments agreed to this course. The Allied generals were able to induce General Rafet Pasha to modify some of the measures, but not all.

20. I was personally in favour of every possible avenue being explored before a state of siege was instituted, firstly, because it meant serious operations, the extent of which could not be gauged; and, secondly, I was unaware to what extent the French and Italian Governments would be prepared to send reinforcements to my assistance. Then, again, the brunt of the enemy's attack was certain to fall upon the British, and drastic action in Constantinople would have been the signal for the British forces at Chanak and on the Ismid Peninsula to be attacked. I explained, therefore, to the Allied High Commissioners that the institution of a state of siege would probably have meant the commencement of very serious operations, and that my troops, both at Constantinople and on the Ismid Peninsula, constituted my reserve troops for the defence of the Straits, the defence of which had been given to me as my primary objective; therefore, I was in no position to defend Constantinople. If I found myself unsupported by Allied troops—and it was impossible in the time for reinforcements to arrive—I should have to withdraw to the Gallipoli Peninsula, in which case all the Christian population in Constantinople would have been in a state of panic, and it was impossible to forecast what might happen. There were, at the time, some 350,000 Christians in Constantinople. It must be remembered that there was great uneasiness in Constantinople after the reports of the scenes which had taken place at Smyrna had been received, and the Christians were relying on our protection. The institution of a

state of siege would also have meant that we should have to take over the complete administration of the city under martial law, and we had not the means of finding the necessary officials. I therefore opposed it, and on looking back I am confident that my request to be allowed to continue my efforts to make a working arrangement with General Rafet Pasha, especially in view of the fact that we were within a few days of the Lausanne Conference, was the correct one. It was therefore with feelings of intense relief that the opening of that conference—on the 20th November, 1922—was reached.

21. During this period the Greek army had, in accordance with the Mudania Convention, been evacuated from Eastern Thrace with the assistance of Allied missions and troops, and by the 30th November, 1922, the Kemalist administration and gendarmerie had been established therein almost without incident, reflecting great credit on the Allied missions and troops concerned. In order to carry this out, I formed a composite brigade of three battalions under Colonel-Commandant W. B. Emery, C.B., C.M.G., whose duty it was to carry out the evacuation of that portion of Eastern Thrace entrusted to British supervision. The total number of Allied troops employed amounted to seven battalions. It was a high test of administration, which was carried through in a manner exceeding my anticipations. On the completion of this task, each of the Allies left one battalion on the Maritza to form a buffer between the Greeks and Turks in accordance with the arrangements made at Mudania.

The Turks made several charges of villages being destroyed and other acts of destruction in Eastern Thrace, but, thanks to the initiative of the British High Commissioner in having, before the Mudania Conference, suggested that Allied military missions should proceed to Rodosto, Adrianople and Kuleli Burgas, to use their influence with the Greek commanders and officials to prevent disorders of every kind, we were able to show the Turks that every care was being exercised and that their charges were in every case unfounded.

One cannot pass from this subject without reference to the assistance given to the Allied missions by General Nider, C.B., the General Officer Commanding the Greek army in Thrace, who in all his dealings with the British army acted with entire loyalty and straightforwardness throughout the operation.

22. At this time I was considerably exercised regarding the life and safety of His Majesty the Sultan, whose protection had been entrusted to me by the Allied High Commissioners. On the 16th November, 1922, however, he applied to me in writing for British protection, and two days later he was secretly removed from his palace under arrangements made by the 2nd battalion Grenadier Guards, and transferred to Malta in H.M.S. "Malaya." The task was a delicate one and was very well carried out by those concerned. The Sultan expressed his gratitude for the arrangements made.

23. During the earlier days of the Lausanne Conference our difficulties continued, but gradually we came to a certain understanding with the Kemalist authorities, and incidents decreased. There was, however, a considerable influx of Kemalist soldiers into Constantinople, and it was evident throughout that they had been preparing organisations, both in Eastern Thrace and in Constantinople, which, in the event of a rupture, would have carried out active operations against the Allies. Thanks to the excellence of my intelligence service, I was fully informed of all these preparations throughout.

24. At the same time, it is only fair to say that the terms of the Mudania Convention regarding the actual line of demarcation agreed upon were not infringed by the Kemalist troops. These lines of demarcation were actually settled on the ground between Allied and Kemalist officers. The Kemalist forces which could have been brought against us at this time were approximately 40,000 at Chanak, 50,000 on the Ismid Peninsula, 30,000 central reserve, 20,000 at Constantinople, and 20,000 in Eastern Thrace.

25. My instructions from home have been clear throughout, and I am very grateful for the confidence that has been extended to me. My orders have been to hold the Straits as my primary objective—

(*a.*) To hold Gallipoli at all costs.
(*b.*) To hold Chanak as long as I could without endangering my force.
(*c.*) To evacuate the Ismid Peninsula when forced to by threat of serious attack.
(*d.*) To evacuate Constantinople when forced to.

It must always be remembered that the troops on the Ismid Peninsula and at Constantinople were the reserve troops for the Dardanelles.

26. My plans were based on the above, and were made in conjunction with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The governing factor in any forced evacuation of Constantinople was the Royal Navy. Should I have been forced to withdraw from the Ismid Peninsula, it would have become a matter of days until the Turks could get guns on to the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, which would have made the anchorage untenable for the fleet. Consequently, I should have had to evacuate Constantinople before the fleet was forced to leave, and my arrangements were made accordingly. I have realised throughout the necessity for Allied unity. I have no hesitation in saying that the views of my colleagues and myself have coincided on all military questions. In this case, however, the instructions of their Governments differed from mine, as the retention of Constantinpole—partly owing to the number of their nationals—was given to them as their primary objective, whereas my primary objective was the Straits.

27. The colonies concerned at Constantinople were as follows: French, some 6,000; Italians, 15,000; British, 3,000. My greatest desire throughout has been to reach the signature of peace with our troops still holding the various fronts—Chanak, Ismid and Gallipoli peninsulas—and with the flag flying high in Constantinople. I am happy to think this has now been realised; there have been moments when it looked impossible. It was evident that, had a serious rupture taken place, the Turks would have attacked. Their objective was to drive the British out of Anatolia and to capture Constantinople. They hoped to achieve the latter by a *coup de main* whilst we were engaged in operations at Chanak and on the Ismid Peninsula. I had made my plans accordingly in conjunction with the Allies. Had the Turks attacked us in Constantinople, the Allied troops would have held a perimeter covering the embarkation of the French, Italian and British subjects and the subsequent embarkation of the British troops. The French troops were to hold Stamboul until such time as their own subjects were evacuated, and would then have withdrawn to Makrikeui, outside Constantinople. It would have been a very difficult operation to carry out, and I am much relieved that it has been avoided. Owing to all the secret and dangerous organisations in Constantinople, an operation of this nature would have given rise to panic, and the fate of the Christian population would undoubtedly have been very serious.

28. I was naturally very disappointed at the failure to reach an agreement at Lausanne in February, more especially as we were then approaching the finer weather, when, owing to the country drying up, operations would have been easier for the Turks. I had an opportunity of seeing General Ismet Pasha on his way through from Lausanne to Angora, and I gathered from him at that interview that he was sincerely desirous of obtaining a peaceful settlement. In view of the fact that peace had been so nearly attained at Lausanne, we had every hope that a settlement would be reached on the outstanding questions without either much delay or likelihood of further danger. It was therefore with confidence that we saw the second Conference of Lausanne open on the 20th April and watched its progress. As the weeks followed each other we became conscious of a serious difficulty arising between the Greeks and Turks on the question of reparations. Both parties remained firm. Our information showed that the Greek army had been thoroughly reorganised and was preparing in real earnest to cross the Maritza and retake Eastern Thrace. We also knew that the Turks had been secretly preparing to resist such advance. We were aware of other secret organisations which had been established by the Turks in Constantinople in order to resist the authority of the Allied forces of occupation. During this period, however, we became aware of the difficulties the Turks were experiencing in keeping their army in the field, and consequently that they had found it necessary to demobilise certain classes. The climax was reached on the 26th May, when happily an agreement was made between the Greeks and Turks regarding the reparations. I look back upon this moment as one of the most critical through which we have passed. Had the Greeks advanced on Constantinople, the position of the Allied forces of occupation in Constantinople would have been exceedingly difficult. I am only too thankful to have been spared the task of maintaining law and order under such circumstances.

29. Again I had reason to hope that, with agreement reached between the Greeks and Turks, we had surmounted the last obstacle to peace, but we were soon to find out that this was not the case. For many more weeks negotiations dragged on, the outstanding questions of coupons, concessions to various companies and evacuation proving most difficult. On more than one occasion a rupture at Lausanne appeared imminent. It is interesting to note that at the same time as the Angora Government was more stubborn and exacting in its demands, the Turkish army was getting weaker and decreasing in value. The men were getting tired and were demanding to be sent home; demobilisation was being carried out; discontent, augmented by difficulties of

supply and clothing, was setting in; so much so that early in June 1923 I became convinced that the Turkish army was not more than 50 per cent. of its value six months previously. I therefore felt it my duty to inform His Majesty's Government that I was of opinion that if the Allies should decide to stand firm and make no further concessions to the Turks, the Allied forces would be able to enforce any policy decided upon, provided the Allies were prepared to reinforce up to a similar strength to the British. I was convinced that the Turks would not push matters to extremes. I was soon to have an opportunity of testing their attitude. For months past I had been aware of the transport of men, guns, machine guns and equipment from Anatolia to Eastern Thrace, where a Turkish army was being built up, presumably to resist a Greek advance. This was strictly against the Mudania Convention, which allowed the formation of 8,000 gendarmerie only in Eastern Thrace. When the Greeks no longer threatened, I became aware of the Turkish intention to retransfer men, horses and guns to Anatolia.

30. On a certain day in June, after verifying my information from the air, I asked the naval Commander-in-chief to hold up the steamship "Umid," which was believed to be carrying guns from Silivri to Anatolia. This proved to be correct. The steamship "Umid" was escorted to Constantinople by H.M.S. "Splendid." She was boarded by a party of Grenadier Guards and Royal Marines, assisted by bluejackets of H.M.S. "Splendid." She was found to contain—

500 soldiers.
300 horses.
4 field guns.
14 mountain guns.

The whole operation was admirably carried out under the direction of Major R. E. Harenc, Indian army, assisted by my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant H. N. Leveson-Gower, R.A. Two field guns, the breech-blocks of two more field guns and fourteen mountain guns were removed and the ship subsequently released. No opposition was offered. All attempts of the Turks to explain away the presence of these guns in Eastern Thrace proved futile.

31. The last nine months has not been an easy period for the Allied forces, owing to the fact that the Angora Government has refused throughout to recognise our occupation, but only accepted our presence. This has led to certain incidents, owing to the fact that it has been necessary for the Allied generals to insist on our right to try any persons arrested for committing offences against the safety of the Allied forces. Although General Rafet Pasha agreed to this right of ours, the Angora Government constantly refused to recognise it. On the whole, however, it is a source of satisfaction that incidents have been so few. It was with relief that we learned that agreement had been reached on all points at Lausanne and that peace would be signed on the 24th July, 1923, and that the Allied forces were all to be evacuated within six weeks of ratification by the Angora Government The closing stages call for little comment.

32. On the eve of peace being signed on the 24th July I issued a special order to the troops, asking them to conduct themselves with dignity and to maintain the high standard of discipline and restraint which they had shown throughout. I also paid an official visit to the Turkish Military Governor, General Selaheddin Adil Pasha, to wish peace and prosperity to Turkey, and requested him to assist in establishing the old traditions which have existed formerly between the British and Turkish armies, so that incidents might be avoided and so that we might carry away with us the same respect which our forces have always had for one another, either as friend or foe. I also said we should leave behind us in Turkish soil the bodies of many thousands of our forces who had given their lives in fair fight, and we felt sure their memory would always be respected. The Allied generals also decided that the usual compliments paid between armies should be observed as regards the Turkish forces. General Selaheddin Adil Pasha readily agreed, and gave orders accordingly. I am happy to report that the peace celebrations in Constantinople passed off without incident as regards the forces.

33. I would draw attention to the refugee question during the period under review. In the early days of November 1920, after General Wrangel's defeat, we were faced with some 140,000 Russians, and this was later followed by some 70,000 Turkish refugees. To this must be added the Armenians and other nationalities, and the influx of nearly 100,000 Greek refugees from Anatolia made this problem one of constant anxiety. I cannot speak too highly of the generosity that has been shown by the British services and the British colony in affording relief, and great credit is due to the inter-Allied sanitary authorities for their efforts in preserving the health of this city

under such circumstances. We have been very fortunate in avoiding any serious disease. I would like to pay a tribute to the work of the American Red Cross and Near East Relief as regards this vast problem, and to the League of Nations' work under Mr. Lawford Childs, and also to the work of the Allied and other nations. It is only fair to judge by results: On the termination of the Allied occupation only some 7,000 Russians remain, the majority of whom have regular employment, whilst others are going to America, Bulgaria and other places. The Turkish refugees have returned to their homes and the whole of the Greek refugees have been transported to Greece and other places. It is indeed a record of which all concerned may well be proud.

34. At my inspection of every unit in the force I have been immensely impressed with the spirit throughout. The decision of the late Government to reinforce this force last September, and the rapidity with which these reinforcements were despatched by the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, undoubtedly saved the situation and made the Turk decide to stay his hand. The way in which the reinforcements were dealt with, the accommodation which was erected and the base which was established at Kelia, also the measures which have been taken for the comfort and recreation of the troops, in order to get through the winter months, reflects the highest credit on all concerned, and I am glad to record that these efforts have been greatly appreciated by the troops themselves. The behaviour of the troops and the standard set by them, not only amongst the troops of our Allies, but amongst all nations in Constantinople, is worthy of all praise. Constantinople is a thoroughly bad city for troops, beset as it is with bad drink and disease, and I cannot speak too highly of the efforts made by the officers of the force, the officers' wives, the Navy, Army and Air Force institutes and the Y.M.C.A. to help the men and to provide counter-attractions. The steady improvement in the health of this force during the last three years is a matter of great comfort to me, and reflects the greatest credit on the medical and sanitary services, which have been carried out throughout to my entire satisfaction.

This is, I understand, the first occasion on which the Navy, Army and Air Force institutes have been called upon to provide a canteen organisation in the field for troops from the day of landing on foreign shores, and I can only say that they have come through with immense credit, and their efforts at Chanak and Gallipoli last winter will not be forgotten by the troops. The supply and transport services of the force have been carried out admirably and have given general satisfaction.

35. I should also like to pay a special tribute to the sister services. The ever-ready assistance afforded to me by Admiral Sir O. de B. Brock, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., and by his predecessor, Admiral Sir J. M. de Robeck, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., has been very great. The powerful fleet standing behind us has been a great comfort. The assistance given by Rear-Admiral J. D. Kelly, C.B., at Chanak, in landing parties to assist Colonel Commandant D. I. Shuttleworth, C.B.E., D.S.O., to wire our position when the situation was extremely critical, was of great value. No commander could possibly have enjoyed more loyal support than I have from the Royal Navy, and I am very grateful indeed to the Admiralty. The kindness extended to our soldiers on His Majesty's ships has been very greatly appreciated. I have also had the honour of having a fine battalion—the 11th Royal Marine Light Infantry Battalion—under my command.

36. I am also very grateful for the help given to me by the Air Ministry, and it has been a great honour to have the highly efficient squadrons of the Royal Air Force—under Group-Captain P. F. M. Fellowes, D.S.O.—under my command. They have loyally responded to every call made upon them. I am also very grateful to the Air Ministry for the 1,000 Air Force personnel *en route* to Mesopotamia who were transferred to Constantinople to assist me in the preservation of order in the town during a very critical period.

I am very proud to say that the firm friendship and co-operation between the three services in Constantinople has not only been a sign of great strength, but, I believe, has been realised and appreciated by everyone in those services, and will, I am confident, have far-reaching effects in the future.

37. I should also like to pay a tribute to the assistance given to me by the British High Commissioner, his Excellency Sir Horace Rumbold, Bart., G.C.M.G., M.V.O., and by Mr. Neville Henderson, C.M.G., who has acted as High Commissioner in the former's absence at Lausanne, and to their staffs.

It has been not only an honour but a great experience and pleasure to have had such an opportunity of working in close co-operation with the Diplomatic Service.

I would also record my appreciation of the kindness extended to me by the French and Italian High Commissioners—his Excellency General Pellé, C.B., and his Excellency

the Marquess Garroni, G.B.E. I have had a great many dealings with the Allied High Commissioners during the last two years, and our relations have always been of the most cordial nature.

38. The difficulties of a force of occupation must always be great, especially in a city of the size of Constantinople, but I feel confident that many useful administrative measures were introduced by the Allies, notably the formation and maintenance of the Turkish gendarmerie in the areas under Allied occupation. The assistance which we obtained from the gendarmerie in the Scutari sanjak was of particular value. Various sanitary measures for protection against venereal disease—which is rampant in Constantinople—repair of roads, &c., will, I think, all prove to have been beneficial. I have personally received nothing but kindness from representatives of all nations with whom I have come in contact during the past two years in the institution of various administrative measures.

39. The work of the Allied Police Commission under Colonel C. R. Ballard, C.B., C.M.G., and subsequently under Colonel Caprini, Italian Carabinieri, deserves great credit. The work of the commission during the past three years has been very great. They have been responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the city and have worked in the closest relations with the Turkish police. The best tribute I can pay to their work is to say that it has never once been necessary to call on the assistance of the troops to help them maintain order.

The British section of the Allied police has been controlled to my entire satisfaction by Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Maxwell, O.B.E., M.C., the Cheshire Regiment, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel W. F. O. Faviell, D.S.O., the Queen's Regiment, and Major T. L. C. Curtis, Coldstream Guards, in succession. The British military police also did excellent work and maintained a very high standard throughout.

The administration of justice by Mixed Courts and the protection of Allied subjects has been very well carried out by military magistrates attached to the Allied Police Commission.

In all questions affecting international and Turkish law I have been most loyally and wisely advised by my legal expert, Captain (Temporary Major) G. Sims Marshall, M.B.E., Durham Light Infantry, Deputy Judge Advocate-General, and much assistance has been given by his Honour Judge Linton Thorpe, His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court.

I would also mention the work of the British fire brigade under Captain W. C. P. Dawson, R.F.A. The brigade made a great name for itself in Constantinople. It reached a very high standard of smartness and efficiency and was instrumental in saving much life and property.

40. I cannot close this despatch without reference to the manner in which the evacuation has been carried out.

On the evening of the 23rd August, 1923, I was informed officially that the Treaty of Lausanne had been ratified by the Government of the Grand National Assembly.

The evacuation of the British forces began the following day, and was carried through according to programme from start to finish, ending on the 2nd October, 1923, with the departure of the Allied generals and the termination of the Allied occupation.

The period of evacuation will always be associated in my memory with the highest example of the conduct of British troops. I called upon the British troops to conduct themselves with dignity and to hand over all barracks and camps in good order. I am glad to report my wishes have been carried out to the letter. Every unit has left in perfect order, and I am very proud to state that not one incident has occurred throughout the whole period.

The greater part of our surplus stores, huts, &c., were sold to the Turkish Red Crescent, and were all handed over in good order.

The Turkish war material which had been in Allied charge was similarly handed over in accordance with the agreement made at Lausanne.

All requisitioned buildings were also handed over.

The close of the occupation was marked by a very impressive ceremony. Each of the Allies and the Turks furnished a guard of honour of 100 men with colour—the British guard being composed of Grenadiers and Coldstream Guards with a colour party of the Irish Guards. The whole parade was under the command of Colonel Commandant J. McC. Steele, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 1st Guards Brigade.

The three Allied generals were received on parade by the above guards.

After inspection of the guards of honour, the colours of the British, French and Italian guards were marched to the front and saluted by the Allied generals whilst

their respective national anthems were played. Similarly, the Turkish colour was brought forward and saluted.

The ceremony was meant to represent the hauling down of the Allied flags with due honour and the hoisting of the Turkish flag. The British, Italian and French guards of honour then marched past the Allied generals and embarked.

At this moment I witnessed a scene which I shall never forget.

The dense crowd of Turks which had witnessed the ceremony and had greeted the generals and troops of the Allied nations with the greatest applause and respect suddenly broke loose and swarmed round the Allied generals.

It was a most spontaneous outburst of goodwill and appreciation of our efforts of the past years, and will ever be remembered. The British guard, with Colonel Commandant Steele marching at its head, was warmly applauded all the way to its place of embarkation.

After taking leave of the High Commissioners and Corps diplomatique and representatives of the several communities assembled, as well as the Turkish Military Governor, General Selaheddin Adil Pasha, and Dr. Adnan Bey and other Turkish officials, the Allied generals embarked on their respective ships. I embarked in the steamship "Arabic" with the 2nd battalion, the Grenadier Guards and the 3rd battalion, the Coldstream Guards.

The ships carrying the Allied generals then steamed out through the Allied fleets, by whom they were saluted by guards and bands. The Allied fleets then followed.

Thus ended the Allied occupation of Constantinople.

A particularly gracious compliment was paid by the Royal Navy as we passed through the Dardanelles at midnight in steamship "Arabic" with the two battalions of the Guards—the last of the British forces in Turkey.

His Majesty's ships at Kilia and Chanak furnished an archway with their searchlights, under which I passed from my late command, and so ended a very happy association with the senior service which none of us will forget.

Before leaving, farewell services were held at Haidar Pasha cemetery, where those we have lost during the occupation lie buried alongside their comrades of the Crimean war, and also at Suvla Bay, where a last tribute was paid to those who fell in the Gallipoli campaign. A memorial service was also held in the Crimean Memorial Chapel on the last Sunday before leaving, and to which chapel the Union Jack which had flown over general headquarters was presented.

I also sent a staff officer, Brevet Major (local Lieutenant-Colonel) Heywood to place wreaths on my behalf in the British cemeteries at the Struma, Doiran and Mikra to the memory of our comrades of the British Salonika force who fell in that campaign.

41. It is my pleasing duty to bring to your notice the support of my Allied colleagues, Lieutenant-General E. Mombelli, K.C.M.G., and Major-General Ch. Charpy, C.B. Since the Allied command was formed in July 1921 these two officers and their staffs have given me the most loyal and devoted support. We have worked daily together through difficult times and have become the firmest of friends. Our work together has been nothing but a pleasure. It has been a great honour to have been entrusted with the Allied command, and one which I shall always look back upon with nothing but affection.

42. I attach a list of officers whose services I wish specially to bring to notice.* We have passed through many difficult times, often on the verge of operations. We have carried out many negotiations requiring great patience and forbearance, and I am very grateful to the efficient commanders and staffs to whom the credit is due for bringing our task to a successful conclusion.

I would specially draw attention to the services rendered by Major-General T. O. Marden, C.B., C.M.G., for the able way in which he has commanded and trained the troops under him, and for the way in which he commanded the troops at Chanak through a very trying period; and I would also draw attention to the services rendered by Colonel Commandant D. I. Shuttleworth, C.B.E., D.S.O., who commanded at Chanak in the earlier stages when the situation, with the small force under his command, was exceedingly critical.

I am also greatly indebted to Colonel (temporary Colonel Commandant) J. McC. Steele, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., commanding 1st Guards Brigade, who has been in control of Constantinople through a difficult period. He has exercised great tact and judgment, and has spared no effort in the training of the troops under n command.

* Not printed.

Similarly, Colonel (temporary Colonel Commandant) A. S. Cotton, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.M., commanding 28th Division, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Walker, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Royal Fusiliers, who have commanded the Chanak and Kilia areas respectively, have rendered very valuable service in the administration of those areas and in the training of the troops.

Every advantage has been taken of the exceptional opportunities of carrying out practice with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.

I would also draw attention to the services rendered by Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson, K.C.B., as Major-General, General Staff, and by Colonel (temporary Major-General) A. A. McHardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., as major-general in charge of administration. These two senior staff officers were sent out to help me when the force was increased. The plans and administrative arrangements made by these two staff officers were excellent. The change of base of this force from Constantinople to Kilia was exceedingly well carried out without fuss or worry, and reflects great credit on Major-General McHardy and his staff. Had operations taken place, this would not only have been invaluable, but would have saved His Majesty's Government a large sum of money.

I would further draw attention to the services rendered by Colonel Commandant W. B. Emery, C.B., C.M.G., for the way in which he conducted the evacuation by the Greeks of Eastern Thrace and the installation of the Kemalist administration therein in the zone allotted to British supervision.

The work of Brevet Colonel W. H. Gribbon, C.M.G., C.B.E., as Colonel on the Staff, General Staff, and of Colonel (temporary Colonel on the Staff) M. H. E. Welch, C.B., C.M.G., as colonel in charge of administration, during the past three years has been of great value. These officers never spared themselves in their efforts to maintain a high standard in the force.

The chief credit for the excellent way in which the evacuation, sale of stores, protection of those whose lives were in danger, &c., has been carried out is due to Colonel (temporary Colonel on the Staff) M. H. E. Welch, C.B., C.M.G., and to the officers under him, especially Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Dunlop, D.S.O., Worcestershire Regiment, Captain I. R. C. G. M. Bruce, M.B.E., the Camerons, and Lieutenant (temporary Captain) J. D. Woodall, M.B.E., M.C., R.A. It constitutes an admirable example of forethought and good staff work. It has been greatly facilitated by the shipping arrangements made by the War Office with the Board of Trade.

I was very fortunate in having the services of Captain E. Unwin, V.C., R.N., as principal naval transport officer. The prompt way in which all shipping arrangements connected with the movements of troops, the maintenance of the force, and the formation of the Kilia base have been carried out reflect great credit on Captain Unwin and his staff.

Since Captain E. Unwin left, these duties have been carried out to my entire satisfaction by Captain T. Oloff De Wet, C.B.E., R.N., who has met every demand made upon him, and to whom much credit is due for the smooth way in which the evacuation has been carried out. The embarkation staff have worked very hard, and every unit on leaving spoke in the highest terms of the assistance given to it.

I have been very fortunate in possessing a highly efficient intelligence service throughout, which has enabled me to keep touch not only with the military situation, but with the various organisations which have existed in the Near East. I venture to think that the information which has been obtained and forwarded has been of use to His Majesty's Government. Much credit is due to Brevet Colonel W. H. Gribbon, C.M.G., C.B.E., for this, and in the later stages to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. M. Cornwall, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., and his staff.

The communications of this force, scattered as it has been on four different fronts, have been difficult to arrange, but have never failed, thanks to the energy and ability displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. W. Barker, D.S.O., Royal Corps of Signals and Staff.

I should like to draw attention to the loyal support given to me by the units of the Indian army under my command during the earlier days of the occupation.

I would also mention the willing help and advice which has been given by Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Hughes, M.B.E., and the staff of the Imperial War Graves Commission, which was found invaluable with regard to the formation of the British base at Kilia.

I would draw special attention to the services rendered to me by Brevet Major T. G. C. Heywood, O.B.E. This officer has acted as secretary of the Council of Allied Generals. He is an excellent linguist, and has afforded the greatest assistance to me

in carrying out many negotiations with my Allied colleagues and at Mudania. For several months he has also been my senior general staff officer

I am also much indebted to my aides-de-camp, Lieutenant C. E. Kendall, R.F.A., and Lieutenant H. N. Leveson-Gower, R.F.A., for all their assistance. The various arrangements and functions connected with our association with the many nations assembled in Constantinople have required considerable organisation, and have been carried out to my entire satisfaction.

43. I attach, as appendices to this despatch, three reports* dealing with—

(*a.*) Operations in the Chanak area from the 9th September to the 26th September, 1922;
(*b.*) Operations in the Chanak area from the 26th September to the 15th October, 1922;
(*c.*) Work of the Thracian composite brigade in Eastern Thrace (British zone) from the 15th October to the 30th November, 1922;
(*d.*) The programme of evacuation; and
(*e.*) List of officers, non-commissioned officers and men specially brought to notice.

I have, &c.
C. H. HARINGTON, *Lieutenant-General,*
Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Forces of Occupation and British Forces in Turkey.

[**E 11123/10149/44**] No. 73

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 330.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 21, 1923.

YOUR despatch No. 744 of 13th November: Desecration of Crimean cemetery.

Reply of the Turkish Government, which is palpably inadequate, has produced a painful impression on His Majesty's Government. You should so inform Adnan Bey, adding that unless a very different attitude is adopted and the claim for compensation met without delay full publicity will be given to the case in this country.

[**E 11265/1019/65**] No. 74.

Sir H. Dobbs to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 23.)

(No. 633.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 21, 1923.

FRONTIER negotiations.

Government of Irak now desire to be formally represented at these. They request that the point may be officially put to Turks. though they realise that Turkey will probably object, and that they may have definite intimation of refusal or acceptance. I hope that it may be possible to arrange this.

This refers to paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 471 of 16th October.

[**E 11271/199/44**] No. 75.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 523.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 23, 1923.

REUTER'S agent is telegraphing to London declaration made to local press by Fethi Bey, second President of Grand National Assembly and late President of the Council, in regard to Caliphate, and in which it is in particular stated appointment of Caliph has absolutely nothing to do with Moslems outside Turkey.

It might be worth while to request Reuter's to repeat to India.

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* Not printed.

[E 11277/7862/44] No. 76.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November 24.*)

(No. 2664.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 23, 1923.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1041 of yesterday's date regarding the convention relative to the assessment and reparation of damage suffered in Turkey by the nationals of the contracting Powers, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of this convention as signed by me to-day, together with a copy of the protocol enabling Roumania to adhere thereto.

In my telegram No. 1014 of the 14th instant, I had the honour to submit to your Lordship that provision should be made for the accession of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to the convention by the insertion of the following sentence in article 8 :—

"Avant l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix de Lausanne l'État serbe-croate-slovène aura la faculté d'adhérer à la présente convention lorsqu'il aura signé ce traité de paix."

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, consider that this sentence would be clearer if drafted as follows :—

"L'État serbe-croate-slovène aura la faculté d'adhérer à la présente convention tant que le Traité de Paix de Lausanne ne sera pas entré en vigueur et à condition d'avoir signé ledit traité de paix,"

and I have agreed to this alteration.

As soon as the convention has been signed by the Italian Ambassador here and by Mr. Otchiai, the Japanese Ambassador at Rome, a date of signature will be inserted, and I will not fail to inform your Lordship thereof.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Convention relative to the Assessment and Reparation of Damage suffered in Turkey by the Nationals of the Contracting Powers.

L'EMPIRE britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon et la Roumanie, désireux d'affecter à la réparation des dommages subis par leurs ressortissants les sommes rendues disponibles en vertu du traité de paix avec la Turquie signé à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923, ont résolu de conclure une convention à cette fin et ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et des Territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes : Le Très Honorable Robert Offley Ashburton, Marquis de Crewe, K.G., Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté britannique à Paris ;

Le Président de la République française : M. le Général de Division Maurice Pellé, Ambassadeur de France, Haut-Commissaire de la République en Orient, Grand Officier de l'Ordre national de la Légion d'Honneur ;

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie : M. le Baron Camille Romano-Avezzana, Grand-Croix des Ordres des Saints Maurice et Lazare et de la Couronne d'Italie, son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire à Paris ;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur du Japon : M. Kentaro Otchiai, Jusammi, première classe de l'Ordre du Soleil Levant, son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire à Rome ;

Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie : ;

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Les Puissances contractantes conviennent d'affecter en commun à la réparation des dommages subis par leurs ressortissants :

1. Les sommes en or visées à l'article 58 du Traité de Lausanne ;
2. Les bons du Trésor 5 pour Cent 1911, du montant nominal de 846,100*l.* sterling, que le Gouvernement britannique consent à affecter à la réparation desdits dommages.

Ce fonds sera administré par la commission prévue à l'article 2 de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 2.

Une commission dénommée "Commission d'Évaluation" sera institué dans un délai d'un mois après la mise en vigueur du traité avec la Turquie pour évaluer les dommages ci-après définis subis par les ressortissants des Puissances contractantes.

ARTICLE 3.

Cette commission se composera de trois membres nommés respectivement par les Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie. Dans le cas où le dommage intéresserait un ressortissant d'un autre Gouvernement contractant, il serait adjoint à la commission pour l'évaluation de ce dommage un membre additionnel nommé par ce Gouvernement. En cas d'égalité de voix, celle du président sera prépondérante.

ARTICLE 4.

La commission établira sa procédure, dans les termes assurant le prompt règlement des dommages.

La présidence sera tenue successivement par les représentants de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie.

Les décisions seront prises à la majorité des voix.

Les décisions de la commission seront sans appel.

Le budget de la commission et de son personnel sera soumis à l'approbation des Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie.

Les dépenses de la commission seront prélevées sur le fonds des réparations.

ARTICLE 5.

Les demandes des intéressés devront être introduites dans le délai d'une année à dater de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Lausanne.

ARTICLE 6.

1. La commission devra évaluer et indemniser dans les conditions prévues à la présente convention les dommages ci-après définis :

(*a.*) Les dommages directes (autres que ceux visés au paragraphe 2 de cet article) subis sur les territoires qui étaient ottomans au 1er août 1914 ou sur mer par les ressortissants des Puissances contractantes, dans leurs personnes ou dans leurs biens, pendant la période comprise entre le 1er août 1914 et la mise en vigueur du traité avec la Turquie par suite de tout acte ou négligence du Gouvernement turc, y compris les dommages résultant de mesures de réquisition, de séquestre ou de confiscation, ainsi que les dommages directs subis sur les mêmes territoires par lesdits ressortissants pendant la même période par suite de tous faits de guerre quel qu'en soit l'auteur.

(*b.*) Les dommages directs causés par l'incendie de Smyrne aux biens et propriétés des ressortissants des Puissances contractantes.

La commission aura pouvoir de déduire de l'indemnité attribuée à ce titre les sommes que le réclamant aurait obtenue par ailleurs ; elle aura également pouvoir d'écarter les réclamations au cas où elle estimerait que le réclamant n'a pas fait toute diligence utile pour obtenir une indemnité à laquelle il aurait eu droit par d'autres voies.

(*c.*) Les dommages visés aux alinéas (*a*) et (*b*) qui ont été subis par les protégés des Puissances contractantes dont la patente de protection ressort à une date antérieure au 1er août 1914.

(*d.*) Les dommages visés aux alinéas (*a*) et (*b*) qui ont été subis sur les territoires restés turcs à la date de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Lausanne par les sociétés ottomanes dans lesquelles les ressortissants des Puissances contractantes avaient un intérêt prépondérant au 1er août 1914.

La commission tiendra compte des avantages d'ordre économique accordés à ces sociétés par le Gouvernement turc en raison des dommages subis par elles. La valeur desdits avantages devra être évalués en espèces et sera déduite du montant revenant aux sociétés en vertu de la présente convention. En aucun cas, la totalité des indemnités à payer à ces sociétés ne pourra excéder la valeur nominale des bons du Trésor visés au paragraphe 2 de l'article 1er.

2. Seront hors de la compétence de la commission et non indemnisés par elle :

(*a.*) Les dommages indirects, y compris la privation de jouissance et le manque à gagner ;

(*b.*) Les réclamations relatives aux sommes à payer par le Gouvernement hellénique en vertu de la convention en date du 25 juillet 1923 réglant le remboursement des dettes résultant des actes des autorités helléniques en Turquie ;

(*c.*) Les réclamations des sociétés concessionnaires à raison de l'utilisation par le Gouvernement turc de leur propriété ou de leurs services, qui devront être réglés par ledit Gouvernement en vertu du protocole relatif à certaines concessions accordées dans l'Empire ottoman, du 24 juillet 1923, et de la déclaration y annexé ou en vertu des arrangements intervenus entre le Gouvernement turc et lesdites sociétés.

ARTICLE 7.

La commission distribuera le fonds de réparations aux intéressés proportionnellement à la valeur des dommages subis par eux. Les indemnités accordées par la commission seront versées aux intéressés par l'entremise de celui des Gouvernements alliés dont ils sont les ressortissants.

ARTICLE 8.

La présente convention sera ratifiée.

Les ratifications en seront déposées à Paris, en même temps que les ratifications du Traité de Paix de Lausanne.

Elle entrera en vigueur pour chaque Puissance contractante en même temps que ledit traité de paix.

L'État serbe-croate-slovène aura la faculté d'adhérer à la présente convention tant que le Traité de Paix de Lausanne ne sera pas entré en vigueur et à condition d'avoir signé ledit traité de paix.

Fait à Paris, , en un seul exemplaire, qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française, qui en délivrera des expéditions authentiques à chacune des Puissances signataires.

Protocole.

Les soussignés ayant signé à Paris à la date de ce jour au nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, une convention relative à l'évaluation et à la réparation des dommages subis en Turquie par les ressortissants des Puissances contractantes, sont d'accord pour reconnaître à la Roumanie la faculté, tant que le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie du 24 juillet 1923 ne sera pas entré en vigueur, de faire procéder à la signature de ladite convention à Paris et par tel plénipotentiaire que le Gouvernement roumain désignera.

Fait à Paris, le novembre 1923.

[**E 11304/7734/44**] No. 77.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 26.)

(No. 756.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 20, 1923.

ADNAN BEY called on me yesterday to enquire whether it would be necessary to furnish Yussuf Kemal with letters of credence before proceeding to London. I told him that clearly none would be required until the treaty had been ratified. Whereupon Adnan Bey gave me to understand that Yussuf Kemal would probably be given a letter addressed to your Lordship, presumably by Ismet Pasha. I gather from this insistence upon furnishing him with some form of credentials that the Turkish Government is apprehensive in regard to Yussuf Kemal's reception in London. On that account it is also possible that his arrival will be postponed until after the elections in England.

2. Adnan then took the opportunity to ask whether His Majesty's Government had come to any decision as to the appointment of a British representative to Turkey after the entry into force of the treaty, and, on my replying in the negative, whether their decision was likely to be affected by the notification which he had made to me and which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 746 of the 14th instant, to the effect that Angora was the capital of Turkey.

3. I asked Adnan, in reply, why he had not, as I had suggested, informed me, simultaneously with that notification, of the special arrangements which the Turkish Government proposed, in the absence of suitable accommodation for the foreign missions in Angora, to make for the transaction of diplomatic business at Constantinople. Since the foreign representatives were the guests of Turkey, it was obviously indispensable that any proposals to this effect should be initiated by the Turkish Government.

4. After attempting, without success, to prove that it was more proper that foreign countries should take the first step in this matter, Adnan Bey finally explained that his Government was precluded from putting forward any general suggestions for special arrangements for the following reason, which is probably a partially true one. The Greek and Bulgarian Governments had, he said, already agreed that their representatives should reside at Angora. If the Turkish Government announced that a special régime would be instituted for all the diplomatic missions in Constantinople, Greece and Bulgaria would at once withdraw their representatives from Angora and allow them to live in the greater comfort of Constantinople. Such a contingency his Government regarded as disastrous and intolerable. Adnan confessed, in fact, that the difficulty baffled him, and expressed the intention of leaving it to Yussuf Kemal to settle with your Lordship in London.

5. The position is undoubtedly complex. On the one hand the Turkish Government is unwilling to propose, publicly and officially, even a temporary régime for the foreign missions in Constantinople, both for motives of principle, with the studied intention of inducing the Powers to send their representatives to Angora, and thereby of ensuring satisfaction for Mustafa Kemal's prestige and ambitions, as well as on the grounds mentioned to me by Adnan, namely, lest, as a result, those countries who have already yielded, either definitely or conditionally, should go back on their undertaking to maintain their representatives at Angora and thereby undo the progress already achieved towards the conversion of that town into the capital of Turkey. There is also the complication of the extreme present bitterness of Angora against Constantinople, which indisposes the Grand National Assembly to any exceptional treatment of the latter.

6. On the other hand, the present inadequacy of Angora as a capital is evident, and the Turkish Government appreciates the fact that, for the moment, anyway, it is physically impossible for the representatives of the greater Powers, be they Ambassadors or only Ministers, permanently to reside there, unless and until suitable accommodation has been specially constructed for them.

7. In this connection Adnan repeated to me the formal offer of his Government to make a free gift of whatever land might be required for His Majesty's Government to build such accommodation. But there, again, Adnan himself realises that foreign Governments may well object on the ground of expense, or may, at least, hesitate until the Turkish Government has itself erected the buildings which are necessary for its own use in a town that is destined to be the capital of the country.

8. Adnan Bey also observed that if His Majesty's Government only appointed a Minister, the latter would still be unable at present to reside at Angora, while he

would be at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the representatives of other Powers, such as Soviet Russia and Persia, whose representatives were already Ambassadors. He added that he had reason to know that Germany also was ready to appoint an Ambassador and to build a residence for him at Angora, and mentioned that he had information to the effect that Herr von Rosenberg was destined to be the future German Ambassador to Turkey.

9. I view the situation as follows: The retention of Angora as the seat of government is an indispensable factor in the scheme of Mustafa Kemal's ambitions. Unless he and the present Grand National Assembly disappear unexpectedly from the scene, Angora is likely to be the capital for several years to come. Even their disappearance, unless it be followed by a restoration of the Sultanate, does not necessarily imply a return to Constantinople. Apart from Kemal, there is a strong school of thought in Turkey against the re-establishment of Constantinople, in view of its exposed position, as the seat of government. The possibility cannot, therefore, altogether be excluded that, if not Angora itself, then some other town in Anatolia may ultimately become the capital of the Turkish Republic. Generally speaking, however, I regard two years, the duration of the life of the present Grand National Assembly, as the minimum period during which Angora is likely to remain the seat of government. Though the magnetic force of Constantinople is undoubtedly strong, it may well be longer than two years before it succeeds in drawing the Turkish Government back to the Bosphorus. I even would not go so far as to assert with absolute confidence that this city would ever again be the capital of Turkey.

10. What attitude, then, do the Powers propose to adopt during the intermediary period, which may last two, four, or an indefinite number of years, before the Turkish Government, if it ever does so, returns to Constantinople? The question has a double aspect. It will have to be decided whether, on the entry into force of the treaty, and even if the titular heads be not immediately appointed, the missions of the Great Powers in Turkey shall revert to the status of Embassies or be reduced to that of Legations. This aspect of the question, however, though more immediate, is of minor importance as compared with the decision as to whether the Powers intend definitely to maintain their missions in Constantinople, where suitable accommodation already exists, or whether they contemplate the necessity of their eventual, even though perhaps temporary, transfer to Angora, where such accommodation is not merely inadequate, but totally lacking, and will have to be constructed at considerable expense. It is no less impossible for a Minister than for an Ambassador to reside with his staff at Angora until that accommodation is built.

11. It must be recognised that so long as the Turkish Government remains at Angora, diplomatic representation at Constantinople, if the willingness to proceed after a while to Angora be not made clear, is likely to be ineffectual. By every form of obstruction and hindrance the Turks will exert pressure with a view to inducing the foreign mountains to come to the new Mahommed. Owing to the exigencies of the situation, the Turkish Government will be obliged, for a period of six months to a year, to tolerate a special arrangement whereby the missions of the greater Powers shall continue to reside in Constantinople, and their obstructiveness during that period will be in proportion to the readiness which each respective Power shows to make up its mind to contemplate the possibility of an eventual transfer to Angora.

12. An expression of the readiness of His Majesty's Government to do so would, of course, be peculiarly gratifying to the Turkish Government and to Mustafa Kemal. It would constitute, on the other hand, a concession which I imagine that His Majesty's Government would regard as distasteful and even somewhat derogatory. Nevertheless, since, once the treaty comes into force, close relations with the Government at Angora are indispensable, even though it be through a diplomatic liaison officer, or a consular agent under the orders of a head of the mission residing in Constantinople, His Majesty's Government may be well advised at least to consider the offer of that Government of a free gift of land at Angora. It would be unnecessary, in the first instance, to build the larger accommodation required for an Embassy or a Legation. To begin with, a single building might be erected, suitable as a residence either temporarily of the liaison officer, or permanently of a consular agent, or intermittently of the head of the mission as a residence during the periodical visits which he will be obliged to make to Angora.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 11305/199/44**] No. 78.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 26.)

(No. 757.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 20, 1923.

THERE has been no notable change during the past week in the general political situation in Turkey. So far as their public expression is concerned, the violent controversies which followed the establishment of the Republic have shown on the whole a tendency to subside. Whether this comparative lull is the precursor of fresh storms in the immediate future it is too soon to say. The leaders of the opposition to Mustafa Kemal are keeping their own counsel, and it is still uncertain whether they think the time has come to try conclusions with him or not. If the question depended only on Constantinople, they are already assured of sufficient support here to act immediately, but there is nothing to show that Mustafa Kemal has lost his hold on Angora. I incline to think that his opponents will wait awhile in order to give the opposition in that place time to develop

2. On the 10th November Kiazim Karabekir Pasha arrived at Constantinople. As your Lordship is aware, this personage has at any time during the last three years appeared to be cast for a leading rôle in politics. No one has ever quite known what that rôle is to be, and, when the Pasha materialises in any non-military connection, he distinguishes himself chiefly by a keen but innocuous interest in such matters as pedagogy and economics. His movements in Constantinople have been much advertised. He seems to have thrown in his lot with Reouf Bey and Refet Pasha, but there is still nothing to show that he has much individual importance as a politician. He visited the Caliph on the 12th November, and on the following day he, with Reouf and Refet, were the principal guests at a tea-party given by the Labour Union. All three delivered speeches, the most notable passage of which was that in which Reouf Bey said, "May God be your helper always; may He preserve all of us from haste, from nervousness, from precipitate decisions; may He grant all of you and all of us success."

3. If this reference to precipitate decisions was, as seems probable, an allusion to the recent constitutional changes effected at Angora, it is perhaps significant that it should have been made at a Labour gathering in the last speech delivered by Reouf Bey during his visit to Constantinople. To mobilise Labour and to use the elements composing it, especially the old-established guilds, for political purposes has become one of the aims of every group of politicians which seeks to establish its ascendancy in Constantinople. Reouf Bey left for Angora the next morning. Refet Pasha, who was at one time said to intend to accompany him, stayed behind, but he also is expected to proceed to Angora in the near future.

4. Nothing has as yet been heard of Reouf Bey's activities since his return to the capital. The press has been busy assigning Embassies abroad to him and others. According to a recent report, there is a talk of sending Refet to Paris, Riza Nour to Berlin, and Reouf himself to another post, possibly Washington. So far as Refet Pasha is concerned, neither Adnan Bey nor the French High Commission has any knowledge of the rumoured appointment. I doubt whether he would accept such a post, and still more whether Reouf would consent to be relegated to a position abroad, however distinguished.

5. The question of the Caliphate and the present Caliph's position has continued greatly to exercise the public mind, but during the last few days there has been a lull in the open discussion of this question also. My impression is that Mustafa Kemal, having tested the opinion of the country at the expense of much indecent publicity, has decided to let the matter rest for the present, after having cheapened the Caliphate and somewhat alarmed the Caliph by proving that no institution and no person, except possibly the President of the Republic, are too exalted to form the subject of discussion in a free and democratic country As against this advantage, the attacks on the Caliph, the rumours of his possible transfer to some place in the interior like Brussa or Konia, or even of his removal from Turkey, and the suspicion that Mustafa Kemal may himself aspire to be Commander of the Faithful, have given an impetus to the idea of substituting a constitutional monarchy for the Kemalist dictatorship. This idea would commend itself to many in Union and Progress and other circles, who to-day profess loyalty to the republic. It would be popular in the country if it were launched with any prospect of success. It would not be the least of its merits in the eyes of easy-going and moderate people that it would almost certainly solve the question of the capital in favour of Constantinople.

6. In this connection it is worth mentioning that a rumour was circulated a few days ago that the Caliph had asked that his provisional monthly allowance of £T. 26,000 should be increased to £T. 50,000. This has been denied. The rumour looks like a further attempt to discredit His Majesty.

7. The jealousy between Constantinople and Angora shows no sign of abatement. Its expression has crystallised during the last week in recriminations regarding the dismissal of the Angora director of the press, a certain Zekeria Bey. The removal of this gentleman from office followed very shortly on the publication of a communiqué to the effect that the Government had no intention of restricting the liberty of the press. Certain organs in Constantinople allege that Zekeria Bey was dismissed because he published this communiqué on his own initiative. Why, they ask, should the Government have taken so severe a view of his action, which, if they really stand for liberty of speech and criticism, amounted at most to a technical omission to consult his superior, viz., the Minister of the Interior?

8. Ismet Pasha, who for the time being retains the prestige gained at Lausanne and is therefore the least criticised of the leading personages in the Ministry, has endeavoured to pour oil on the troubled waters by a statement which appeared in the "Wakt" newspaper of the 17th November. I enclose a French version of this as published in the "Stamboul" of the same day.* It deals more particularly with the questions of the Caliphate and the press, but it touches also on certain other questions in a rather anodyne fashion.

9. The alleged maltreatment of Moslems in Greece continues to be exploited in all sections of the Turkish press. Ismet Pasha's wise endeavour to discourage the demand for reprisals against the Greeks here, in the speech reported in my despatch No. 745 of the 13th November, has unfortunately produced little effect. A great meeting of protest against the alleged atrocities was held at Angora on the 15th November. What is more serious, a similar meeting is projected in Stamboul on the 24th November, and it is freely said in the press that the object of this gathering will be not merely to protest against Greek action, but to support the demand for reprisals.

10. It will not have escaped your Lordship, in reading my recent reports, that, while the proclamation of the republic was in one sense a revolutionary step forward, it had, from a constitutional point of view, its conservative aspect, inasmuch as it was accompanied by the restoration of the Cabinet system of Government, which two years ago was anathema to the extreme democrats of Angora, and of which Mustafa Kemal was at that time the most ardent opponent. In this connection it is interesting to note some minor instances of the same conservative tendency. The re-establishment of the Directorate-General of Customs in Constantinople (see my despatch No. 688 of the 23rd October) is now an accomplished fact. A proposal to revive the Council of State has once more been mooted and has the support of the Government. The Assembly recently voted a law authorising the transfer of the Court of Cassation from Sivas to Eskishehr, a measure which will bring it within much easier reach of the established commercial centres, such as Constantinople and Smyrna.

11. An element of comic relief has been imported into the general situation by the sudden collapse of the Turco-Albanian negotiations at Angora. It was announced some days ago that these negotiations had been crowned with success and that a treaty of perpetual friendship had been initialled. The text was published, and reference was made to an accompanying "établissement" convention which was to follow. Great complacency was exhibited in all the press articles on the subject, which were copiously illustrated by the portrait of Shukri Kaya Bey, one of the less attractive members of the first Turkish delegation at Lausanne, who had conducted the negotiations with the Albanians. It only remained to sign the treaty to the accompaniment of the usual banquet. These formalities were fixed for the 18th November. The banquet actually took place, but it was announced immediately afterwards that the treaty could not be signed, as a hitch had arisen over the question of the nationality of Albanians in Turkey. The hitch was apparently a serious one, for it was also announced that both sides had resumed their full liberty of action and that the Albanian delegates would leave Angora on the 19th November. I enclose for the sake of record a translation of the draft treaty as published in the "Journal d'Orient" of the 18th November.*

12. Apart from this episode, there is little to report regarding the various negotiations with foreign Powers which the Angora Government have at present in hand. They continue with the Hungarians in Angora and the Austrians and Americans here. The negotiations with the latter, which relate principally, if not entirely, to claims, do not appear to be making much headway.

* Not printed.

13. Turkish official and public opinion continues to be concerned, without being unduly excited, over the delay in the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty by the Great Powers. Some apprehension is expressed lest, as a result of the general election, *e.g.*, if Mr. Lloyd George should return to power, Great Britain should not ratify the treaty at all. The "Ileri," the foremost Kemalist organ in Constantinople, suggested on the 18th November, in a leading article on the enclosed statement by Ismet Pasha, that the other Powers were waiting for Great Britain to take the lead, and intimated some resentment at this supposed subservience on their part.

14. A local paper of no particular authority stated on the 18th November, without disclosing the source of its information, that the recent incident at Erivan, which led to the precipitate departure of the Turkish representative from that place, had been liquidated by an official apology conveyed by Suritz to the Angora Government, that the Turkish representative at Erivan was returning to his post, and that various consuls whom the Bolsheviks had prevented from proceeding to their posts in the Caucasus would now do so. I have no confirmation of this report.

15. In general the Turkish public is much more concerned with internal politics than with international relations. There is a general feeling that the present situation at home is both unsatisfactory and unstable. If the opponents of Mustafa Kemal should succeed in giving him a good shove it would not take much to topple him over. He is, however, a past-master in the art of adapting himself to new situations. His opponents are a motley crowd. Even if they should achieve sufficient cohesion to destroy his position, there is no reason to suppose that a more stable general situation would result. It would be premature to attempt to estimate the effect of such a change on Turkey's internal policy and international relations. It is enough to say for the present that under any régime the now prevalent xenophobia would die very hard, and, as regards larger international issues, that elements even more hostile to the West than those now in power would have as great a chance of obtaining the ascendancy as those which sincerely desire the re-establishment of good relations with, for instance, Great Britain. Fortunately we are dispensed from the necessity of attempting to influence the course of events in Turkey; but it may well be that the evils of the Kemalist régime which we know are less than the potential evil of some future régime which we know not of.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 11176/1019/65**] No. 79.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 1071.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 26, 1923.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 513 of the 6th instant on the subject of the Mosul frontier negotiations, I have to inform you that the Colonial Office, while maintaining their original preference for London as the site of the conference, have suggested that if the Turks maintain their objections to this proposal, some neutral town such as Geneva might be chosen as a compromise. In the circumstances, I am not of opinion that any advantage would accrue from the selection of Geneva, or of any other neutral locality, where the representatives of both sides would be equally exposed to the inconvenience of long-distance communication with their Governments. You may therefore inform the Turkish Government that, in order to meet their wishes, His Majesty's Government agree to the conference being held at Constantinople.

2. It is assumed that the Turkish authorities clearly understand from the wording of the note which you addressed to Adnan Bey on the 19th ultimo (a copy of which was transmitted in your despatch No. 681 of the 23rd ultimo) that the period of nine months provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne commenced on the 5th October. In reply to an enquiry from the Colonial Office on this point, I am informing them that such is the case, and that no doubt can well subsist on the matter in view of the categorical wording of your note.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11176/1019/65] No. 80.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 26, 1923.

IN reply to your letter of the 19th instant on the subject of the Mosul frontier negotiations, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state, for the information of the Duke of Devonshire, that after careful consideration he is of the opinion that for political reasons it is desirable to defer to the Turkish objections to the proposal that the conference should be held at London. On the other hand, his Lordship considers that there is nothing to be gained by the selection of some neutral locality. He has therefore instructed Mr. Henderson to inform the Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government agree to their suggestion regarding Constantinople.

2. With particular reference to the second paragraph of your letter under reply, I am to state that, in view of the categorical wording of Mr. Henderson's note of the 19th ultimo, copy of which was transmitted to you in Foreign Office letter of the 2nd instant, Lord Curzon does not consider that any doubt can exist in the minds of the Turkish authorities that the nine months' period, stipulated in the treaty for the settlement of the Mosul frontier question, commenced on the 5th October last.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 11346/2104/44] No. 81.

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1415.)
My Lord, *Washington, November* 16, 1923.

WITH reference to my despatch No 1383 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that in a letter replying to an enquiry from Mr. Henry Woodhouse, the largest stockholder in the "Ottoman American Development Company," as to the attitude of the State Department towards ensuring American control of the Chester concessions under a proposed readjustment, the Department states that it is contrary to the practice of that Department to intervene in the internal affairs of private companies, and that it is therefore not in a position to comply with the company's requests. Furthermore, the letter from the State Department adds that the promoters of the company appear to have been misinformed in asserting that a voting trust agreement entered into last December was drawn at the request of the State Department. "This was not the case," the letter runs, "nor was the Department aware until after the agreement had gone into effect that it contained a reference to the Department. It is hardly necessary to add that this reference was entirely unauthorised."

In view of the attitude of the State Department and the resignation, as reported in my above-mentioned despatch, of several trustees, who were to have undertaken to finance the Chester concessions for several hundred million dollars, it is now announced that the voting trust will be discontinued and the 50,000 shares of stock voted henceforth by individual owners.

I have, &c.
H. G. CHILTON.

[E 11348/11168/44] No. 82.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 524.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 27, 1923.

MY telegram No. 521.
Strike ended.

[E 11355/1019/65] No. 83.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 28.)

Sir, *Downing Street, November* 27, 1923.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to refer to the telegram from the High Commissioner for Irak dated the 21st November, a copy of which was transmitted to you under cover of the letter from this Department of the 22nd November, reporting that the Government of Irak have expressed a desire to be formally represented in the forthcoming frontier negotiations with the Turkish Government, and have asked that this proposal may be submitted officially to the Turkish Government.

2. I am to enclose, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston an extract from Irak intelligence report No. 21, from which it appears that the Irak Government are actuated, in making this request, by a desire to make capital out of the harsh attitude which they will represent the Turks to have shown towards the Arabs, in the event of their request being refused by the Turkish Government.

3. His Grace realises that the Irak Government's proposal is not in harmony with article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which provides for the Turco-Irak frontier to be settled by direct agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government, no mention being made of the participation of the Irak Government. On the other hand, his Grace apprehends that, if His Majesty's Government were to reject the proposal of direct participation by the Irak Government in the frontier negotiations without taking any steps to ascertain the Turkish attitude on the subject, their action would almost certainly be misrepresented in Irak. Moreover, it appears likely that any unsatisfactory features of the boundary as ultimately determined would in such event be ascribed locally to the refusal of His Majesty's Government to support the request of the Irak Government.

4. In these circumstances it is for consideration whether it would not be preferable that the refusal should come from the Turkish Government rather than from His Majesty's Government and whether the risk of a Turkish rebuff is not to be preferred to that of incurring odium in Irak.

5. In submitting the Irak Government's proposal to the Turkish Government (should his Lordship be prepared to take this course) it might be represented that, although Irak participation is not specifically provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne, it would clearly be advantageous in the interest of a permanent settlement for the Government of the State which is most closely concerned in the frontier settlement to have some official voice in the negotiations.

6. In view of the foregoing considerations, his Grace inclines to the view that the balance of advantage lies with the latter course, viz., to submit the proposal of the Government of Irak to the Turkish Government; but the matter is on in which he would, of course, defer to the views of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He would be glad to learn what action in the circumstances his Lordship thinks it desirable to take.

I am, &c.
J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Extract from Irak Intelligence Report No. 21.

744. AT the meeting of the 22nd October, a letter was read from his Excellency the High Commissioner stating that his Excellency had seen articles in the local press demanding that a representative from the Irak should participate in the discussions as to the frontier. His Excellency pointed out that the Turkish Government would almost certainly object to Irak's being officially represented and that though His Majesty's Government would welcome the presence of an official representative, in view of the wording of the Lausanne Treaty they would be unable to insist on the point. He added that there could be no objection to the presence of an Irak representative in a consultative capacity. The council passed the following resolution:—

"That the Irak Government are desirous of deputing a representative on their behalf to take part in the forthcoming negotiations in connection with the

frontiers of Irak, and they request his Excellency the High Commissioner to communicate their wish to the Turkish Government and inform the Irak Government of their reply."

The underlying idea is that in the event of the Turks refusing the request the Irak Government will be able to make capital out of their harsh attitude towards the Arabs.

[E 11376/11376/44] No. 84.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 573.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November* 28, 1923.

(R.) DIRECTOR-GENERAL of Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed me last night that during last twenty or twenty-five days Turks were refusing landing at Constantinople to Greek subjects, which was breach of Lausanne Treaty (see articles 2 [groups omitted] on pp. 141–175 of "Treaty Series No. 16"). He quoted one case in which a girl had been sent back to Greece on the ground of her parents having entertained British officers during British occupation. He asked if Acting British High Commissioner might be instructed to support Greek Chargé d'Affaires in his [? group omitted] to get matter remedied. He did not approve of reprisals, but thought matter would be put right with British assistance. (End of R.)

He was not appealing to other signatories of Lausanne Treaty as he thought this useless.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 10842/1/44] No. 85.

Memoranda respecting the Financial Provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne.—(*Communicated by Mr. S. D. Waley, Treasury, November* 29, 1923.)

I.—Memorandum respecting Reparation.

UNDER article 58, Turkey renounces in favour of the other contracting parties (except Greece) any right in the sums of gold transferred by Germany and Austria under the Treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain (see Note 1).

Broadly speaking, the effect of this is that a sum of slightly over 5,000,000*l.* is available to meet the reparation claims of British, French and Italian subjects. (The claims of Japanese and possibly of Roumanian and Serbian subjects, will also be met from the fund, but are very small in comparison.)

The disposal of this reparation fund was provided for by a separate Inter-Allied Agreement, which was signed at Paris on the 23rd November, 1923, on behalf of this country, France, Italy and Japan. Roumania is entitled to accede up to the date of the coming into force of the treaty, and Serbia is also similarly entitled to accede if and when she signs the Peace Treaty under the special protocol of the 24th July ("Lausanne Settlement Blue Book," p. 227), which she has hitherto refused to do.

Under this agreement an Inter-Allied Commission is to assess reparation claims against Turkey (including damage caused by the Smyrna fire), and to distribute the fund in proportion to the claims as assessed (see Note 2). The Inter-Allied Commission is also to receive from the British Government certain Turkish Treasury bills, and will add the proceeds of these bills to the Reparation Fund (see Note 3).

The arrangements outlined above may give rise to the following questions:—

1. Why were not larger reparation payments exacted from Turkey?
2. Why was not a fixed sum allocated to this country?
3. What dividend will the commission pay, and how soon?

1. *Reparation Total.*

Under the Treaty of Sèvres Turkey was to pay cost of occupation and reparation claims in full by means of annuities; in the Conditions of Peace of the 31st January

she was to pay 15,000,000*l.* in all; under the Treaty of Lausanne she is to pay nothing, over and above the 5,000,000*l.* which we already hold. This may be represented as a disastrous series of weak concessions. The reply is that His Majesty's Government were convinced of the futility of imposing impossible liabilities on an impoverished State, such as post-war Turkey—a State of some 6 million peasants, which has been continually at war since 1912. The failure to obtain reparation from Austria and Hungary or any large sum from Bulgaria afford examples which it would be folly to neglect. To have imposed a paper burden of many millions of pounds—to be discussed, postponed, reduced and finally waived—would have conferred no benefit on reparation claimants, and would, by preventing the economic revival of Turkey, have inflicted real damage to Allied interests.

2. *Distribution of the Fund.*

The proposal that the funds available for reparation should be divided between the Governments concerned, each Government being left to deal with its own nationals was very carefully considered, but was not adopted because the information as to the total amounts of the British, French and Italian claims was so incomplete as to make an equitable division impossible; reliable information as to the claims of the nationals of the respective countries could only be obtained after detailed investigation of these claims on similar principles, and in these circumstances the French and Italian representatives did not feel able to agree to a division of the fund, which could only have been made on an arbitrary basis: *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, and as no one knew the exact proportion of their own country's claims, each readily assumed that his own country's proportion was very large. Finally, it would be difficult to fit Japan (which was aware of only one comparatively small claim) into any percentage system.

It is important to realise that the Inter-Allied Commission will assess all claims on a uniform basis, and make awards in strict proportion to the claims as so assessed.

3. *Probable Dividend.*

It is impossible to give any idea at all of the dividend which the commission will be able to pay, since the claims which will be presented and the total which will be assessed are unknown. As regards date of payment, it must take some months to collect and assess claims, but the convention was drawn up so as to facilitate payment at the earliest possible date.

Note 1.

These sums in gold were deposited at the Deutsche Bank in Berlin (£T. 3,552,000) and at the Austro-Hungarian Bank at Vienna (£T. 2,109,000) by the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments as cover to the first issue of Turkish currency notes. The deposits were in the name of the Ottoman Public Debt Council. But as the council's functions in no way comprised such a responsibility, the council can only be regarded as the trustee of the Ottoman Government in the matter. The gold was to be repaid by Turkey after the war by a long-term loan; this confirms the view that the gold belonged to Turkey. Under the Treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain the gold was to be delivered "to such authority as the principal Allied and Associated Powers may designate." Actually the gold from Berlin is at the Banque de France, and the gold from Vienna at the Bank of England (for the account of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, London Branch). Both sums are held "in the name of the principal Allied and Associated Powers," *i.e.*, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and (possible) the United States of America. But these Powers must also be regarded as trustees, and the owners (in succession to Turkey) are—under article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne—Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Roumania.

Note 2.

The agreement may be summarised as follows:—

The British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Roumania agree to devote jointly to Turkish reparation claims the sums of gold referred to in article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Turkish Treasury bills to be handed over by Great Britain.

A commission (the "Assessment Commission") will assess the claims and distribute the fund in proportion to the assessed claims.

The claims which will rank are those in respect of damage suffered from the Turkish authorities by the nationals of the signatory Powers (or their pre-war "protégés") between the 1st August, 1914 (when mobilsiation and requisitioning began) and the coming into force of the treaty, on the territory of pre-war Turkey, including requisitions and confiscations; also direct damage (excluding loss of property) due to hostilities ("faits de guerre"), whether Turk or Greek was responsible, since it is impossible to allocate responsibility for battle damage in a war zone. [On the other hand, requisitions by the Greek authorities do not rank, but can be claimed from Greece under the agreement printed at p. 239 of the "Lausanne Treaty Blue Book," Cmd. 1919.]

The claims of Ottoman companies controlled by Allied nationals rank, with certain special limitations: (*a*) damage suffered in "detached" States, *e.g.*, Syria, is excluded; (*b*) compensation in cash or kind paid or payable by Turkey under the Concessions Protocol or otherwise is deducted; (*c*) the amounts payable to such companies shall in no case exceed 846,000*l*.

These limitations were imposed in order to satisfy Italy, which has no interest in Ottoman companies; the "maximum limit" is most unlikely to come into play, and it can safely be stated that it will not operate to reduce by a penny the amounts payable to British-owned companies.

Note 3.

In addition to the gold sums, the Inter-Allied Commission will receive from the British Government certain Turkish Treasury bills to the nominal value of 846,000*l*., and will add the proceeds to the fund for distribution.

The history of this matter is as follows: In 1911, Turkey ordered the two battleships "Erin" and "Reshadieh" to be built in England. These were requisitioned by His Majesty's Government in 1914. The National Bank of Turkey had undertaken to pay the instalments due to the contractors for the "Erin," and in return the Turkish Government (wishing to spread its liability over a long period) had given the bank Turkish 5 Per Cent. Treasury Bills. The bank sold the bills, and Turkey paid the interest and paid off the bills on maturity till 1914, when Turkey refused to continue the payments, as His Majesty's Government had possession of the battleships. The holders of the bills opened negotiations with the Treasury, who agreed eventually to buy the bills. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government did not pay for the battleships, as Turkey's attitude was uncertain (she had, in fact, concluded a secret alliance with Germany in August 1914). When Turkey went to war her claim on His Majesty's Government was duly confiscated to the Crown in accordance with international law, and thus, in the end, His Majesty's Government acquired these two battleships without paying for them.

In these circumstances it was thought desirable to use these bills to satisfy the strongly expressed view of our French and Italian allies that this country should make a special contribution to the Turkish Reparation Fund in view of the fact that we had obtained those two battleships from Turkey without payment. At a critical moment during the second phase of the Lausanne Conference the difference in the British point of view, on the one hand, and the French and Italian point of view on the other in regard to the Allied reparation claims against Turkey was having very dangerous repercussions on the question of the Turkish claims for reparation from Greece. Many weeks had passed without it being possible to establish complete agreement between the Allies, and the situation grew more critical from day to day. In these circumstances it was considered to be well worth while to make this comparatively small concession in order to restore the "common front," and in the result a rupture between Turkey and Greece was successfully avoided.

In order to understand the above remarks fully it must be recollected that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had in fact actually promised to contribute 5,000,000*l*. to the Inter-Allied Turkish Reparation Fund on the last day of the first part of the Lausanne Conference; the Cabinet felt unable to repeat this offer on any future occasion, and the disappointment of our Allies was natural and intense. As it happened, the British Government took a far more serious view of the danger of a rupture between Greece and Turkey than our Allies. Turkey refused to be reasonable till the Allies' offer to waive reparation was confirmed, and the French and Italian Governments refused to confirm this waiver owing to their disappointment about the battleship money. The price we paid for restoring unity was not very

large; the Turkish Treasury bills are entirely unmarketable, and it is much to be feared that Turkey will refuse to recognise any liability in respect of them.

The transaction is, however, very difficult to describe in public without unduly emphasising this country's change of mind about the battleship money and without encouraging Turkey to default on the bills.

II.—Memorandum respecting the Ottoman Pre-War Debt.

The pre-war Ottoman Debt (other than the Ottoman loans secured on the Egyptian tribute) is to be distributed between New Turkey and the "succession States," viz., Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania and the Dodecanese—which acquired Turkish territory or were detached in 1912–13—and Syria, Irak, Palestine and Arabia, which are detached by the Treaty of Lausanne.

Most of the Turkish loans are held in France, but a considerable amount of Turkish 4 per cent. Unified Debt is held in this country. This debt is governed by the Decree of Moharrem of 1883 (with the annexed decrees of 1903 and 1911). In 1876 Turkey declared her bankruptcy, and her creditors finally agreed to a reduction of the debt in return for the irrevocable assignment to their representatives, the Ottoman Debt Council, of six revenues. This concordat was embodied in the Decree of Moharrem. But the Angora Government has taken possession of these assigned revenues (except in the neighbourhood of Constantinople) and has generally ignored the contractual rights of the Debt Council, with the result that there are no funds to pay the coupons on the Unified Debt, and the market price of the 4 per cent. Loan has fallen to about 20.

The bondholders may therefore ask, what steps are taken by the Treaty of Lausanne to protect their interests? The answer is that at the final meeting of the Finance Committee of the Lausanne Peace Conference, the Allies made the following declaration:—

> "The British, French and Italian Governments declare that the assets assigned by the provisions of the Decree of Moharrem and the annexed decrees and by those of all other contracts and agreements relative to loans and advances concluded by the Ottoman Government remain entirely unimpaired (subject to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace, especially as regards the distribution of the Public Debt) unless and until such provisions are modified by a common agreement between the parties.
>
> "The British, French and Italian Governments each reserve the right to intervene, in such method and by such means as they may deem proper, in order to protect the rights and interests of their nationals."

In order to make this declaration fully intelligible it is necessary to recapitulate the history of the events which led up to it. The Allies originally proposed to insert in the treaty a confirmation of the Decree of Moharrem and loan contracts. Ismet Pasha offered on the 3rd February to substitute a declaration to the same effect (which would have been accepted), but during the second phase of the conference openly put forward a proposal that the treaty should provide that the service of the pre-war Turkish loans—which is, for the most part, by the terms of the contracts payable in several currencies, including sterling, at the option of the holders—should henceforward be payable in paper French francs. The Allied delegations said that if the Turks wished for a fresh concordat, as in 1876, they must approach the bondholders: the bondholders met in Paris in May and refused to discuss the matter till peace was concluded; hence a deadlock was reached and for many weeks it seemed that the conference would be wrecked on this question. Finally it was agreed that the question should be dealt with by the above declaration, which leaves the matter to be dealt with in the first instance between Turkey and her creditors. A committee has in fact been appointed by the British bondholders under the auspices of the Council of Foreign Bondholders: and if no amicable agreement is reached, His Majesty's Government are free to support the bondholders by any means which may be judged to be expedient and most likely to be effective.

The bondholders have of course a strong weapon in the fact that Turkey cannot hope to raise fresh loans till she has made satisfactory arrangements with her existing creditors.

III.—Summary of the Financial Clauses of the Treaty with Turkey.

Section 1 of the financial clauses provides for the distribution of the pre-war Ottoman Public Debt between Turkey and the territories detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars and after the great war.

Article 46 lays down this general principle. (For the purposes of a summary, it is convenient to deal with the other articles in a somewhat different sequence from that in which they appear in the treaty.)

Article 50. The distribution will take place in two stages. In the first place the Ottoman Public Debt as it existed in 1912 will be distributed between Turkey and the States in whose favour territory was detached after the Balkan wars, *i.e.*, Greece, Serbia (including Montenegro), Bulgaria, Albania and Italy (in respect of the Dodecanese). The second stage will be that the balance of the debt, for which Turkey remained responsible after the first distribution, together with the loans contracted between 1912 and the 1st November, 1914, will be distributed between Turkey and the States in whose favour territory is detached from Turkey by the present treaty, such as Syria, Palestine and Irak.

Article 51. The share of each State will be fixed in accordance with the proportion which its revenues bore to the revenues of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. In order to fix this proportion in a normal period when Turkey was not at war, the revenues of the years 1909–10 and 1910–11 will be taken as the basis; for example, the share of Greece will be the fraction represented by the revenues of the Ottoman Empire within the frontiers of 1912 divided by the revenues of the territories transferred from Turkey to Greece after the Balkan wars (including territory transferred originally to Bulgaria and afterwards to Greece), and the share of Palestine will be the fraction represented by the revenues during 1909–10 and 1910–11 of Turkey within the frontiers of 1914 divided by the revenues during the same years of those Turkish provinces which now constitute Palestine. Customs revenues will be included in fixing the total share of the Balkan States, taken together, but will be excluded in calculating the part of each Balkan State in the total share thus fixed, since a part of the customs duties paid at Salonica, &c., in 1912 are now paid on the Serbian and other inland frontiers.

Article 47. The procedure will be as follows:—

> The Ottoman Public Debt Council will within three months fix the share of each State on the basis described above. These States will then become liable for the share thus fixed in the annual charges for the services of the loans of the pre-war Ottoman Public Debt.

Article 48. The States concerned (other than Turkey) undertake to furnish adequate security for the payment of their share.

Article 53. The shares in the annual charges of the loans thus fixed will date back in the case of the Balkan States to the Treaties which ended the Balkan wars, and in the case of Syria, Palestine and Irak to the 1st March, 1920. The annuity of the annual charges due in respect of the Dodecanese will date back to 17th October, 1912, and those in respect of the Greek islands referred to in article 12 to the 1st November, 1913.

Article 55. The arrears thus due will be payable without interest in twenty equal annuities. By a concession agreed to in the second phase of the conference, Turkey will be allowed the same terms for the payment of the arrears due in consequence of the seizure of the assigned revenues in Anatolia by the Angora Government. Provision is made for arbitration both in regard to the calculation of the share of each State and in regard to the security to be assigned to such share.

Article 49. After the share of each State in the annual charges has thus been fixed, the capital of the Ottoman Public Debt will be divided up between the various States concerned, each State taking the same fraction of the capital as it has already taken of the annual charges. Each State concerned will thus be able to issue entirely fresh securities (on exactly the same terms as the existing Ottoman securities) for its own share of the debt. After the division of the capital in this manner, each State will be responsible (1) for its share in the annual charges on the undivided Ottoman Debt up to the date of this division, and (2) for the annual charges on its own share of the capital of the debt as from the date of this division of the capital. The detailed arrangements in connection with the division of the capital of the debt are to be dealt with by a special commission in Paris, and any questions on which the commission cannot reach agreement will be decided by arbitration.

Article 52. By a concession made in the second phase of the conference, certain advances (*i.e.*, internal short-term loans) are to be divided up in the some proportions as the external pre-war Ottoman Public Debt.

Article 56 provides that the German and Austro-Hungarian representatives shall no longer sit on the Ottoman Debt Council.

Article 57 provides that the periods of prescription laid down in the loan contracts shall be treated as having been prolonged by the period of the war.

The Annex to this section contains a list of the loans and advances of the Ottoman Public Debt.

Section 2 of the financial clauses deals with the waiver of reparation and with miscellaneous points. By *article* 58, Turkey and the Allied Powers mutually renounce all claims for reparation in respect of loss and damage suffered during the war by the Government themselves or by their nationals. Turkey renounces in favour of the Allied Powers (other than Greece) her rights to the sums in gold (about 5,000,000*l.*), which were deposited during the war in Berlin and Vienna by the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments as a loan to Turkey to provide cover for the first issue of Turkish paper currency. These sums have been transferred to the Allied Powers by Germany and Austria in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain. (The obligations of the Ottoman Debt Council as regards the first issue of Turkish paper currency are cancelled.) Turkey also renounces any claim against the British Government in regard to the two battleships which were being built for the Ottoman Empire by British firms, and were requisitioned by the British Government in August 1914.

Under *article* 59 Greece recognises her obligation to make good the damage caused in Anatolia by the acts of the Greek army contrary to the laws of war, but Turkey finally renounces all reparation claims against Greece in consideration of the financial position of Greece resulting from the prolongation of the war and its consequences.

Article 60 provides that the States in whose favour territory is detached from Turkey after the Balkan wars and by the present treaty shall acquire without payment the property of the Ottoman Empire constituted in such territory, including property which originally belonged to the Turkish Civil List, but which had been transferred to the Turkish State in 1908 and 1909 and property administered by the Civil List for the benefit of any public service. As regards Civil List property in territory transferred to Greece after the Balkan wars or subsequently shall be referred to an arbitral tribunal at The Hague.

Article 61 relieves Turkey from responsibility in regard to the pensions of Turkish officials who have acquired non-Turkish nationality.

By *article* 62 Turkey recognises the transfer to the Allied Powers of her debts to Germany and the other ex-enemy States, and the Allied Powers agree to release Turkey from the debts in question.

Article 63 provides for the release by Turkey of Germany from the obligation to accept Turkish notes at a specified rate of exchange after the war.

[**E 11376/11376/44**] No. 86.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 335.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 30, 1923.

ATHENS telegram No. 573, repeated to you, of 28th November: Admission of Greeks into Turkey.

I am content to leave you to decide whether, and, if so, to what extent, you can usefully intervene in this matter.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 223.)

[E 11304/7734/44] No. 87.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (*No.* 3765), *Paris; and to Sir R. Graham* (*No.* 1523), *Rome; Mr. Chilton* (*No.* 1787), *Washington; and Sir C. Eliot* (*No.* 455), *Tokyo.*

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 30, 1923.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3685 of the 22nd instant relative to the question of the future status and place of residence of the Allied diplomatic representatives in Turkey, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a further despatch from the Acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople on this subject.*

2. While His Majesty's Government are definitely of opinion that Ambassadors should not in any circumstances be appointed to reside at Angora, they consider that no decision should yet be taken in response to the pressure which the Turks are obviously attempting to exert in regard to the question of the rank of the Allied representatives who may be appointed to reside at Constantinople.

3. As regards the question of the acceptance or otherwise of a site for the construction of a residence for a liaison or other diplomatic officer at Angora, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that this question should be allowed for the present to remain open for consideration.

4. You may inform the Government to which you are accredited of the views of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 11355/1019/65] No. 88.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 1, 1923.

IN reply to your letter of the 27th November on the subject of the Mosul frontier negotiations, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to state, for the information of the Duke of Devonshire, that, while fully recognising that a refusal on the part of the Turkish Government to admit the official participation of an Irak representative at the forthcoming discussions would enable the Irak Government to advertise the unfriendly feeling of the Angora Government towards King Feisal's Administration, the Secretary of State is at the same time somewhat apprehensive of the possible use for propaganda purposes by anti-British elements in Irak of an unsuccessful endeavour by His Majesty's Government to secure what would be represented as the obvious right of a country under British mandate. The unfortunate effect of a rebuff by the Turkish Government might thus outweigh the advantage anticipated in the extract from the Irak intelligence summary transmitted in your letter under reply.

2. I am therefore to suggest, for his Grace's consideration, that the most satisfactory procedure would be for an Irak representative to attend the meetings of the conference in an unofficial capacity as an expert, without any preliminary consultation of the Turkish Government. It has been the Secretary of State's experience that such expert advisers have, during recent conferences, accompanied all parties concerned, and that they have almost invariably ended by insinuating themselves into the meetings without their names figuring on the official lists of representatives submitted by any of the parties concerned.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 11475/8629/44] No. 89.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 3.)

(No. 772.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 24, 1923.

THE "Ileri," which may be described as the official Kemalist newspaper in Constantinople, published on the 20th instant an article on the problem of Turkey's economic recovery. The article is noteworthy by reason of its presence in the "Ileri"

* See No. 77.

and of the status of its author, Soubhi Nuri Bey, who is a strong partisan and one of the principal publicists of Mustafa Kemal, as well as for its remarkable frankness and the accurate picture that it draws of the present unprofitable economic situation in Turkey.

2. Soubhi Nuri Bey asks whether the nation or the Government is responsible for this unfortunate state of affairs, and, without apportioning the blame, clearly attributes it to the latter. This criticism is, of course, in no way directed against Mustafa Kemal, the implication being rather that the remedy is to be sought in the extension of the powers of the latter.

3. The following is a summary of the article in question:—

"The Turkish budget shows a deficit and will not balance for several years. Our revenues are small while our expenses are steadily increasing. Our note issue is insufficient for our needs. There is no gold in the country. The Ministry of Finance cannot supply the various Government Departments with credits. The Departments without credits can undertake no useful enterprises.

"Our farmers need advances in order to buy seed and agricultural machinery. Our merchants are anxious that ports and railways should be built, relations with foreign countries re-established, laws governing import and exports drawn up and that the Government should not create difficulties for them. Our manufacturers also desire facilities in order to build up industries.

"The Greeks and Armenians used to be the producers and traders in Turkey. They have gone and we have taken their place. Are we able to fill it? Have Turks been able to take the place of the Christian traders of Smyrna and the Black Sea? What was the pre-war figure of our exports and what is it now? Have we the necessary capacity for business? One truth is as clear as the day: Trade is stagnant, the population is in a state of misery and poverty and a large number of people are unemployed. Ten per cent. of our land only is cultivated. Our budget shows a deficit of from £T. 30,000,000 to £T. 40,000,000. If we cultivated 20 per cent. of our land we could balance our budget.

"In civilised countries the law is the basis of everything. The Turkish laws are old and defective. It is absolutely necessary for us to improve them. And we need much money: to build factories, to buy machinery and to procure specialists. We cannot get this money in Turkey for there is none in the country.

"We must make up our minds to have recourse to foreign capital and then decide upon the conditions which we are ready to accept, the enterprises to be undertaken with the money and the security to be offered. We must publicly announce our programme, our needs, our conditions and our security and prove that we are worthy of trust, that we will pay out debts, and that we have a stable State and Government.

"But will foreign capital be ready to lend us money? The Treaty of Lausanne has not yet been ratified, and no agreement has been reached between the bondholders and the Government in regard to the payment of the interest on Turkey's foreign debt. Before this latter question is solved in a manner that is in conformity with the interests and rights of both parties, what foreign capitalists will lend money to our country or to our private enterprises? In France capitalists can lend money at 10 per cent. In South America and Canada foreign capital can get 18 to 20 per cent., and, moreover, the internal affairs of these countries are stable and they have excellent laws. If we go to foreign capitalists, what will be the first questions that they will ask us? Has Turkey finished with the war, internal strife and revolution? Is there peace and tranquillity in the country and has the era of law and order begun? Is the People's party strong? Is the Government solidly established in accordance with present-day necessities? Is the republic stable? Are foreigners well treated? Is Turkish justice competent? Are the Turkish laws good and in accordance with present-day necessities? Are commerce and industry facilitated?

"What answer," says Soubhi Nuri Bey, somewhat pathetically, "could we give to such questions? If well-ordered countries pay 18 to 20 per cent., what would Turkey have to pay? It is easy to declare that we will or we will not have foreign capital; but would it not be useful for us to know what foreign capital thinks of us?

"The better the credit of the State the smaller the rate of interest that has to be paid, and credit is only built up on facts. The sooner we adapt our laws, our government machinery, our mentality and our law courts to the exigencies of the

age the better will be our credit and the easier it will be to find money. That is to say, Turkish industry, commerce and agriculture will develop in proportion to the foreign capital which we shall be able to obtain: in other words, our budget will balance. Turkey is rich, her soil is fertile and her people intelligent, honest and laborious. Turkey with a slight effort could become a very rich and prosperous country. But, above all, it is necessary that she should have good laws and that her credit should stand high both at home and abroad."

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 11478/199/44**] No. 90.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 3.)

(No. 775.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 27, 1923.

AS I anticipated in my despatch No. 757 of the 20th instant, the return of Reouf Bey to Angora has been followed by developments which, though so far inconclusive, are likely to have an important bearing on the future course of events in Turkey.

2. The first of these developments was the publication on the 20th November of a brief intimation by Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha, dated the previous day, to the effect that, as the present duties of the former did not permit of his exercising actively the functions of president-general of the People's party, he deputed Ismet to act on his behalf in that capacity. Immediately following on this, Ismet, as deputy president-general of the party, issued a circular announcing the transformation of the "Defence of Rights" Association, as from the 19th November, into the People's party, and expressing confidence that the party would be able to secure victories of peace no less decisive than the results achieved by the "Defence of Rights" Association in its historic struggle for the salvation of the country. Rejeb Bey, Deputy for Kutahia, would be secretary-general of the party.

3. There was nothing in Ismet Pasha's announcement to excite surprise, as, when the People's party was constituted early this year in view of the elections, it was definitely contemplated that it should in due course supersede the "Defence of Rights" Association. What did give rise to comment was the fact that Mustafa Kemal, President of the Republic, should merely have deputed Ismet to act for him as president-general of the party rather than vacate the office.

4. The explanation probably is that, while Mustafa Kemal, now that more or less normal conditions have been established, prefers to call his organisation a "party"—a name which sounds democratic and implies the possibility of the existence of other parties in the State—he really intends the People's party to be regarded as the rallying ground of all true patriotism. Early in the constitutional period the Committee of Union and Progress similarly transformed itself into the so-called party of Union and Progress; but a more illuminating analogy may be found in present circumstances by comparing the Turkish People's party with the Communist "party" in Russia, which, I understand, controls both the Soviet Government and the Third International, and with the Fascist "party" in Italy, which coexists with other parties, but which in fact claims to be the sole genuine expression of a new-born desire for national regeneration. Analogies, if pushed too far, are dangerous; but in this case I am struck by a parallel which I feel will help to an understanding not only of the principal incident to be related in this despatch, but also probably of future developments.

5. On the 21st November a trivial but significant incident occurred in the Grand National Assembly. A question arose as to the precedence of speakers on a Bill of no particular political interest. Reouf Bey having secured possession of the tribune, another Deputy protested, and accused the First Vice-President, Sabri Bey, who was presiding, of partiality. Reouf retorted, but said that after what had passed he would resume his seat without speaking on the business before the Assembly. On his doing so there were cries for Reouf to continue. He refused, and subsequently Sabri Bey tendered his resignation on the ground that the House had shown lack of confidence in him.

6. I mention this only because the scene in the Assembly, which was a lively one, centred round the person of Reouf Bey. In the event Sabri Bey was induced to

withdraw his resignation, and the whole matter was eclipsed the next day, the 22nd November, by what has been far and away the most considerable event of the past week. This was a solemn meeting of the People's party held with the express object of calling Reouf to book for the statements made by him in Constantinople after the proclamation of the republic. The gist of these statements had been that the proclamation was the hasty work of "irresponsible" persons at Angora. The party met early in the afternoon and sat for nearly nine hours. Special police measures were taken outside. Mustafa Kemal himself attended, but does not appear to have taken an active part in the proceedings. Ismet Pasha acted as principal spokesman of the party. According to the first accounts which reached Constantinople on the 23rd November, Reouf's first attempts to define his position were considered unsatisfactory, whereupon he spoke for four hours, proclaimed his whole-hearted acceptance of the republic, and satisfied his critics. It was also stated that, as regard the Caliphate, he and Ismet subscribed to the view that, so long as the Caliphate preserved its present purely religious rôle, it should be respected, but that no interference by the Caliph with "the rights and principles of the nation" would be tolerated.

7. The question of opposing currents in the party had for several days before this meeting greatly occupied the public mind. The anti-Kemalist papers here had seized on a statement by the secretary-general regarding the difficulty of establishing a recognised party organ, either in Angora or Constantinople, as proof that the differences between "Conservatives" and "Liberals" in the party were acute. The secretary-general addressed a letter to the press a day or two before the great meeting of the party, protesting against the interpretation which had been put on his words. The upshot of the meeting itself was hailed by the Kemalists as demonstrating that there was no such division in the party, which was homogeneous and therefore strong. It was announced that Reouf Bey's defence, which had established this happy result, would be published *in extenso*. This has not yet been done, but on the 24th November the managing body of the party issued a communiqué, the material portion of which is as follows:—

> "Reouf Bey, in his reply, gave detailed explanations. He declared that he was, in the fullest sense, a republican and an opponent of constitutional monarchy and that he would not separate from the party. He reassured the party regarding the portion of the aforesaid statements (*i.e.*, those which he had made in Constantinople), which were calculated to cause misunderstanding. Upon this, the party, seeing that there was no division, decided that the matter had been sufficiently discussed."

8. Doubt has been cast on these first reports of the outcome of the party meeting by various telegrams to the effect that Reouf in reality took back nothing of what he had said in Constantinople. He is represented by some as having maintained that he is all for national sovereignty, but that not every republic assures that sovereignty. The rival Turkish newspapers are fiercer than ever in their polemic as to what he said and what he meant. Perhaps the best indication that he has not given complete satisfaction to the Kemalists is that the "Ileri" of the 26th November contains an article which ostensibly attacks a rival organ here, but which incidentally ridicules Reouf himself. There is a general sense of bewilderment in Constantinople. Two things only are clear: firstly, that someone has won a famous victory, but whether Reouf or Ismet, *i.e.*, Mustafa Kemal, nobody knows; and, secondly, that Reouf, challenged to leave the party, refused to do so. My own tentative impression is that Reouf, having spoken for four hours, escaped in a cloud of words, and that he aims at capturing the party from inside rather than at setting up a rival organisation.

9. So far as the Caliphate is concerned, the lull which I noted in my despatch No. 757 has continued, and minor quarrels (*e.g.*, that regarding the dismissal of the director-general of the press, for reasons which the Opposition papers regard as a menace to their liberty of speech) are not worth recording. The only other event of the week at Angora which deserves mention is that, on the 22nd November, two Kemalist Deputies introduced a Bill, in twenty-four articles, proposing various constitutional changes. The text has not been published and somewhat conflicting accounts of the proposal have been circulated, but there appears to be no doubt that the Bill deals with a large range of subjects connected with the powers of the President, the Cabinet and the Assembly, and that it includes, notably, provisions to enable the President to refer legislation back to the Assembly and to lengthen the normal life of the Assembly from two to four years. These proposals are evidently

intended to consolidate Mustafa Kemal's dictatorship, and they may be expected to lead to lively debates in committee and in the Assembly. In their purely constitutional aspect they give evidence of the same conservative tendency in regard to institutions which I noted in my despatch No. 757. Another minor example of the same tendency is a proposal, which has been put forward separately, to establish a Cour des Comptes.

10. In Constantinople the great event of the week has been the arrival here, on the 21st November, of a deputation of the Assembly, headed by Fethi Bey, which left again for Adrianople on the 24th November to take part in the celebration of the first anniversary of the recovery of that town from the Greeks. On the day of his arrival Fethi Bey made a declaration to various journalists, which I enclose in translation.* It appeared with numerous variants in the several local papers. The enclosed version is taken from that published in the "Ileri." I would draw your Lordship's special attention to the passage dealing with the Caliphate and the particularly outspoken statement that Moslem countries other than Turkey have nothing to do with the election of the Caliph. In this connection please see my telegram No. 523 of the 23rd November. This appeared in all versions of the declaration, though in at least one it was softened by a prefatory remark that the Caliphate belongs to the Islamic world. In most versions, though not in the "Ileri," Fethi Bey is reported as having definitely contradicted the report that the Caliph had offered to abdicate. Your Lordship will also observe his reference to Mosul. His hedging utterance concerning Mustafa Kemal's intentions as regards visiting Constantinople is amusing. The truth appears to be that the last thing the President wants to do is to come here, and that just now the presence of foreign warships serves as a sufficient excuse, though a substitute for it will doubtless be required later.

11. The rivalry between Constantinople and Angora continues to manifest itself in various ways. Side by side with it there is an undoubted clash between two tendencies which it is becoming the fashion to call Conservative and Liberal, but which might perhaps be more correctly defined as Islamic and Modernist. It is not possible to associate these rival tendencies with anti-Kemalists and Kemalists respectively, as both political camps contain elements which vary enormously in their view of the extent to which the Turkish State should look to the law of Islam or to modern European systems for its inspiration. Taking a very broad view, however, it may be said that the true blue Kemalists, for all their xenophobia and nationalism, are increasingly inclined to say that Turkish law must be brought into line with modern—*i.e.*, European—ideas. Thus, in a leading article of the 23rd November on the defects of Turkish legislation, the "Ileri" urged *inter alia* the need of a proper Civil Code, though it is well known that the chief obstacle to the elaboration of such a code is the inadaptability of Moslem law to modern conceptions and requirements, and spoke of the law on Wakfs and real property generally as mediæval The "Aksham," a paper of doubtful tendency but in the main Kemalist, had on the 24th November an even more outspoken article deriding the enforcement of the penalty prescribed by the religious law, *i.e.*, the bastinado, for offences against the "dry régime," and said that such a penalty was entirely out of place in a republic. Turkey, the writer said, must either be a civilised Power like European nations or must remain an Asiatic Government like Afghanistan. In this connection, I may mention that there is now little doubt that the days of the dry régime are numbered. The Government is moving rapidly in the direction of legislation which will sanction the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, while attempting to avoid the scandal of public drunkenness. The Islamic "Tevhid-i-Efkiar" is practically alone in advocating the maintenance of the dry régime. Few Turks of the class which supplies this afflicted country with its journalists have any prejudice against alcohol.

12. The agitation against the alleged oppression of Moslems in Greece is still kept alive in the press. The Governor-General of Constantinople had the good sense o withhold permission for the meeting of protest which was to have been held in Stamboul on the 23rd November on the ground that he could not grant it without authority from Angora. On the other hand, Fethi Bey is reported to have spoken about the alleged atrocities in a speech at the Adrianople celebrations of the 25th November, and to have said that Turkish patience had a limit, and that "if our rights are trodden under-foot the Turkish Empire will be in no way responsible for the measures of reprisal which will be taken."

13. The question of the maintenance or suppression of the Tobacco Régie, a concern in which, as your Lordship is aware, French interests predominate, is being

* Not printed.

given a political complexion by the organisation of numerous meetings at Smyrna and other provincial centres to urge the Government to cancel the concession.

14. There has been a certain amount of scaremongering in the press about Communist propaganda in Constantinople. The line taken by the authorities is that there is no ground for alarm, but that if any attempt should be made to translate Communist theory into subversive activities here their vigilance would be quite equal to the occasion.

15. Endeavours to stimulate patriotism by announcing that the repairs to the "Goeben" are to be put in hand and that Turkey will be the possessor of a beautiful navy have fallen rather flat. The prospect of a call for subscriptions to meet the heavy expenditure which the re-conditioning of the "Goeben" would admittedly entail possibly damps enthusiasm. It is true that the Minister for Finance, who has just arrived in Constantinople, has given a glowing account of the state of Turkish finances. He states that the deficit in the budget is no more than can be bridged by economies on estimated expenditure. These assurances do not appear to inspire the confidence to which the position occupied by their author would appear to entitle them.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 11484/1019/65**] No. 91.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 3.)

(No. 783.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which has been addressed to the High Commissioner for Irak, respecting the representatives of Mosul in the National Assembly.

Constantinople, November 28, 1923.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Mr. Henderson to Sir H. Dobbs (*Bagdad*).

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 28, 1923.

I HAVE observed in recent issues of the fortnightly intelligence reports from Bagdad references to alleged efforts on the part of the authorities at Angora to arrange for Deputies representing Mosul to sit in the Grand National Assembly. It may interest you to know that, so far as I have been able to ascertain here, the Assembly brought together as a result of the recent elections does not contain any Deputies purporting to represent any part of the Mosul area. The list of constituencies and Deputies in my possession, which I believe to be complete, does not include the name of any constituency in that area, nor do the names of Ibrahim Effendi-el-Haidari or Nazim Bey of Kirkuk appear in it. The former of these gentlemen is, so far as I know, in Constantinople.

2. While the Turkish elections were in progress, statements appeared in the local Turkish press to the effect that the Kemalist organisation would recommend to the inhabitants of Mosul four candidates whose names were given as Ibrahim Haidari, Sheikh Seyyid Kurdi, Sheikh Vasfi, and Moussa-el-Hachim. No further developments in this connection have come to my notice, and I attach no importance to the statement of which more would certainly have been heard had there been any foundation for it.

3. I have, however, recently had a sidelight on the matter, which may be of some value to you. A Constantinople journalist, who belongs to the Baban family, and who is therefore specially interested in Suleimanie, assured a member of my staff on the 17th November that a brother-in-law of Sheikh Mahmoud had actually arrived in Constantinople bearing a document issued by some local council and countersigned by the sheikh himself, certifying that the bearer had been duly elected a Deputy to the Grand National Assembly. The informant was unable to give this person's name, nor did he mention the precise constituency which he claimed to represent. He stated, however, that the bearer of the document, which he had himself seen, was a

brother of Sheikh Mahmoud's wife. He added that the individual's claim to sit in the Assembly had been disallowed.

4. The journalist who supplied this information is not a wholly trustworthy person, but, as he volunteered it in the course of a friendly conversation, I have no reason to suppose that on this occasion he was not speaking the truth. I should not wish the information to be used in any way which would enable Sheikh Mahmoud or the Turkish authorities to trace it to the journalist in question.

5. It occurs to me that the document described above may be the " Madhbatah " mentioned at the beginning of paragraph 753 of the Bagdad Intelligence Report No. 21, dated the 1st November.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 11485/1019/65**] No. 92.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 3.)

(No. 784.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 28, 1923.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 681 of the 23rd October, I have the honour to state that on the 20th November the " Tevhid-i-Efkiar " newspaper gave prominence to a telegram from Angora to the effect that the Council of Ministers had discussed the Mosul question on the 18th November; that Ferid Bey, the Minister of the Interior, had described recent occurrences at Mosul, and had urged the necessity of immediate action to end the situation arising out of them; that Ismet Pasha had furnished reasoned explanations regarding Mosul from the point of view of the Peace Treaty; and that secrecy was being observed as to the conclusions arrived at. The " Wakt " published a very similar telegram, in which it was stated that all the Ministers, headed by Ferid Bey, had urged the necessity for dealing with the situation.

2. I rather anticipated that, if these reports were true, Adnan Bey might be instructed to speak to me on the subject; but, apart from a somewhat cursory reference to Nestorian levies and to alleged violations of the *status quo* by the British in a conversation which I had with him on the 26th November, he has not mentioned the Mosul question of late. In that conversation he spoke vaguely, and on my observing that he was probably thinking of something which had happened several months ago, he did not pursue the subject.

3. So far as the press was concerned, nothing further appeared regarding the alleged meeting of the Council of Ministers at Angora. For a week the only important published reference to Mosul was the statement made by Fethi Bey in the statement to the press mentioned in my despatch No. 775 of the 27th November. I reproduce here for convenience of reference the relevant portion of that statement, as given in the " Ileri." The versions of it given by the other papers do not differ materially. Fethi Bey, according to the " Ileri," spoke as follows:—

> " The Mosul question still remains as left at Lausanne. No negotiations regarding it have yet taken place. Mosul is, of course, ours. The Turks constitute the majority of the population living there. Mosul is very naturally our right. I repeat firmly and definitely: Mosul will return to the mother country. We have not a shadow of doubt about it."

4. On the 27th November, just a week after the telegrams reported in paragraph 1 above, the " Tanin " and the " Tevhid-i-Efkiar," both Opposition papers, published mutually contradictory telegrams from Angora. Both papers announced, like various other organs, that the Grand National Assembly had, on the 26th November, formally approved the appointment Yussuf Kemal Bey to London. The " Tanin " telegram regarding Mosul was as follows:—

> " *Angora, November* 26.—Yussuf Kemal Bey, our representative in London, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tewfik Bey, military adviser at Lausanne, have been appointed plenipotentiary and military adviser respectively for the settlement of the Mosul question. No decision has been taken by the Council of Ministers regarding the reports concerning the interview of the British representative with Adnan Bey, delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Constantinople. No discussion of this question has taken place in the Council of Ministers."

The " Tevhid " telegram was as follows:—

> " *Angora, November* 26.—The reports to the effect that Yussuf Kemal Bey, our representative in London, and that Lieutenant-Colonel Tewfik Bey, military adviser at the Lausanne Conference, have been appointed plenipotentiary and military adviser respectively for the settlement of the Mosul question, that the conference will meet in London, and that Dr. Adnan Bey has made communications on this subject to the British representative, are untrue. No discussion of this matter has yet taken place in the Council of Ministers and no decision has been taken."

5. The form of the " Tevhid " telegram suggests that it was sent after that to the " Tanin " had been despatched in order to catch it up and serve as an unofficial *démenti*. The reserve displayed by the Turkish Government itself is probably due to a wish, on the one hand, not to indispose His Majesty's Government by contesting the position that the negotiations were initiated by my note of the 5th October, and, on the other hand, to postpone any real negotiations until after the entry into force of the Lausanne Treaty.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 11522/7158/44**] No. 93.

Sir O. Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 3.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vatican, Rome, December* 3, 1923.

MY despatch No. 162 of 29th November.

Having since privately sounded Cardinal Secretary of State, I have come to conclusion that in our own interests proposed representation should refer to Palestine only and should state that, having assumed mandate, His Majesty's Government cannot admit that liturgical honours or any privileged position be accorded to representative of a foreign Power. As Cardinal Secretary of State definitely concurred in my statement that with mandate in operation matter was now one which only concerned His Majesty's Government and Holy See, I would beg to withdraw last paragraph of my despatch and to suggest prompt action without any reference to French.

I should be glad of instructions by telegraph.

[**E 11521/8766/44**] No. 94.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 4.)

(No. 579.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, December* 3, 1923.

ALBANIAN Minister at Paris has requested French Government to remind Greek Government of promise made by M. Caclamanos at Lausanne on 29th January that Albanian Mussulman inhabitants of Epirus would not be included in exchange of populations. French Minister at Athens has been instructed to act in concert with Italian Minister and me.

I await instructions.

[**E 11606/1019/65**] No. 95.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 6.)

(No. 529.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 6, 1923.

YOUR despatch No. 1071 crossed my despatch No. 784. Your Lordship will see by latter that possibility of Yussuf Kemal being placed in charge of negotiations has been ventilated in Turkish press. While I do not believe Turkish Government has taken any decision in this sense, these rumours make me think it probable that Yussuf Kemal will be instructed to broach question of scene of negotiations when

he arrives in London, and Turks may weaken on their request that they should take place in Constantinople.

Unless, therefore, your Lordship [group undecypherable] has definite preference for Constantinople, I would suggest postponement of any formal communication to Turkish Government pending Yussuf Kemal's arrival. Meanwhile, I might discuss question in non-committal manner with Adnan and sound him as to present intentions of Turks.

I cannot guarantee Turkish Government's acceptance of 5th October as commencement of period of negotiations. Their concurrence can only, though legitimately, be inferred by their silence on a point which was very clearly stated in a note to which they have replied. If it suited them, they are, however, quite capable of denying acceptance, which I have hitherto thought it politic to take for granted. Nevertheless, if you agree to my returning to the charge on question of site of conference, I can endeavour to get explicit admission as regards 5th October. Before doing so I should be glad to learn whether His Majesty's Government, for their part, consent to Turkish wish to defer opening of conference until after ratification of treaty by Great Britain.

[**E 11553/10145/44**] No. 96.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 337.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 6, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 520 of 16th November: Turkish Red Crescent Mission to India.

Government of India are prepared to admit mission on condition that delegates give categorical assurances before starting that they will abstain from political discussion while in India. Itinerary will be subject to approval of Government, and if objectionable demonstration is produced at any point of route programme may have to be curtailed. If composition and conduct of mission prove satisfactory, Government of India may be prepared to give them support with Moslem princes and notables.

[**E 11521/8766/44**] No. 97.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 228.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 6, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 579 of 3rd December: Position of Hellenic Moslems of Albanian race under Exchange of Populations Convention.

Since League of Nations has been entrusted with all arrangements for execution of Exchange of Populations Convention, His Majesty's Government consider that Albanian representations should be addressed to, and put forward by, that body. It appears undesirable that Allied Powers should intervene directly in this dispute, more especially as counter-complaints regarding treatment of Greeks in Albania have also been received, and intervention in both cases would be involved.

French Government, who have enquired views of His Majesty's Government, have been informed accordingly.

[**E 11610/7862/44**] No. 98.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received December* 7.)

(No. 2762.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs informing the Roumanian Government of the signature by the Allied Powers of the Turkish Reparation Convention.

Paris, December 5, 1923.

Enclosure 1 in No. 98.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy, Paris.

COMME suite à sa communication du 12 octobre 1923, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique la copie d'une note qu'il vient d'adresser à la Légation de Roumanie à Paris pour l'informer de la signature, le 23 novembre dernier, par l'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon de la convention et du protocole relatifs à l'évaluation et à la réparation des dommages subis en Turquie par leurs ressortissants.

Une copie de ces documents a été adressée en même temps à la Légation de Roumanie.

Paris, le 5 décembre 1923.

Enclosure 2 in No. 98.

M. Poincaré to Roumanian Minister, Paris.

M. le Ministre, *Paris, le 5 décembre* 1923.

ME référant aux explications qui vous ont été fournies le 12 novembre dernier à mon Département au sujet de la réparation des dommages subis par les ressortissants alliés en Turquie, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le projet de convention dont je vous avais saisi le 12 octobre, et dont vous trouverez le texte sous ce pli, a été signé le 23 novembre par la France, l'Empire britannique, l'Italie et le Japon. Tenant compte du désir du Gouvernement royal de Roumanie de pouvoir signer ultérieurement cette convention, les représentants de la France, de l'Empire britannique, de l'Italie et du Japon ont le même jour signé le protocole ci-joint, dont je vous avais communiqué le projet, reconnaissant à la Roumanie la faculté, tant que le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie ne sera pas entré en vigueur, de faire procéder à la signature de la Convention relative aux Réparations en Turquie.

Agréez, &c
R. POINCARÉ.

[**E 11643/52/44**] No. 99.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 7.)

(No. 530.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December* 7, 1923.

MY despatch No. 808, last paragraph.

Grigorios, Archbishop of Cadikeui, was elected Greek Patriarch yesterday. Government did not interfere beyond laying it down that only Turkish subjects exercising ecclesiastical functions in Turkey must participate as electors or candidates. Greek prelates seem to have shown some independence in their choice and did not desire Eftim to interfere. Turkish press generally is hostile to new Patriarch.

Despatch follows.

[**E 11522/7158/44**] No. 100.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir O. Russell (Vatican).

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 7, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 32 of 3rd December: French claim to protectorate over Catholics in Near East.

You should address immediate representation to Cardinal Secretary of State in sense suggested in your despatch No. 162 of 29th November, as modified in your above-mentioned telegram, explaining that, Palestine mandate having now come into

force, His Majesty's Government cannot admit that liturgical honours or any privileged position should be accorded to the representative of a foreign Power, and that they therefore request that the Catholic authorities in Palestine may be advised that the French representative is no longer entitled to any privileged position or liturgical honours at Catholic services.

[E 11650/1019/65] No. 101.

Sir H. Dobbs to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 8.)

(No. 675.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *December 5, 1923.*

WAY in which rebuff by Turkish Government could provide material for anti-British propaganda is not understood by me. It would, on the contrary, be clear that His Majesty's Government had done their best to support the rights of the Irak State to the full, and Turkey's refusal to recognise those rights could, and would, be used to produce feeling of indignation against Turkey. On the other hand, a refusal by His Majesty's Government to approach Turkey might be taken to mean unwillingness of His Majesty's Government themselves that Irak should be formally represented. It would be unfortunate if at the present moment, when relations are particularly cordial, such an impression were created. I feel sure that any potential disadvantages are easily outweighed by advantages of acceding to the Government of Irak's request.

This refers to your telegram No. 564 of 4th December.

[E 11667/52/44] No. 102.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 531.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 7, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 530.

Papa Eftim, accompanied by armed body of Lazes, occupied Patriarchate this morning and expelled entire Holy Synod, Archbishop Nicea being slightly injured in scuffle which took place.

Turkish police as usual refused to interfere in what they described as dispute of private character.

Holy Synod is applying to Governor-General for protection, but being Friday has so far been unable to get into contact with him.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 132.)

[E 11659/8766/44] No. 103.

Mr Bentinck to British Consul, Canea.—(Repeated to Foreign Office (No. 583); received December 8.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 7, 1923.*

I LEARN that Italians are making trouble about black Moslems in Crete being included in exchange of populations. As these people came originally from Libya, Italians now claim that they are Italian subjects.

Have you any information?

(Repeated to Rome, No. 113.)

[E 11648/8766/44] No. 104.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 584. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, December 7, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 548.

Turks on Mixed Commission to-day threatened expulsion of Greeks from Constantinople on account of conditions in Macedonia.

Commission are greatly worried.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 195.)

[E 11669/7781/44] No. 105.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 534.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 8, 1923.*

SENIOR Naval Officer here has received instructions from Admiralty that British warships should leave Constantinople and return as soon as possible to Malta after consulting with me as to suitable date.

In view of Mr. Oliphant's letter of 26th November stating that your Lordship approved of withdrawal before 31st December, I am notifying Turkish authorities and my French, Italian and American colleagues that for reasons connected with naval arrangements destroyer will leave 13th December and light cruiser 15th December.

[E 11581/7781/44] No. 106.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 340.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 8, 1923.*

YOUR private letter of 13th November to Oliphant: Withdrawal of Allied warships from Turkish waters.

Admiralty have instructed Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to arrange for withdrawal of His Majesty's ships from Turkish waters as soon as possible.

French and Italian Governments are being informed.

[E 11715/7899/44] No. 107.

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 1483.)
My Lord, *Washington, November 30, 1923.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a hard fight is expected in the Senate when the Lausanne Treaty comes up for ratification at the forthcoming session of Congress. The Opposition is led by Mr. James W. Gerard, formerly United States Ambassador at Berlin and now chairman of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, who has many prominent men behind him, including Mr. Oscar S. Straus, formerly Ambassador at Constantinople. A memorandum, signed by 100 statesmen, high army officers, financiers and others, has been prepared for presentation to President Coolidge and Mr. Hughes:—

> "It is morally an indefensible treaty," it runs. "It is an utterly humiliating and purposeless treaty. It surrenders every American right in Turkey. It renders impossible the continuance of American educational and philanthropic enterprises in that country. It ignores our solemn pledge to Armenia. The economic concessions it purports to secure for a few Americans are now admitted to be of dubious value and have already been transferred into alien hands.
>
> "The Turks have broken thus early their promises of good behaviour and their guarantees to our missionaries and to the remnants of Christians in

Turkey. All reports which have recently reached the outside world from Turkish and foreign sources show that factional armed conflicts, wide-spread banditry and hopeless economic chaos seriously threaten Kemal's régime, and that the task which confronts this Government is, according to the admission of Italian leaders, a truly impossible one.

"America stands to gain absolutely nothing by resuming relations with Turkey in this state and can lose nothing further by maintaining the *status quo* and awaiting developments. The downfall of the Kemalists appears inevitable and imminent. By now surrendering our rights to Kemal we shall find it difficult to reassert them against any régime which may overthrow and succeed him.

"We believe that the honour of America, no less than every dictate of reason, demands that the Senate reject the Lausanne Treaty."

The treaty is attacked on seven points :—

"Our nationals in Turkey are to be deprived of the protection of the American consular courts—a prerogative they have enjoyed since 1832—and made subject to the notoriously corrupt Turkish police and courts.

"Our missionary institutions in Turkey are to be likewise subject to Turkish laws. The question of indemnity for damages suffered by Americans 'through arbitrary and illegal acts' is left for later discussion. Our merchant vessels may, as in the past, pass through the Dardanelles, which, however, may be closed at the will of the Turks as was done in 1914.

"Our archæologists enjoy the same rights that are enjoyed by Turkish archæologists. This only requires the comment that there never have been any Turkish archæologists.

"The open door—we resume our former privilege to trade with and invest in Turkey. The importance of that privilege may be gauged by the fact that in 1913, when Turkey's estimated population was 17,500,000, American exports to lation of Turkey now is only about 5,000,000.
of Turkey now is only about 5,000,000.

"Protected minorities are to enjoy the protection of Turkish laws—as in the past. Since 1774 Turkey has solemnly agreed in twenty-one international documents to protect the Christians."

Later, the document says :—

"If, as appears, the Chester Concession was the inducement leading to the sacrifice of American rights and the abandonment of Armenia, then, in the light of our fuller knowledge of the illusory nature of this concession—no longer even in American hands—the only plausible argument in favour of the Lausanne Treaty becomes untenable."

The effect of this memorandum, however, will undoubtedly be lessened by the following statement issued by Dr. James L. Barton, secretary of the American Board of Missionaries, chairman of the Near East Relief and representative at Lausanne of American religious, educational and philanthropic organisations :—

"Turkey won her case at Lausanne by securing from the Allies and the United States treaties which did not contain, by any means, all that by right should have been in. These treaties, and especially the one with America, contains all that could have been secured under the circumstances. The question is shall this treaty be ratified or shall it be rejected?

"If ratification means condoning the crimes against humanity of the present Turkish Government and its predecessors, rejection must follow. But after the repeated declarations at Lausanne of the spokesman for the United States of the universal condemnation of the atrocities committed against her subjects by the Turkish officials and by the Government, there can remain no doubt upon this point.

"The treaty is meagre and incomplete, but if we reject it there will remain no basis for future negotiations, while by accepting it the way will be open for further negotiations upon points not now included.

"While American institutions are not named in the treaty, diplomatic correspondence outside the treaty already provides for their continuance. There is much reason for believing that the rejection of the treaty by the Senate would lead to the closing of all American institutions in Turkey, religious, educational, philanthropic and commercial, and would close the door for future negotiations.

"The ratification of the treaty would make possible the continuation in the country of established American interests. While our treaty does not cover the protection of minority populations, the presence of American institutions cannot fail to serve them in many ways.

"Turkey has been admitted into the sisterhood of nations by the Allied treaties; America can hardly afford to withdraw now its influence from that country, in which its interests are humanitarian and not political.

"I am convinced that we can best serve the minority races of the Near East and the Near East itself by keeping in close diplomatic relations with Turkey and so using the good office of our Government in the best interests of all.

"This means, therefore, the ratification of the treaty and the setting up in Turkey an embassy of special wisdom and strength to continue negotiations and help Turkey to give an administration that will be tempered by justice and mercy."

The Department of State believes that, in the end, Mr. Barton's appeal will carry more weight among the Senators than Mr. Gerard's memorandum, and the treaty will be ratified, but only after a very close struggle.

I have, &c.
H. G. CHILTON.

[**E 11692/199/44**] No. 108.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 808.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 5*, 1923.

IN my despatch No. 775 of the 27th ultimo, I dealt at some length with the duel in the People's party on the 22nd November between Reouf Bey and his critics. The full report of the debate reached Constantinople on the 27th November, and was published here on the 28th and 29th November. As reproduced in the "Tanin" newspaper it occupied no less than forty-nine columns, but it has done so little to dissipate the fog surrounding the intentions of Reouf Bey and his friends that I do not propose to trouble your Lordship with a detailed account of it. The debate abounded in futile hairsplitting and was not free from unedifying personalities, although, on the whole, the combatants were very polite to one another, and the abuse indulged in by some of Ismet Pasha's supporters was directed against persons in Constantinople only. Such references as were made to Mustafa Kemal were couched in terms of almost religious respect. The actual person of the Caliph was not brought into discussion, though some strong language was used as to what would happen if the holder of that office should ever venture to encroach on the liberties of the people, and one speaker criticised the maintenance of the old ceremonial of the Friday selamlik as a proof that the idea of monarchy persisted in Constantinople. Foreign Powers were represented as seeking for opportunities in Turkey's internal dissensions. Incidentally, I may mention that Mr. Ryan's return to his post in this High Commission was cited as a proof that Great Britain more particularly was eager to take advantage of the confused internal situation here.

2. So far as concrete results were concerned, the debate was as unproductive of result as the famous battle between Tweedledum and Tweedledee. All real issues were evaded. Reouf Bey professed himself an ardent Republican, but insisted on his view that the proclamation of the republic was precipitate and that the apprehension which it had excited, *e.g.*, in Constantinople, was justified. He implied rather than stated that the particular form of republic existing in Turkey did not necessarily secure the principle of national sovereignty. He declined to leave the party by his own act and retired before the end of the discussion, leaving the party to take its own decision. Ismet Pasha then made a short further statement in which he still expressed dissatisfaction with some of Reouf Bey's explanations, but he was persuaded by one of his own supporters not to press matters further. The principals have since rested on their oars while the press has been busy discussing what were the issues, who won the day, whether anyone won at all, or whether there was any battle to win or lose.

3. The tumult in the press has by now pretty well subsided, and the whole episode has fallen into its place as the first inconclusive round in a struggle which will certainly continue. The next round will in all probability be fought in the near future over the

new constitutional proposals. The draft law mentioned in my despatch No. 775 of the 17th ultimo was ruled out by the Committee on Drafts of the Grand National Assembly, but the Assembly itself on the 1st December accepted a proposal of Yunus Nadi Bey, a strong Kemalist, overruling the Committee on Drafts and referring the draft law to the Constitutional Committee, where it is expected to give rise to lively discussions on and after the 5th December. The opposition to it is for the moment associated with the name of Ismail Djambolat Bey, one of the old guard of the Committee of Union and Progress, but all the other sections of the heterogeneous opposition to Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha are doubtless sharpening their swords. It will not be so easy in these coming debates as it was at the party meeting to evade what are considered vital issues, such as the proposals that the President of the Republic should have the right to refer legislation back to the Assembly and to dissolve the Assembly and that the Assembly should sit for a limited period each year instead of in permanence as heretofore.

4. The discussion of these constitutional questions may well decide the fate of Ismet Pasha's Government, if not that of Mustafa Kemal himself. The Government is already encountering difficulties over certain questions like that of the Tobacco Régie and the Anatolian Railway. A strong movement in favour of the suppression of the Tobacco Régie has been engineered by the Opposition. Ismet Pasha is doubtless impressed not only by the difficulty of substituting another system for that of a conceded monopoly, but also by the danger of trouble with the French. Anyhow, he has shown no willingness to lay proposals for the suppression of the Régie before the Assembly. His policy of concluding a fresh agreement with the present Anatolian Railway group, represented by the old managing director, M. Huguenin, is being strongly opposed in the Grand National Assembly, and rumours have begun to circulate of the resignation of his Ministers of Finance and Public Works as a result of that opposition.

5. Mustafa Kemal's own position is less seriously threatened, unless it be true, as many affirm, that he is in the last stages of physical breakdown and refuses to adopt the only remedy, namely, abstinence from alcohol. I am slow to believe these stories, and I should not be surprised to see him take advantage of the growing political chaos to impose a complete dictatorship at a favourable moment in the constitutional discussions. Whatever the real reason, he has kept very much in the background of late, only emerging to give a statement which appeared in the Constantinople "Terdjuman-i-Hakikat" on the 1st December. It consisted mainly of a vigorous attack on the Opposition, as your Lordship will see by the enclosed translation.* The editor of the "Terdjuman," in introducing this statement to his readers, acclaims Mustafa Kemal as the saviour of his country, the man who defeated "all the hopes and plans of Lloyd George," and who, remote from imperialist ideas, established an honourable national Government in Turkey, unlike Napoleon who reduced his own country to misery and steeped Europe in blood. This collocation of names, even to contrast their owners, is significant.

6. Another striking example of the way in which Mustafa Kemal is still building up his position, or having it built up for him, is the adoption by the Grand National Assembly on the 4th December of a special budget for the presidency of the republic. The President is to receive a salary of £T. 5,000 a month and a representation allowance of £T. 7,000 a month, the equivalent of over 18,000*l.* a year in all; and he is to be provided with a regular household of secretaries, aides-de-camp, &c. Judged by Turkish standards, the emoluments of the President are princely, and the representation allowance is particularly high for a capital where life is so primitive and water the only beverage consumed on public and semi-public occasions. According to telegraphic reports, one Deputy suggested that Mustafa Kemal personally should receive £T. 10,000 a month for life, but that the normal salary of the President should be £T. 1,000. The Assembly, however, voted the proposals submitted to it by a majority of 143 to 5. Concurrently with these arrangements, rumours are rife of an intended reduction of the Caliph's allowance from State funds, which, according to one very recent report, it is proposed to reduce as low as £T. 10,000 a month.

7. One of the most notable, and in a way satisfactory, features of the present situation is the undoubted nervousness of the Turks regarding their position *vis-à-vis* of the Great Powers, especially Great Britain. Constant indications of this appear in the press. The "Ileri," the principal Kemalist organ here, has of late been publishing articles of an anti-British and pro-French tendency; but there are signs of a healthy feeling that it is

* Not printed.

not safe to try any of the Western Powers, least of all Great Britain, too high. Anti-Turkish feeling in the United States of America is also exciting a good deal of apprehension.

8. None of the minor questions which have been agitating public opinion here has come to a head. For the moment I will merely mention that the Greek Patriarchate has again come into the limelight owing to the preparations which are being made by the prelates in Constantinople to elect a new Patriarch. The Turkish papers are again clamouring against the patriarchate as a political institution. The Government is ostensibly holding aloof, but appears to be endeavouring to compass the election of Mgr. Cyril, Metropolitan of Rhodopolis, or Matchka, and the notorious Papa Eftim has just returned from Angora to Constantinople, presumably in order to bully the prelates once again.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 11695/8766/44**] No. 109.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 811.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna respecting minorities in the Smyrna Vilayet.

Constantinople, December 5, 1923.

Enclosure in No. 109.

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.

(No. 164.)

Sir, *Smyrna, November* 28, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that during the last month or two the Turkish authorities have been releasing the Armenians who were detained in custody here and in the interior. Through the good offices of the American Near East Relief some 500 of these Armenians have already been sent to Greece, and 500–600 more remain to be despatched. Only a few of those who have been liberated have chosen to stay in Turkey. Most are—like the Greek prisoners—broken in body and spirit, and only too anxious to take their first chance of leaving this country. The authorities have given no reason for the liberation of the Armenians, but they have allowed hints to reach them that they had better depart in case anything untoward should happen. This, presumably, is felt to be the simplest way of getting rid of a remnant too reduced to need sterner measures, and yet too capable of revival to be allowed to benefit by the general amnesty whenever it is proclaimed.

2. These Armenians have been enrolled in labour battalions, composed mainly of Greeks. The men are of all classes—clerks, tradesmen, mechanics, peasants. They have been employed on all kinds of work without much regard to their aptitude. There have been some hundreds here engaged in various duties, and 1,400 Greeks and 500 Armenians in Magnesia employed mostly on agricultural work. Others are reported to have been in different places in the interior, including Angora, where 4,000 of them are said to have been employed on attempts to make public buildings and a railway extension towards Sivas.

3. Now the Greeks, who have survived the privations of the last fourteen months, are being collected with a view to exchange. Several thousand are already here. From the zone between Smyrna and Afion-Kara-Hissar it is estimated that 10,000 Greeks will be forthcoming. They are all men. The women and children have already left or disappeared.

4. The problem of dealing with the Moslems received from Greece is giving the Turkish authorities a degree of anxiety which it is easy to understand. A certain official named Ihsan Pasha (not the general of that name is established here, with a staff, as local representative of the Department for the Exchange of Populations. The Moslems from Mitylene were reported to have been sent to Aivali last month, and

small contingents from Chios and other places have arrived here. The authorities endeavour to send the arrivals up-country without delay, as they are afraid of leaving large numbers of half-starving people in the town. There is a plan for distributing the refugees over the vacant areas and helping them with seed and agricultural implements. But to carry it out with success would require a higher degree of administrative efficiency than exists at present. As even the native peasants are expected to suffer during this winter, it is to be feared that it will go hard with the immigrants, whether they manage to stop in Smyrna in the ruins and in huts, or whether they are sent to severer climates up-country. The representative here of the American Near East Relief calculates that half a million Moslems will come to Turkey from Greece, and that of these perhaps 100,000 will be allotted to the zone of the old Greek occupation round Smyrna. The Vali—perhaps because he was himself misinformed or because he wished to minimise the problem—told me that a total of 150,000 Moslems would come to Turkey, 60,000 to the old Greek zone and 20,000 to the Vilayet (*i.e.*, former sandjak) of Smyrna.

5. The present position of the Jews is curious. They were not damaged by the fire of Smyrna. On the contrary, many of them made fortunes by buying goods for next to nothing from looters, who did not know what to do with them, and then selling at good prices. The departure of the Greeks and Armenians also left the Jews in command of the business market. But, for the same reason, they were the only section of the population left for the Turks to fleece, and, as they were known to be abnormally well off, they invited, and met with, a mild form of persecution. There was a certain amount of anti-Jewish propaganda in the press, and Jews in the up-country villages began to find things uncomfortable. The press propaganda has ceased, but the Jews do not feel altogether happy. There is a continual exodus—especially among the small trader class—to Egypt, South America and elsewhere. They are apprehensive for the safety of their persons and fortunes, and some do not think the prospects of business here good enough to warrant them in taking the risk of staying.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 11697/8133/44] No. 110.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 813.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 5, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the *procès-verbal* of a private meeting of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, together with a report of an interview between Sir Adam Block and Hassan Fehmi Bey, the Turkish Minister of Finance, who passed through Constantinople a week ago on his way back to Angora.

2. The Italian High Commissioner informed me yesterday that he had been invited by his Government to make, as soon as my French colleague and I received similar instructions, an identic communication to the Turkish Government on the lines of the request put forward to your Lordship in the letter addressed to Sir Eyre Crowe by the secretary of the British Council of Foreign Bondholders of the 14th November last, a copy of which Sir Adam Block was good enough to communicate to me to-day, together with the accompanying *procès-verbal*. I told M. Maissa that I had as yet received no instructions on the subject, but would, of course, concert with him and M. Jessé Guróly as soon as I did so, more especially as the effect of any such *démarche*, if made, would at least be considerably strengthened if made simultaneously. I feared, however, that, though it would undoubtedly make the Turks uneasy, it would merely elicit a reply to the effect that the question of the debt must wait till after the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty by the Powers.

3. The entirely unsatisfactory and even truculent attitude adopted by Hassan Fehmi Bey in his conversation with Sir A. Block confirms this anticipation. Apart from the financial chaos in which the Turkish Government is helplessly and every day more inextricably entangled, it is also, as I have reported elsewhere, really anxious lest the Powers may at long last not ratify the treaty. Its refusal to negotiate with the bondholders or, in fact, to begin seriously to negotiate for the settlement of any outstanding questions must, in my opinion, largely be regarded as pressure on the

Powers to ratify. In this respect the Turkish Government would appear to be at cross-purposes with the French Government, which, as is evident from M. Mussolini's instructions to M. Maissa, is taking the initiative as regards making an immediate and identic representation to the Government at Angora on the subject of the debt. It would not be unreasonable to think that the French Government favours a *démarche* of that nature at this moment, on the eve of the debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the Treaty of Lausanne, both for parliamentary reasons as an answer to the opponents of the treaty and as a threat to the Turks that the French ratification may even be withheld until a solution is reached in regard to a question in which the French public is so largely interested.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 110.

Procès-verbal de la Séance privée tenue par le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, le Lundi 3 Décembre 1923.

Présents :

Sir Adam Block, K.C.M.G., *Président.*
M. F. des Closières.
M. B. Nogara.
Son Excellence Mehmed Djavid Bey.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT rappelle à ses collègues qu'à la date du 28 juillet 1923, il avait, avec leur assentiment, tenté une première démarche auprès de son Excellence Zékiaï Bey, Commissaire du Gouvernement auprès de la Dette publique, aux fins de savoir quand l'Administration centrale pourrait reprendre en mains la direction de ses services en province et rentrer en possession des revenus dont elle avait été privée soit en province, soit à Constantinople.

Cette démarche étant restée sans réponse, Sir Adam Block crut devoir la renouveler en allant trouver, le 16 septembre suivant, son Excellence Adnan Bey, représentant diplomatique du Gouvernement turc à Constantinople, à qui il posa de nouveau les deux questions ci-haut, en le priant, en outre, de vouloir bien lui faire connaitre les intentions de son Gouvernement relativement à la date d'ouverture des négociations à engager avec les porteurs pour le choix de la monnaie de paiement des coupons.

Cette seconde intervention étant également demeurée sans suite, M. le Président saisit l'occasion que lui offrait le récent passage à Constantinople de son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Bey, Commissaire aux Finances, pour aller s'enquérir directement auprès de ce dernier de ses vues et dispositions relativement au règlement des questions litigieuses déjà signalées à leurs Excellences Zékiaï et Adnan Beys.

Au cours de son entretien avec le Ministre, Sir Adam Block le pria notamment de bien vouloir répondre aux deux questions suivantes, qu'il se permettait de lui poser en sa qualité de président du Conseil de la Dette et en vertu d'une demande catégorique d'éclaircissements parvenue des syndicats anglais et français :

1. Quand le Gouvernement turc compte-t-il restituer au Conseil de la Dette la gestion des revenus concédés aux porteurs ?
2. Quand ledit Gouvernement compte-t-il entrer en négociations avec les porteurs, en vue de la reprise du service de l'Unifiée et des Lots turcs ?

Comme il ressort du compte rendu détaillé de cet entretien, dont le texte, communiqué par M. le Président à ses collègues, figure en annexe au présent procès-verbal, les déclarations faites par son Excellence le Ministre, en réponse à ces deux questions, sont loin d'être satisfaisantes.

Sur la première question, qui concerne le rétablissement du conseil dans la plénitude des droits et attributions qui lui sont conférés par le Décret de Mouharrem, son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Bey a déclaré que toute décision sur ce point restait subordonnée à la ratification du traité, aux résultats définitifs des travaux de répartition de la dette turque, et enfin, à l'issue des négociations avec les porteurs au sujet du mode de règlement de la dette restant à la charge de la Turquie.

En ce qui concerne, d'autre part, la reprise du service de l'Unifiée et des Lots turcs, son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Bey la subordonne, en premier lieu, à la ratifica-

tion, par les Gouvernements alliés, du Traité de Lausanne et, en second lieu, aux résultats définitifs des travaux de répartition de la dette ottomane.

M. le Président attire la très sérieuse attention du conseil sur la gravité des déclarations de son Excellence le Commissaire aux Finances, qui laissent subsister toutes les difficultés pendantes entre le Gouvernement et l'Administration, en aggravant de ce fait le préjudice considérable déjà causé aux porteurs, et qui équivalent, en quelque sorte, à une répudiation officielle des obligations imposées au Gouvernement par les Décrets de Mouharrem et annexe.

Le conseil, vivement ému d'avoir à constater la situation regrettable qui résulte pour le Gouvernement comme pour les porteurs de ces déclarations de son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Bey, décide de la signaler d'urgence aux trois syndicats en leur adressant, à cette fin, copies du présent procès-verbal et de son annexe.

Enclosure 2 in No. 110.

Compte rendu de la Visite faite par Sir Adam Block, Président du Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane, à son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Bey, Commissaire aux Finances de la République turque, le 25 Novembre 1923.

JE me suis rendu, à la date du 25 novembre 1923, chez son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Bey, Commissaire aux Finances de la République de Turquie, qui se trouvait de passage à Constantinople.

Après les présentations, j'ai ouvert l'entretien en rappelant au Ministre les démarches déjà effectuées par moi auprès de son Excellence Zékiai Bey, Commissaire du Gouvernement près l'Administration de la Dette, et auprès de son Excellence Adnan Bey, représentant diplomatique de ce même Gouvernement à Constantinople, en vue d'attirer leur attention sur la situation anormale dans laquelle se trouvait placé le Conseil de la Dette du fait de la mainmise du Gouvernement d'Angora sur ces agences d'Anatolie, comme de la perte de la totalité de ses revenus en province et de celui de la surtaxe douanière à Constantinople.

J'ai rappelé qu'au cours de mes entretiens avec ces personnalités, je leur avais exprimé le désir d'être prochainement fixé sur la date, au moins approximative, à laquelle l'Administration pourrait reprendre en mains la direction de ses services provinciaux et rentrer en possession des revenus dont elle était actuellement privée soit en province, soit à Constantinople.

Je relevai le fait que le Gouvernement d'Angora avait, jusqu'à ce moment, laissé cette question sans réponse, et fis remarquer au Ministre que cette situation anormale avait fait naître à Paris, à Londres et à Rome une inquiétude et un mécontentement croissants, qui commençaient à se faire jour dans la presse de ces pays. Je lui appris, à ce propos, la formation à Londres et à Paris d'associations ayant pour but la défense des intérêts des porteurs de l'Unifiée et des Lots turcs.

Énumérant ensuite les principales irrégularités commises par le Gouvernement turc, je citai, entre autres, celles-ci :

1. La modification apportée, sans le consentement du Conseil de la Dette, à la loi sur les spiritueux, modification ayant entraîné une perte de £ T. 4,000,000 pour notre Administration et de £ T. 3,000,000 pour le Trésor.
2. La prise de possession par le Gouvernement de nos salines de Phocée, dont la Direction de la Dette publique d'Angora assure l'exploitation directe, aux lieu et place de notre conseil, et le renvoi collectif des techniciens placés par notre Administration centrale auprès de cette saline.
3. La conclusion de l'accord entre le Gouvernement et la Société de la Régie des Tabacs, sans consultation préalable avec le conseil, qui est, cependant, le concessionnaire du revenu des tabacs et le principal intéressé dans l'exploitation de ce revenu.
4. La suspension du versement à notre Administration des recettes de la surtaxe douanière.
5. Le fait que les traites sur la douane, assignées en compensation de certains revenus, n'ont pas été remises par le Gouvernement à notre conseil.

J'ai déclaré à son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Bey que le moment me paraissait venu de mettre fin à ces anomalies, et n'ai pas manqué d'invoquer à ce propos les déclarations faites à maintes reprises soit à Lausanne par les plénipotentiaires du Gouvernement turc, soit à Constantinople, par les représentants de ce Gouvernement,

et d'après lesquelles le conseil devait, dès la signature de la paix, être rétabli dans l'exercice de ses droits et attributions. Aussi longtemps, ai-je fait remarquer, qu'existait la séparation entre le Gouvernement de Constantinople et le Gouvernement d'Angora, ce dernier a pu avoir des motifs impérieux de mettre la main sur la majeure partie des recettes provenant des revenus concédés aux porteurs et de ne pas s'en dessaisir ; mais aujourd'hui qu'un seul Gouvernement, celui de la République turque, exerce son autorité sur toute l'étendue du territoire, aucune raison valable ne peut être mise en avant pour justifier la continuation de cette mainmise. Une autre question qui préoccupe vivement les porteurs est celle de la reprise du paiement des coupons et du service d'amortissement de leurs titres. Son Excellence le Ministre n'est-il pas d'avis que des pourparlers devraient être engagés sans retard à ce sujet avec les porteurs, comme il a été prévu à Lausanne, maintenant que le traité a été signé par tous les Gouvernements intéressés et qu'il a, d'autre part, reçu la ratification du Gouvernement turc ?

Faisant alors état des instructions catégoriques données par les syndicats au Conseil de la Dette, en vue d'obtenir des informations précises sur les dispositions du Gouvernement de la République turque relativement au règlement de la situation exposée plus haut, j'ai, en ma qualité de président du Conseil de la Dette, agissant au nom de ces mêmes syndicats, prié son Excellence le Ministre de vouloir bien répondre aux deux questions suivantes :

1. Quand le Gouvernement turc compte-t-il restituer au Conseil de la Dette la gestion des revenus concédés aux porteurs ?
2. Quand ledit Gouvernement compte-t-il entrer en négociations avec les porteurs, en vue de la reprise du service de l'Unifiée et des Lots turcs ?

Son Excellence le Ministre m'a fait, en réponse, les déclarations suivantes :

En vertu du Traité de Lausanne, les pays détachés doivent assumer une part de la dette extérieure de la Turquie ; aussi longtemps que cette part ne sera pas déterminée et que le montant n'en aura pas été communiqué au Gouvernement turc, toute négociation de ce dernier avec les porteurs serait vaine. Comme vous le savez, la ratification du Traité de Lausanne par les Gouvernements alliés doit précéder la fixation de ces parts contributives ; si cette ratification n'a pas encore eu lieu, la responsabilité de ce retard n'incombe pas à la Turquie, et les porteurs, s'ils se jugent lésés dans leurs intérêts par cet état de choses, devraient, selon moi, exposer leurs plaintes à leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

Pour ce qui concerne le rétablissement du conseil dans la plénitude des droits et attributions qui lui sont conférés par le Décret de Mouharrem, son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Bey a déclaré que toute décision sur ce point restait subordonnée à la ratification du traité, aux résultats des travaux de répartition de la dette turque et enfin à l'issue des négociations à engager avec les porteurs au sujet du mode de règlement de la part de la dette qui restera à la charge de la Turquie. Jusqu'à la solution de ces questions, le Gouvernement ne jugeait pas possible d'admettre le contrôle du Conseil de la Dette sur des revenus de l'État.

J'ai fait observer à son Excellence qu'on pourrait inférer de ses paroles que le Décret de Mouharrem n'existait plus, ce qui serait contraire aux déclarations faites par les plénipotentiaires turcs à Lausanne et reproduites dans les procès-verbaux de certaines séances, auxquelles j'avais eu moi-même l'honneur d'assister.

Le Ministre me répondit qu'il n'avait aucune connaissance de telles déclarations et qu'au surplus, il n'avait pas lu les procès-verbaux en question. Il ajouta que si des déclarations semblables avaient été faites, elles l'avaient été sans l'autorisation du Gouvernement d'Angora et ne sauraient, par suite, lier ce Gouvernement.

Désireux de lui faire préciser le fond de sa pensée, je lui posai cette question directe : Dois-je conclure que le Décret de Mouharrem n'existe plus ? Et je le priai de bien réfléchir avant de me répondre, en lui représentant toute l'importance de la question et la grave répercussion que ses paroles pourraient avoir au point de vue du crédit extérieur de la Turquie. J'ajoutai que je ne voulais pas communiquer aux syndicats une réponse défavorable, qui serait susceptible de produire dans les milieux financiers une impression extrêmement fâcheuse.

Le Ministre m'enjoignit alors d'un ton rogue : "Je vous prie de ne pas me suggérer les réponses que je dois vous faire ; je considère que la guerre a mis fin à tout contrat."

Me faut-il donc, ai-je insisté, considérer que le Gouvernement ne reconnaît plus le Décret de Mouharrem ?

Son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Bey me répliqua aussi sèchement : " Interprétez mes paroles comme bon vous semble ; la guerre a aboli tous les contrats et conventions."

Il ne me restait plus qu'à exprimer tous mes regrets de notre désaccord sur cette question capitale, ce que je fis en relevant qu'aux yeux des porteurs le Décret de Mouharrem conservait toute sa valeur légale, étant donné qu'un débiteur ne peut annuler ou modifier un contrat passé avec son créancier sans entente préalable avec ce dernier.

Au cours d'un rapide échange de vues que nous avons eu ensuite au sujet du budget de l'Administration centrale de la Dette publique pour l'exercice 1340, budget transmis ces jours derniers à Angora, son Excellence le Ministre m'a signalé la nécessité de réduire l'effectif de notre personnel en mettant fin, notamment, aux services de nos agents étrangers et de nos agents chrétiens de nationalité turque.

Je lui ai rappelé que l'Administration venait de licencier tous ses agents hellènes, conformément à la demande qui lui en avait été faite par le Gouvernement, en soulignant, à ce propos, que la proportion de l'élément étranger au service de la Dette était, à ce jour, de 4·30 pour cent seulement, ce qui pouvait passer pour négligeable. J'ai d'ailleurs ajouté qu'il ne fallait pas confondre l'Administration de la Dette avec une administration officielle, à caractère exclusivement turc. En effet, en vertu du Décret de Mouharrem, les agents de l'Administration relèvent uniquement du conseil, qui peut seul procéder, sans limitation ni restriction aucune, à leur nomination, à leur révocation, à la fixation de leurs traitements, les pouvoirs exclusifs qui lui ont été reconnus en cette matière par les rédacteurs du Décret de Mouharrem ayant été considérés, par ces derniers, comme l'une des conditions essentielles destinées à assurer audit conseil l'indépendance d'action qui lui est indispensable pour gérer les revenus concédés au mieux des intérêts des porteurs. Le conseil a donc, à ce point de vue, le droit et même l'obligation de rechercher, sans distinction de nationalité, les employés les plus capables de le bien servir, et de les rétribuer suivant la qualité de leur travail.

Sans vouloir discuter cette question de principe, son Excellence le Ministre m'a répliqué que l'Administration était, en tout cas, tenue de se conformer aux lois et règlements de l'État et de ne pas contrecarrer les projets du Gouvernement. En ce qui concerne spécialement les fonctionnaires grecs de la Dette, sujets turcs, le Gouvernement est convaincu qu'ils ont toujours la mentalité hellène.

Répondant à ces observations de son Excellence, je lui ai dit que je ne pouvais me rappeler une seule circonstance dans laquelle le conseil aurait agi contrairement aux lois et règlements du pays et que, personnellement, je n'avais jamais manqué, au cours de mes vingt et une années de présence au sein de ce conseil, de donner toutes les preuves possibles de déférence et de dévouement au Gouvernement, à l'occasion de ses demandes légitimes.

Avant de nous séparer, le Ministre, faisant allusion aux dépenses de l'Administration, me déclara qu'elles lui paraissaient excessives, la proportion en étant, d'après lui, de 50 à 55 pour cent par rapport aux recettes.

Je lui marquai mon extrême surprise d'une telle assertion, venant d'un membre du Gouvernement, attendu que d'après les chiffres portés au budget de la Dette, la proportion de ces dépenses n'excède pas 10 pour cent. J'exprimai l'espoir qu'il voudrait bien donner mandat à l'un de ses fonctionnaires de procéder avec moi à un examen minutieux de nos comptes de dépenses ainsi qu'à toutes vérifications utiles dans nos services et registres, en vue d'établir au grand jour l'exactitude de cette dernière proportion.

[E 11718/7158/44] No. 111.

Sir O. Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) *The Vatican, December* 10, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 35

I have made representation verbally and in writing to Cardinal Secretary of State. He appeared if anything to derive satisfaction from communication, promised me a written reply and added with a smile that he would lose no time in informing French that a privileged position could no longer be accorded to their representative in Palestine.

[E 11898/52/44] No. 112.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 17.)

(No. 821.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 11, 1923.

IN the final paragraph of my despatch No. 808 of the 5th instant I anticipated that the sudden return of Papa Eftim to Constantinople, coupled with the preparations then being made for the election of a new Œcumenical Patriarch, pointed to further trouble for Greek ecclesiastical circles here. The past week has unfortunately witnessed the realisation of my fears. A new Patriarch was in fact elected without incident, but on the day following the election the Anatolian priest, with a handful of Turkish followers, by a sudden *coup* made himself master of the patriarchate, from which he was dislodged forty hours later by the Turkish police on the receipt of orders from Angora, when the patriarchate authorities were once more at liberty to return to their posts.

2. The above brief recital of events makes it somewhat difficult to understand the exact nature of the relations subsisting between Papa Eftim and the Turkish Government. Whatever these may be or have been, however, it had become increasingly clear that, as a result of his absence in Angora, the effect of Eftim's *coup* of the 2nd October had begun to wear off and the prelates composing the provisional Synod to show themselves capable of a certain independence of action. So much indeed was this the case that on the 30th ultimo the seven metropolitans, whose expulsion had been ordered by Eftim, were invited to participate in a meeting of the Holy Synod, though it is understood that this decision was only taken after unofficial enquiries had established that the Turkish Government saw no objection thereto.

3. Meanwhile, in response to the encyclical, which, as stated in my despatch No. 742, had been issued on the 16th October, inviting all archbishops dependent on Constantinople to signify their wishes in regard to the choice of a new Patriarch, further votes were gradually reaching the patriarchate, until on the morning of the 1st instant they had reached the number requisite for a valid election. The Synod thereupon met to discuss its future line of action, and, though in the interval the leading prelates had received anonymous letters written in Turkish instructing them to support the candidature of the Metropolitan of Rhodopolis, who was understood to be the Government nominee, no definite decision was arrived at. Two days later, however, it was finally decided to hold the election on the 6th instant, and, as the Turkish police had previously intimated that prior notice of the election must be given to the Government, the necessary communication was made to the Vali of Constantinople, and a telegram in the same sense despatched to Angora.

4. Such was the position when on the afternoon of the 3rd December Papa Eftim, accompanied by his Turkish staff and without having obtained the permission of the Synod to leave his self-created post, suddenly arrived at the patriarchate, and immediately conferred with the Archbishop of Rhodopolis. In statements to the press he said that the sole object of his visit was to remove certain misunderstandings, and that he would return to Anatolia as soon as his mission was accomplished. Though he was received by the Vali, the members of the Synod refused to have any relations with Eftim, who was apparently prepared to await the developments to which the election might be expected to give rise.

5. The election was, however, carried out according to plan, and indeed the position was somewhat simplified by the delivery on the morning of the 6th instant of a notice from the local Turkish authorities addressed to the Holy Synod of the Greek Œcumenical Patriarchate stating that it was necessary that in religious and spiritual elections to be held in Turkey the electors should be Turkish subjects and persons holding at the time of the elections religious office in Turkey, and that the person to be elected should also have the same qualifications. At the opening of the official sitting of the Synod, therefore, the prelates belonging to dioceses outside Turkey withdrew, ceding their rights to their brethren of Turkish dioceses. The voting papers were then examined, a list of three candidates drawn up, and, in the Patriarchal Church, Grigorius, the aged Archbishop of Kadikeuy, who had obtained a majority in the earlier voting, was elected to the patriarchal throne by the vote of ten out of the eleven archbishops present. The enthronement of the new Patriarch was fixed for the 13th December, and it was decided to notify the result of the election to the Turkish Government.

6. It was not, however, to be expected that Papa Eftim would accept the new situation without a struggle. In a statement to the press immediately after the

election he ascribed his defeat to Hellenic intrigue directed by M. Politis, the newly appointed Greek representative at Angora, expressed the opinion that the new Patriarch would not be acceptable to the Government, and hinted at surprises which might be in store for the morrow. The same night he resigned his post as patriarchate representative at Angora, and the following morning, when the Synod was actually in session, occupied the patriarchate with the aid of ten armed lazes, threatened the prelates and officials, and forcibly expelled them from the patriarchate. Laze guards were posted at the doors, and admission refused to all but Turks and Eftim's Greek sympathisers. At the same time he issued a proclamation to his "Orthodox co-religionists" stating that he had occupied the patriarchate in the name of the nation, that the elected Patriarch was a compatriot of Veniselos and a creature of Meletios, and that he awaited the Government's instructions for the annulment of the election.

7. In the meantime the expelled prelates, after a hurried meeting, had sent a delegation to inform the Director of Police and the Vali of the incident and to ask for protection. Owing to its being a Friday, and to the unwillingness of these functionaries to become involved in patriarchal affairs without instructions from Angora, contact with them could not be established, whereupon it was decided to send telegrams to Angora protesting against the activities of Papa Eftim, begging the Government to remove him, and to permit the proper functioning of the patriarchate. On the following morning the same delegation eventually succeeded in obtaining an audience with the assistant Vali, who promised to institute an enquiry regarding the presence of Moslem Turks in the patriarchate, but added that as regards the general question, which was a religious one, the Ministry of Justice was alone competent, and that instructions from Angora must therefore be awaited.

8. These instructions arrived in Constantinople late the same evening, and at midnight Papa Eftim's Turkish secretary, a certain Safvet Bey, who is said to be a brother of the Director of Police at Angora, was summoned to the police station and notified that he, Papa Eftim, and their companions must evacuate the patriarchate forthwith. This order Eftim showed no alacrity to execute, but an hour later, in response to a second summons, he quitted the patriarchate. The latter was later reoccupied by the patriarchal authorities, who have since resumed their normal functions.

9. The action of the Turkish Government in this matter has naturally caused the liveliest satisfaction in Greek circles. Telegrams expressing fervent thanks to the Government and the staunchest loyalty to the republic have been despatched to Angora, and a patriarchal delegation has waited on the Director-General of Police to express gratitude for his intervention. The event has further given rise to much speculation as to the attitude which the Government will now adopt towards the new Patriarch and the patriarchal institution. The Government's intervention would appear almost to constitute tacit recognition of the latter, and in regard to the former it is interesting to note that the Vali, in a statement to the press after Eftim's *coup*, used very guarded language in regard to Mgr. Grigorius, whose complicity with the Greeks had not, he said, been proved, while the Minister of Justice, in an interview to an Angora correspondent, declared that the election was no concern of the Government, which was indifferent as to the exact title of the head of the Orthodox Church in Turkey so long as the laws of the country were not violated or public order disturbed. Such declarations seem to point in the direction of a tacit joint recognition, more particularly as the new Patriarch, who has already been recognised by other branches of the Church, has on various occasions dissociated himself from the past policy of the patriarchate, especially at the time of the rupture of relations between the patriarchate and the Turkish Government, when he carried his objections to the point of resignation from the Holy Synod. Patriarchate circles are therefore quietly confident that the worst of their troubles are now over, and hope that, after his enthronement two days hence, the new Patriarch will be officially received by the Vali, an event which would of course be one more step towards that complete official recognition.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Mr. Bentinck.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 11929/1019/65**] No. 113.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 17.)

Sir, *Downing Street, December* 17, 1923.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st December regarding the Irak Government's desire to participate officially in the forthcoming Turco-Irak frontier negotiations and their request that this proposal should be submitted to the Turkish Government.

2. In this connection I am to invite the attention of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the telegram on this subject from the High Commissioner for Irak, dated the 6th December, a copy of which was transmitted to you under cover of this Department's letter of the 7th December. From this, Lord Curzon will observe that Sir Henry Dobbs adheres to the view that a refusal on the part of His Majesty's Government to recommend this proposal to the Turkish Government would create a most unfortunate impression in Irak, and that he does not anticipate that the local effect of a refusal by the Turkish Government to entertain the proposal would lead to anti-British propaganda. In view of the High Commissioner's strongly expressed opinion that, from a local point of view, any potential disadvantage would be easily outweighed by the advantages of acceding to the Irak Government's request, his Grace trusts that Lord Curzon will reconsider the decision communicated in your letter of the 1st December and will now approve representations being made to the Turkish Government in the sense desired by the Government of Irak.

I am, &c.
J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[**E 11606/1019/65**] No. 114.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 343.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 17, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 529 of 6th December: Mosul negotiations.

Can you ascertain discreetly and without appearing to attach importance thereto probable date of Yussuf Kemal's arrival in London?

Under article 7 of Evacuation Protocol negotiations were to commence on completion of evacuation and are consequently not dependent on ratification by His Majesty's Government.

Meanwhile, you may postpone action on my despatch No. 1071 of 26th November.

[**E 12008/1019/65**] No. 115.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 19.)

(No. 538.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 19, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 343 of 17th December.

Adnan Bey to-day in the course of general conversation told me that he had not the least idea when Yussuf Kemal would leave for London. About a fortnight ago he told me he expected him to reach London about the Christmas holidays. There was at that time much talk in the press of his early departure. Since result of elections became known there have been no further references, and I suspect that plans for his journey have been altered as a result of the political situation in England as well as Angora.

I told Adnan that I should be glad for personal reasons to know as soon as possible probable date of Yussuf Kemal's departure, and I will report as soon as I learn anything definite.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[E 12050/199/44] No. 116.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 348.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 21, 1923.

FROM press reports Mr. Ryan has recently been subjected to vituperation in Turkish press, and it has even been hinted that he was connected with the Aga Khan's letter. You should address strong remonstrance to Adnan Bey, pointing out that such treatment of a distinguished member of His Majesty's mission is intolerable and has created most unfortunate effect on His Majesty's Government, who consider that such action on part of the Turks is an unfortunate prelude to resumption of friendly relations between the two countries.

[E 12071/199/44] No. 117.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 542.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 23, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 348.

I have already spoken to Adnan on the subject of these attacks on Mr. Ryan, in which it must be admitted that official circles have been careful to refrain from associating themselves in any way. Independence Court, for instance, has steered clear so far, which I feared it might not do, of absurd suggestion made in press that he was implicated in publication here of Aga Khan's letter (please see my despatch No. 827).

In all the circumstances, I feel strongly, and Mr. Ryan himself entirely agrees with me, that it would be more politic, and even more dignified, to refrain from official protest, which in all probability would only elicit reply that Government cannot be held responsible for utterances of an uncontrolled press. In fact, whatever action Government took would, I fear, be likely merely to incite journalists to further attacks and might lead to awkward deadlock.

I trust, therefore, I may be authorised to use my discretion as to manner in which to convey to Adnan Bey impression created on His Majesty's Government by these attacks.

I am reporting more fully by letter on general aspects of campaign against Mr. Ryan.

[E 12077/7158/44] No. 118.

Sir O. Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *The Vatican, December* 24, 1923.

MY telegram No. 34.

I hear privately that new French Ambassador, on the occasion of his first interview with Cardinal Secretary of State, protested vehemently against withdrawal of liturgical honours in Palestine. This has unfortunately involved postponement of instructions to Jerusalem.

[E 12135/199/44] No. 119.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 848.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 19, 1923.

SINCE the date of my despatch No. 827 of the 12th December the proceedings of the Court of Independence, despatched from Angora to Constantinople, have almost monopolised public attention here. Immediately on its arrival the court set to work on the preliminaries of the trial of the journalists arrested in connection with the publication of the Agha Khan–Ameer Ali letter. It created a further sensation on the 13th December by ordering the arrest, not only of one Beha Bey, sub editor of the

"Tanin," who had published that morning an article assuming responsibility for the publication of the letter, but also of two persons of a different kind, namely, Lutfi Eikri Bey, a well-known lawyer, publicist and politician, and Ekrem Bey, second military aide-de-camp to the Caliph.

2. Lutfi Fikri Bey has been in recent years leader of the Turkish Bar in Constantinople, and has long been a well-known, if not very effective, figure in Turkish public life. Over a month ago he took a leading part in the Caliphate controversy, and had the courage, unlike most of the Opposition who render lip-service to the republic, to proclaim himself an advocate of the principle of constitutional monarchy. This was a sufficient reason for his arrest. The reasons for that of Ekrem Bey were more obscure, and have not yet been disclosed. He is a young officer of German education, but British sympathies. A person of convivial tastes, well acquainted with English, he has made himself conspicuous by frequenting the society of British naval officers, and talking rather freely in general society. These facts, combined with his closeness to the Caliph's person, may well have exposed him to suspicion.

3. The public hearing of the case against the journalists began on the 15th December with all the apparatus of a State trial. The responsible manager of the "Ikdam" and the Beha Bey mentioned above had been released, leaving Jahid Bey of the "Tanin," Velid Bey of the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," Hairi Muhiuddin Bey, responsible manager of the same paper, and Djevdet Bey of the "Ikdam," to be dealt with by the court. They were formally charged by the Public Prosecutor under the law on treason, on the ground that they had published the Agha Khan–Ameer Ali letter before it had reached the addressee, Ismet Pasha, and that this letter contained incitements contrary to the decision of the 1st November, 1922, *i.e.*, the decision of the Grand National Assembly abolishing the Sultanate. Each of them was then strictly examined in the others as to how the letter had reached them, why they had published it, what they knew of the writers, and why, having regard to its nature, they had published the letter without comment. All agreed in stating that it had reached them in the ordinary way through the post. All professed very little knowledge of the Agha Khan and Ameer Ali. They justified the publication of the letter on the ground that it was a document of public interest, and got out as best they could of the implication that by publishing it without comment they had endorsed its contents. Jahid Bey scored a point by explaining that he could not presume to offer observations on a letter addressed to Ismet Pasha before the Pasha had himself expressed his views.

4. The trial was resumed on the 18th December, when a large number of journalists were called as witnesses and examined as to whether they had received the letter, what those who had received it had done with it, what those who had not received it would have done with it had it been sent to them, what they thought of its contents, and so forth. This hearing was of little interest except as an example of the ineptitude of Turkish amateur judges. Throughout both hearings a tone of exquisite courtesy was observed between the tribunal and the accused. On the 15th December the Agha Khan and Ameer Ali were spoken of very cavalierly, but I understand that at the second hearing greater respect was shown them. The best feature of the proceedings so far has been that no attempt has been made, except by one of the accused, Velid Bey, to ventilate further the ridiculous theory that British intrigue has been at work. Altogether, it looks as though the authorities now realise that Angora "went off at the deep end" over the famous letter, and that little use can be made of it as a stick with which to beat either the Opposition or Great Britain. The trial, which has not yet ended, may still have surprises in store, but, on the whole, I incline to the view that the four journalists will be acquitted amid a chorus of congratulation that the air has been cleared, and that the Court of Independence will rely on other prosecutions to frighten the Opposition elements in Constantinople and to justify its own existence.

5. Before leaving the subject of the Agha Khan–Ameer Ali letter, I may mention that the papers of the 18th December published a telegram from Angora reproducing a message, alleged to have been received from the Central Caliphate Committee of India, assuring Mustafa Kemal of their devotion to the cause of Turkey, applauding the establishment of the republic, denouncing the senders of any messages in a contrary sense, proposing to send a deputation to present respects to the President and asking for information regarding events in Turkey. The message purports to have been sent by the Ali brothers, Djemal Khan and Abdul Ghulam-Azad.

6. In Angora itself there have been further developments. Following on the decision to set up the Court of Independence, a controversy arose as to the scope of its jurisdiction. The egregious Yunus Nadi created a storm of criticism by

suggesting in his paper, the "Yeni Gyun," that the court should be invested with extra legal powers. The Government, more moderate, were content with asking the Assembly to extend the jurisdiction of the court to acts calculated to endanger the internal and external security of the State, plots and espionage, as well as to acts contrary to the law of treason. The Opposition demanded that it should confine itself to treason alone. The question was put to the vote on the 13th December and, after a debate, part of which was conducted in secret, the Government proposal was carried by 89 to 63, six Deputies abstaining.

7. This division has had a two-fold effect. In Constantinople the Court of Independence was not slow to take advantage of it to order the arrest of five persons of whom little or nothing is known in European circles, who could probably not be accused of treason, but who will, in all probability, be tried for plotting to disturb public order. Among them are one Ali Osman, a former head of the important Lightermen's Guild, and a certain Laz Mehmed, known as "the Communist." It looks as though these five men were Lazes or persons with Laz connections, and the significance of their arrest will be appreciated when it is remembered how great a part the Lazes of the Black Sea coast played in the events which led up to the murder early this year of Ali Shukri, Opposition Deputy for Trebizond and the rounding up and slaughter of his murderer Laz Osman Agha a few days later. Finally, the court has ordered the arrest of a small number of miscellaneous persons, including it is said one Sari Ali, of whom I know nothing, but who is said to have been a British spy. In short, the Court of Independence is branching out in a great variety of directions.

8. The other effect of the division of the 13th December is being witnessed in Angora. The votes were more nearly equal than on any previous occasion so far as my recollection goes in the history of the Grand National Assembly. According to one account some thirty Deputies walked out of the house rather than vote at all. However this may be, the fact that sixty-three had the courage to vote against an important Government proposal shows the growing strength and boldness of the Opposition. Doubts are freely expressed as to whether Ismet Pasha can carry on much longer in face of this Opposition and of the fact, which even supporters of the Government admit, that the administration of the country is falling into a state of chaos. There are still more persistent rumours of the impending resignation of individual Ministers, each of whom has his own troubles in addition to sharing in the general weakness of the Government. It is alleged that Seid Bey, the Minister of Justice, cannot face the criticism provoked by a new draft law on family relations and he has been heckled regarding the Government's attitude, at present a creditable one, in the question of the Greek Patriarchate. Moukhtar Bey, Minister of Public Works, is at logerheads with numerous Deputies over the question of the Anatolian Railway, the concession for which he and the Government wish to renew, notwithstanding the agitation in the Assembly in favour of re-purchase. Sefa Bey, Minister of Education, is also said to be contemplating resignation for reasons which have not been made public in Constantinople.

9. In conclusion, I may mention that Abdul Kadir Kemali Bey, one of the leaders of the "Second Group" in the late Grand National Assembly, was arrested a few days ago at Adana and is being tried in that place. The cause of his arrest is believed to be an article which he published in his paper, the "Mujahede," attacking the republic and reflecting incidentally on Mustafa Kemal.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 12137/8766/44] No. 120.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 27.)

(No. 850.)

Constantinople, December 19, 1923.

My Lord,

AFTER receiving your despatch No. 1055 of the 20th November, relative to Adnan Bey's representations concerning the alleged ill-treatment of Moslems in Greece, and before I had taken action on it, I received your Lordship's further despatch No. 1092 of the 1st December, conveying certain additional information, in using which I was authorised to exercise discretion. Almost simultaneously with the latter despatch I received the repetition of Mr. Bentinck's telegram No. 584 of the 7th December, reporting that the Turkish delegates on the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations had used threatening language regarding the Greeks of

Constantinople, and a copy of Mr. Bentinck's despatch No. 928 of the 21st November, bearing on the general situation regarding the execution of the convention.

2. I had been struck by the fact that towards the end of November and early in December there was a marked falling-off in the agitation here and at Angora regarding alleged Greek misbehaviour. This appeared to me to indicate that the Turks were beginning to feel the weakness of their position in any controversy as to the relative conduct of the Turkish and Greek Governments in regard to the execution of the convention; and I thought the moment favourable for a communication to Adnan Bey of rather wider scope than that prescribed in the first despatch referred to above. I felt that I should be interpreting your Lordship's wishes if I let Adnan Bey know that His Majesty's Government, while still of the opinion that the allegations on either side were mainly the concern of the Mixed Commission and the League of Nations, were nevertheless watching the situation with an interest justified by the large part which the British delegation at Lausanne had taken in helping Turks and Greeks to come to an agreement regarding the manner in which the exchange of populations was to be carried out.

3. I was the more inclined to review the situation as a whole with Adnan Bey, as I had information that the principal Turkish delegate on the Mixed Commission was being recalled to Angora, and that there was a prospect of his being replaced.

4. In these circumstances, I decided to prepare a carefully worded statement based on all my information up to date and to present it personally to Adnan Bey in the form of a memorandum. I enclose a copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I handed to Adnan Bey this afternoon. Your Lordship will observe that I have avoided any direct statement that His Majesty's Government had refrained from taking action on his note of the 12th November, lest it should prejudice the right of His Majesty's Government to use their good offices at any later stage on behalf of the Greeks, whose complaints appear to me to be more specific and on the whole better founded than those of the Turks.

5. In drawing up the enclosed statement I have made cautious use of the report of the League of Nations enclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 1124 of the 8th December, avoiding anything likely to compromise the confidential character of that paper. I trust that my action will make it easier for me to prepare in due course the report which your Lordship has asked me to furnish on the paper communicated to you by the League of Nations. At present I am not able to offer any observations of value thereon, as the matters dealt with relate principally to the situation in Greece. *Primâ facie* I am disposed to regard the theory advanced in paragraph 11 of the League of Nations paper as a plausible one, but I shall be better able to form a definite judgment on this point when I have seen how the Turks react to my memorandum to Adnan Bey.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Athens.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 120.

Aide-mémoire.

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a étudié soigneusement le contenu de la note, datée du 12 novembre, de son Excellence le représentant du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République turque. Quoiqu'il considère que les questions qui y sont traitées soient plutôt du ressort de la Commission mixte et de la Société des Nations, il a néanmoins prêté une attention des plus sérieuses à l'étude de l'opération de la Convention pour l'Échange des Populations, étant desireux, non seulement du point de vue humanitaire mais aussi comme ayant participé aux débats qui ont amené la conclusion de cette convention, de voir s'effectuer l'échange dans les meilleures conditions de bonne volonté réciproque et de célérité. Il a ainsi compulsé les renseignements provenant de sources diverses qu'il possède et qui pourraient l'éclairer à ce sujet. De l'étude de ces renseignements, il reçoit, dans les grandes lignes, l'impression suivante:

1. Les plaintes de mauvais traitement de l'élément musulman en Grèce paraissent être dues, au moins en partie, à une certaine confusion qui s'est faite entre les musulmans domiciliés en Grèce et d'autres coreligionnaires récemment arrivés du Royaume serbe-croate-slovène et dont le sort est pitoyable.

2. A ce qu'il paraît aucune distinction n'a été faite au préjudice des musulmans en ce qui concerne le logement forcé des réfugiés d'Asie Mineure dans les maisons des particuliers. Le problème du logement de ces réfugiés est d'une telle envergure que cette mesure a dû être appliquée indistinctement à toute classe et à toute section de la population.

3. Quant aux autres abus allégués, l'information dont dispose le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté démontre que le Gouvernement hellénique, la Société des Nations et la Commission mixte se sont tous efforcés de faire disparaître tout sujet de plainte qui aurait pu exister.

4. Le Gouvernement hellénique de son côté a proféré des plaintes d'une nature catégorique qui paraissent réclamer des efforts analogues de la part du Gouvernement turc. Ces plaintes portent notamment sur :

(*a.*) L'allégation que les hommes valides qui devaient d'après l'article 4 de la convention former le premier contingent des Grecs à rapatrier sont encore retenus en Turquie ;

(*b.*) La condition pitoyable où se trouvent les Grecs assemblés sur les côtes de l'Asie Mineure dont des groupements considérables seraient expédiés en Grèce sans que les dispositions y appropriées aient été prises d'avance ;

(*c.*) Le fait que le Gouvernement turc, qui a exprimé le désir de faire transporter les musulmans sujets à l'échange à bord des seuls navires turcs, manque d'en envoyer aux ports d'embarquement en temps voulu et retarde ainsi l'opération de l'échange ;

(*d.*) Le refus allégué du Gouvernement turc de permettre l'établissement de sous-commissions mixtes selon les provisions de l'article 2. (Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté aime à espérer que cette doléance aura été déjà écartée par suite de l'accord qui serait intervenu entre les délégués turcs et grecs à la Commission mixte vers le 17 novembre.)

5. Des vues plus optimistes semblaient prévaloir à la Commission mixte pendant la seconde moitié de novembre, mais le représentant britannique fut péniblement surpris de recevoir le 7 décembre un télégramme du Chargé d'Affaires britannique à Athènes lui rapportant le bruit que les membres turcs de la Commission mixte auraient menacé de faire expulser les Grecs de Constantinople comme représaille des conditions qu'ils affirmaient exister en Grèce. Bien que le représentant britannique n'ait reçu jusqu'ici aucune instruction de son Gouvernement au sujet de cette menace—peut-être par suite de la non-confirmation du bruit—il croit de son devoir d'attirer l'attention de son Excellence le représentant du Ministère des Affaires étrangères sur cette menace en lui faisant observer—au cas où elle aurait été exactement rapportée—que rien ne serait plus apte à attirer les conséquences funestes prévues à l'avant-dernier alinéa de la note précitée qu'une telle action dirigée contre les Grecs de Constantinople en représailles de prétendus abus qui semblent au moins avoir été fortement exagérés et auxquels, en tant qu'ils existent, toutes les parties intéressées se sont efforcées de porter remède.

Constantinople, le 19 décembre 1923.

[**E 12138/52/44**] No. 121.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 851.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 19, 1923.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 821 of the 11th December, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 13th December, the new Greek Patriarch, Gregory VII, was solemnly enthroned with the customary ecclesiastical ceremonial in the Patriarchal Church at the Phanar. The Patriarch came by water from Kadikeui, his former diocese, all the way to Phanar. After the ceremony he held a reception. No disagreeable incident of any sort occurred. The Rev. Mr. Borough, chaplain of the Crimean Memorial Church, was present at the ceremony and reception.

2. Immediately after his enthronement the Patriarch addressed appropriate telegrams to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Ismet Pasha, the Minister of Justice and the Governor-General of Constantinople. In his telegram to the President he stated

that on assuming his new functions he had offered up prayers for the prosperity and progress of " the republic of our common country."

3. The Turkish Government has not modified the attitude of benevolence, of which it suddenly gave proof by expelling Papa Eftim from the patriarchate after his last raid, but it has avoided any formal recognition of the new Patriarch. On the 17th December the Minister of Justice, in reply to a question in the Grand National Assembly, made the following statement :—

> " There is a great difference between the present position of the Church of Phanar and its position during the National struggle. Formerly, religious privileges existed, of which the most important was that the patriarchate possessed a right of jurisdiction. The Greek and Armenian Patriarchates and the Rabbinates had acquired certain privileges granted as a favour by the State, but, thank God, these denominational privileges have disappeared. Those institutions have no longer any political or administrative functions. They are purely religious institutions. The ecclesiastics designated as spiritual heads have no other attribute. There was formerly a law respecting their election. There was a lay council. All this has ceased to exist. In the eyes of the State, the result of the election which has been held merely amounts to the election of a priest, a chief priest. The State has the right of inspection and control in these elections, which are purely religious. The State cannot agree to the spiritual heads being elected from among foreign subjects. The electors and the elected must be our subjects. The Government has followed, and is following, the points which it was its duty to follow. We are not aware that foreign influence was exerted in the election, and we do not see that it could have been exerted. If it should have been, we should immediately annul the election. The Metropolitan of Kadikeui, who has been elected, is a Turkish subject, who is occupied with his spiritual functions. He states that he has caused the republic to be congratulated, and has had prayers said in the churches for the happiness of the country. Papa Eftim is not the man of the Government. He is their own paid employee. Papa Eftim has stated that the elections did not inspire confidence. I am examining that matter. If this is a simple allegation, it will not be taken into consideration. If an object is being pursued outside our national policy, or if a centre of sedition is being organised, the State will immediately perfom its duty without hesitation or negligence."

4. Papa Eftim continues to rage against the new Patriarch, and has been endeavouring to induce the newly-established " Court of Independence " to interest itself in the question of disloyalty in the patriarchate. There are no signs, so far, that he has had any success. The patriarchal authorities, on their side, are said to contemplate trying Eftim in the ecclesiastical courts for his outrages on religion.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Athens.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 12083/54/44**] No. 122.

M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 27.)

LE Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement d'Angora a écrit, le 25 octobre, à l'Office international d'Hygiène publique et au Comité permanent d'Hygiène de la Société des Nations, en les priant d'établir la liste des six médecins parmi lesquels le Gouvernement turc choisira les trois conseillers de l'Administration sanitaire des Frontières, conformément à la déclaration du 24 juillet 1923.

Le Gouvernement français estime que, si cette liste porte les noms de médecins de nationalités neutres, il est à craindre que ceux-ci soient choisis par le Gouvernement turc. La liste pourrait être composée de la façon suivante : deux noms anglais, deux français et deux italiens. Mais, d'autre part, il conviendrait de ne mentionner sur la liste que des médecins qui accepteront la situation offerte. Or, il paraît difficile d'obtenir leur consentement s'il n'est pas possible de leur indiquer à quelles conditions pécuniaires et autres ils seront au service du Gouvernement turc pendant une durée de cinq ans. Par exemple, seront-ils obligés, comme fonctionnaires turcs, de porter le

tarbouch, même en dehors des cérémonies officielles; auront-ils le droit de donner des consultations et d'avoir une clientèle? Le mieux serait sans doute de ne désigner que des médecins actuellement fixés à Constantinople.

Le Gouvernement français serait heureux de savoir comment le Gouvernement britannique envisage la solution de cette question.

M. de Montille saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 22 décembre 1923.

[**E 12100/84/65**] No. 123.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 27.)

Sir, *Downing Street, December* 24, 1923.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, copy of a secret despatch from the High Commissioner for Irak on the subject of the future of the Assyrian race.

I am, &c.

J. E. MASTERTON-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 123.

Sir H. Dobbs to the Duke of Devonshire.

(Secret.)

My Lord Duke, *The Residency, Bagdad, December* 13, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to submit suggestions on the future treatment of the Assyrian race.

2. In October last I interviewed a number of representative Assyrians at Mosul and in the districts lying between Dokuk and Amadiya, and made enquiries into their present situation, the result of which is set forth in the following paragraphs:—

(A.)—*Assyrians from Persian Territory.*

3. There are now in Irak only about 5,000 Persian Assyrians. Their homes were in Urumia and its neighbourhood. They are supporting themselves either by service in the levies, or by daily labour in Mosul, or by cultivating as tenants the lands of Christians or Kurds in the north-western portion of the Mosul Vilayet. About 9,000 of them have already returned to their places in Persia, and are doing fairly well there. But they complain that the Persian authorities are compelling their children to learn the Koran in the schools, and are generally suppressing Christian education. If this could be remedied, and if they could secure some guarantee of good treatment, such as the appointment of a British vice-consul to Urumia, they would all prefer to return to Persian territory. I recommend that a British vice-consul be appointed to Urumia, with special instructions to report periodically on the welfare of the Assyrians. This would be cheaper and less embarrassing than any plan hitherto suggested, and would be the most natural and permanent solution of our difficulty in so far as the Persian Assyrians are concerned.

(B.)—*Assyrians from Turkish Territory not to be claimed for Irak.*

4. There is no prospect of the inclusion in Irak of the Assyrian districts of Lewin, Berwar North, Kochannis, Diz, Noiduz, Van, Gavar, Mergavar, Tergavar, Shamsdinan and Mar Bisho. I suggested to the refugees from these districts, who number about 6,000, that they might possibly be able to return to their homes under the same conditions as I have suggested for the Persian Assyrians, a British consul or vice-consul being again posted to Van. They refused to entertain this project. I explained to them that, failing this, there was nothing for them but to settle under the Irak Government, which would be advised by British advisers for some fifteen years, and which they could consequently trust not to oppress them for at least that period. After some discussion, they seemed to be reconciled to this idea, provided they could

be given permanent titles to Government lands in suitable places, instead of being mere tenants at will, as at present. I ascertained that there were considerable tracts of Government lands in the Dohuk division which might be made available for Assyrian settlement, and desired the administrative inspector of Mosul to prepare a list of Government villages which could be examined for the purpose. This I have not yet received, but I have not wished to delay this despatch for the want of its receipt. These Assyrians complained that in many of the villages in which they had been temporarily settled they had been decimated by malaria, and they feared that this disadvantage would attach to any other villages which might be assigned to them in the submontane tracts available for settlement. I found that it is true that malaria is excessively prevalent in all this neighbourhood, and that it attacks new settlers with particular virulence. But I am informed that malaria is almost equally bad throughout the original homes of these Assyrians, in spite of their greater elevation. They will not therefore be subjected to any new disability in their new villages. I recommend that the plan of the settlement of these Turkish Assyrians in Irak be steadily pursued, and I will take the matter further as soon as I get the lists of lands for which I have asked.

(C.)—*Assyrians from Territory to be claimed for Irak.*

5. The Assyrian tribes from territory which is to be claimed for Irak are the Upper and Lower Tiari, Tkhuma, Baz, Jelu and others, numbering in all about 14,000. Of these, about 7,000 (mainly Upper and Lower Tiari and Tkhuma) have already returned to their homes, and more are expected to return next spring and to begin rebuilding their houses. Their great difficulty hitherto has been the lack of big beams for their roofs, since all the big poplars growing on the spot have been cut down by the Turks, and the cost of importing beams from elsewhere is prohibitive. In consequence they have to look forward to a long period during which they will have to live in temporary huts. I gathered that, even if their country were given back to the Turks, these people, with the exception of the Baz and Jelu, had every intention of staying in it, and of defending themselves in their mountain fastnesses as long as they could. This they hope to be able to do, especially if they can be provided with ammunition. The Jelu and Baz tribesmen, on the other hand, declared that they would not return to their country if it were given back to the Turks, since the land is in any case poor, and their country is more open to Turkish attack than the Tiari and Tkhuma country. If, therefore, the Turks obtain the Jelu and Baz country, these tribesmen will have to be given land under the Irak Government, like other Assyrians who refuse to return to their homes under Turkey.

6. If the Tiari, Tkhuma and Jelu and Baz country were assigned to Irak, those who had their homes there desired that it should become autonomous, under British protection. I said that this would be very difficult to manage, owing to the remoteness of their country from the sea. They then said that they wished at all events to be interfered with as little as possible. Having already consulted with the then Prime Minister on this point, I told them that I believed that it could be arranged that they should live under a very loose form of control similar to that formerly exercised over them by the Turks, who allowed them to choose their own headmen and to arrange for the collection and payment of their taxes. They said that they would in the last resort, and very reluctantly, accept such an arrangement, provided that they could be regularly supplied with ammunition to defend themselves against their neighbours, the Kurds, and provided also that they could have in charge of them a British consular officer, who would be able to mediate between them and the Irak Government. If this could be arranged, they would be willing to continue serving the Irak Government in the levies. I replied that I thought it might be arranged that a supply of ammunition should be sent up to them every year, but that I doubted whether it would be possible to assign a special British officer for their protection. There would for many years to come be a British administrative inspector at Mosul, and he would always be able to intervene effectively for their protection, if necessary.

(D.)—*Summary of Recommendations.*

7. My recommendations may be summarised as follows:—

(*a.*) The Assyrian refugees from Persia remaining in Irak should be encouraged to return to their homes, and will do so if Persia will guarantee that the

religious education of their children shall not be interfered with, and if a British consul or vice-consul can be appointed to Urumia to look after their interests.

(*b.*) The Assyrians from former Turkish districts not claimed for Irak, about 6,000 in number, will not return to their homes, and must be given suitable lands in the submontane districts of Irak. Such lands are likely to be available.

(*c.*) The Assyrians from former Turkish districts now claimed for Irak will all of them return to their homes if this claim is upheld, and will settle down in fair contentment under a loose form of subordination to the Irak Government, provided the British Government can guarantee the regular supply of ammunition to them. If these lands are returned to Turkey, the bulk will still remain in their homes and do their best to defend them; but the Jelu and Baz will not do so, and must be given lands in Irak as under (*b*).

8. I have written the foregoing on the assumption that no form of autonomous Assyrian State in the north of Irak can be seriously contemplated. The plan of Agha Petros for an Assyrian State, which is to include Mosul and Rowanduz, seems in any event so fantastic as hardly to merit examination. Such a State would comprise a majority of Arabs and Kurds hostile to the Assyrians, and the mere canvassing of such a project would alienate from the British Government all Moslem opinion throughout Irak, and would make the pursuit of our present policy towards Irak impossible. The adoption of such a project would fatally and permanently entangle us in the highlands of Central Asia. Nor can it be claimed that Great Britain is under any obligation to make for the Assyrians such heavy sacrifices as this plan would entail. The British had no need of the Assyrians in the war, and did not encourage them to rise against the Turks. It was the Russians who stirred them up, just at the time of the outbreak of the Russian revolution, and who then deserted them. The British rescued the remnant of the race, brought them round through Western Persia into Irak, supported them there for years at a cost of several million pounds, and have since then trained their young men to arms. If we now see that as many of the Assyrians as possible shall be resettled in their homelands with what security we can compass, and that the rest shall be planted in suitable spots in Northern Irak, we shall, in my opinion, have amply met any claims which they can be said to have upon us.

I have, &c.
H. DOBBS.

[**E 12148/1019/65**] No. 124.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 27.)

(No. 544.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December* 27, 1923.

TURKISH Government complain of reconnaissance flight of four aeroplanes on 5th December from direction of Rowanduz across "the frontier" over villages of Mavan Bisk and Chahnan.

They protest against violation of Turkish territory and ask that steps may be taken by competent authorities to prevent a recurrence.

Please telegraph your observations.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 14.)

[**E 12197/8133/44**] No. 125.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 27.)

(No. 545.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 27, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 349.

I am unaware to what exact measures French Ambassador was referring, but see my despatch No. 813 of 5th December. Whole attitude of Angora in respect of Public Debt continues to be contrary to rights of European creditors, *e.g.*, abolition of spirit tax, seizure of debt revenues, control of debt agencies and other acts contrary to Decree of Muharrem, most recent of which was seizure of Chatalja assigned revenues, which up till this month had continued to be paid to Debt Administration.

It seems to me desirable that French Embassy itself should be asked to specify measures referred to, as I am somewhat apprehensive lest French Government may wish for parliamentary reasons to use a joint representation of ultimatum as an excuse for delaying ratification of treaty.

[**E 12072/199/44**] No. 126.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 350.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 542 of 23rd December: Mr. Ryan.

You may certainly use your discretion in matter.

[**E 12008/1019/65**] No. 127.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 351.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1923.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 529 and 538 of 6th and 19th December: Mosul negotiations.

It has been decided that Sir P. Cox will represent His Majesty's Government in the verbal negotiations, and it is desirable that they should begin as soon as possible.

You may inform the Turks that we would still like the discussions to take place in London, but that if they prefer Constantinople we shall not object.

[**E 11929/1019/65**] No. 128.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1923.

WITH reference to your letter of the 17th instant on the subject of the official representation of the Irak Government at the Mosul negotiations, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that his Lordship has invited Sir P. Z. Cox, G.C.M.G., to be the representative of His Majesty's Government at the forthcoming discussions, and that Sir P. Cox has accepted.

2. In view of Sir P. Z. Cox's close association with Irak during recent years, the Secretary of State considers that the need for approaching the Turkish Government, in the manner suggested in your letter, to secure the participation of an official Iraki representative at the negotiations no longer exists, and that local feeling on the subject will be satisfied with this choice.

3. There will, none the less, be no objection to the attendance of an Iraki expert in an advisory or technical capacity, as was pointed out in my letter of the 1st instant, and in this case no communication need be made to the Turkish Government at the present time.

I am, &c.
D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 12246/11904/44] No. 129.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 853.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 22, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in continuation of my despatch No. 852 of the 19th instant, a copy of the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Hungary, which was signed on the 18th instant.

2. This copy has been supplied to me privately by M. de Kiss.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Budapest.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 129.

Traité d'Amitié entre la Hongrie et la Turquie.

LA Hongrie, d'une part, et la Turquie, d'autre part, également et sincèrement désireuses d'établir et de consolider les liens de sincère amitié entre le Royaume de Hongrie et la République turque, et pénétrées de la même conviction que les relations entre les deux États, une fois établies, serviront à la prospérité et au bien-être de leurs nations respectives, ont résolu de conclure un Traité d'Amitié et ont à cet effet nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Son Altesse sérénissime le Gouverneur du Royaume de Hongrie : M. Alexandre Kiss de Nemesker, Chargé d'Affaires de Hongrie à Sofia ;

Le Président de la République turque : Le Dr. Adnan Bey, Député de Constantinople à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et délégué à Constantinople du Ministère des Affaires étrangères,

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1ER.

Il y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre le Royaume de Hongrie et la République turque, ainsi qu'entre les ressortissants des deux États.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour établir les relations diplomatiques entre les deux États conformément aux principes du droit des gens ; elles conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques de chacune d'elles recevront à charge de réciprocité, dans le territoire de l'autre, le traitement consacré par les principes généraux du droit international public général.

ARTICLE 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour régler les relations consulaires et commerciales entre leurs pays respectifs ainsi que les conditions d'établissement et de séjour dans les territoires de chacune d'elles des ressortissants de l'autre partie par des conventions qu'elles se réservent de conclure conformément aux règles du droit international public général sur la base d'une parfaite réciprocité.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Angora le plutôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double, à Constantinople, le 18 décembre 1923.

S. DE KISS.
DR. ADNAN.

[E 12254/10131/44] No. 130.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 862.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 26, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Politis, a prominent member of the Greek delegation throughout the Lausanne Conference, who arrived here some weeks ago, left for Angora on the 22nd December in order to take up his duties as Greek Chargé d'Affaires. He was accompanied by his wife, a Greek lady of Constantinople origin, and a small staff.

2. During his stay here M. Politis was in relations with Adnan Bey and transacted a certain amount of business with him, but it was made clear that their relations were of an unofficial character. At one moment a rumour was put about that M. Politis would not be accepted as representative at Angora, but Adnan Bey himself contradicted this and the general attitude of the Turkish authorities has been scrupulously correct. Even the Turkish press, excepting a few comments at the time when the above rumour was circulated, has observed a reserved and inoffensive attitude regarding the Greek representative.

3. The only connection in which the Turkish press has been definitely offensive to the Greek Legation has been as regards a quite subordinate official one M. Stelianopoulos. This gentleman was, I understand, employed in the Greek High Commission during the armistice and seems to have incurred some odium. After M. Politis arrived here there was a good deal of agitation in the Turkish papers regarding M. Stelianopoulos. They insisted, I believe without foundation, that he was in reality a Turkish subject and suggested that he should be arrested and expelled. The Turkish authorities refrained from identifying themselves with this agitation which has now almost died down.

4. On his arrival at Angora on the 23rd December, M. Politis made a short statement to the press to the effect that reports regarding the appointment of a Greek Minister were premature ; that, for the present, representatives would be established in the respective capitals, and consuls at Constantinople and Salonica ; that his relations with Adnan Bey in Constantinople had been unofficial, but that he would be in official relations with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Angora ; and that he would present credentials.

5. The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Athens, Nebil Bey, has not yet left for his post.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative in Athens.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 12265/199/44] No. 131.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 878.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 26, 1923.

SINCE my despatch No. 848 of the 19th instant was drafted, the Court of Independence has held five sittings. Three of them, held on the 19th, 20th and 24th December, were devoted to the trial of Lutfi Fikri Bey. That of the journalists was resumed on the 22nd December and continued on the 25th December. The proceedings, though of great local interest, are hardly worth reporting in detail. I will therefore confine myself to a general account of them.

2. The charge against Lutfi Fikri Bey was founded on two particular publications of his when the controversy about the Caliphate was at its height in November and a rumour had been put about that the Caliph meditated resignation. In the "Tanin" of the 10th November, he published an open letter to the Caliph urging him to stand firm in a situation in which his decision must affect the course of the history of Turkey and of Islam, and to avoid, even at the risk of death, the fall for ever of the dynasty. One of the editors of the "Aksham," Nejmuddin Sadik Bey, having

criticised this letter as being couched in language more appropriate to a Sultan than to a Caliph, and on other grounds, Lutfi Fikri Bey retorted, in an article which the "Tanin" preferred not to publish, and which therefore appeared in the "Aksham" itself on the 15th November. In this article Lutfi Fikri, after replying to Nejmuddin Sadik's criticisms under various heads, declared that national sovereignty, of which he was no less ardent a votary than his opponent, could be secured as well by a constitutional as by a republican system, that he himself preferred the former, and that to maintain a Caliphate without temporal power was impossible.

3. The prosecution maintained that these publications were contrary to the decision of the 1st November, 1922, regarding the Sultanate and the Caliphate, and to article 1 of the Law on Treason as amended by the Grand National Assembly's decision of the 15th April, 1923, a decision the importance of which was explained in Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No. 239 of the 18th April. At the first hearing on the 19th December, Lutfi Fikri was closely examined as to his views and replied with caution, but with a stoutness which drove the President of the Court to the point of thumping the table. Next day, after the examination of the accused had been completed, the Public Prosecutor delivered himself of an impassioned *réquisitoire*, two features of which are worth mentioning. Reproaching Lutfi Fikri with his preference for a constitutional system, an expression which was used throughout in the sense of institutional monarchy, he indulged in a violent tirade against the House of Osman. In the past its members had ceded territories steeped in Turkish blood to secure Greek and Serbian girls. During the national struggle a Sultan and Caliph, making religion his tool by the abuse of fetvas, had made common cause with the enemy, and members of that House had disported themselves at balls with enemy officers, whilst the nation shed tears of blood. Secondly, the Public Prosecutor, replying to a suggestion by Lutfi Fikri that his opponent in the "Aksham" controversy should himself have been prosecuted for raising the issue of how the Caliph should be elected, declared significantly that no law forbade the discussion of this question. He concluded his *réquisitoire* by asking that Lutfi Fikri should be condemned under articles 1 and 2 of the Law on Treason.

4. This *réquisitoire* left some doubt as to whether the Public Prosecutor was asking for a death sentence or not. Article 2 of the law prescribes the capital penalty for treason, but probably admits of a lesser sentence in the case of accessories, and article 3 provides for penal servitude in the case of persons inciting others to treason provided no seditious outbreak ensues. At the last hearing on the 24th December, after two lawyers had spoken for the defence and Lutfi Fikri had restated his position with some courage, the Public Prosecutor again left it uncertain whether he was asking for a capital sentence or not. It seems probable, however, that he intended his first *réquisitoire* as a demand for such a sentence, for on the second occasion he stated explicitly that, if Lutfi Fikri should escape under article 1, he would still be liable under article 3 of the law. Apart from this, the most notable feature of the Public Prosecutor's language on the 24th December was the manner in which, before rebutting certain legal arguments, based on the wording of the law, which had been used by the defence, he laid down the principle that a republican Public Prosecutor was not confined within the narrow framework of laws and procedures.

5. The proceedings of the 24th December ended the trial, but the court reserved sentence.

6. The resumed hearing of the case against the four journalists on the 22nd December presented few features of general interest. The accused were again examined very closely in the case of Jahid and Velid Beys, more or less formally in the other two cases. It was considered significant that the court went back to certain matters antecedent to the publication of the Aga Khan–Amir Ali letter, such as past publications in the "Tanin," and Jahid Bey's alleged relations with the French when he restarted his paper in 1922. At this hearing Jahid Bey, who is undoubtedly the leading personality among the accused, gave as good as he got, and even succeeded once or twice in making the outside public laugh with him, to the indignation of the court. Among the elements in his defence, he cited the Aga Khan's letter in the "Times" of the 17th December. In this connection I may mention that no local paper has dared to reproduce Sayyid Amir Ali's letter in the "Times" of the 14th December, but that of the Agha Khan was widely reproduced after Jahid Bey had made use of it in court. The ever suspicious Turkish mind has conceived the idea that the latter letter may have been written with the express object of saving the accused journalists.

7. On the 25th December the Public Prosecutor delivered his *réquisitoire* in the case of the journalists. It was in striking contrast with that against Lutfi Fikri. He intimated pretty clearly that the Agha Khan and Amir Ali must be regarded as tools used by a foreign Power in connection with intrigues concerning the Caliphate, but he exonerated the journalists from any complicity with those two persons. The fault of the journalists had consisted of publishing the letter, which had itself been drawn up with an ulterior motive. It might have been possible to take a lenient view of their conduct had it been possible to lay hands on the authors of the letter. As it was, the journalists must be punished. The Public Prosecutor asked for the condemnation of Velid, Jahid and Ahmet Djevdet Beys under article 3 of the Law on Treason, *i.e.*, the article prescribing penal servitude for incitations to treason not followed by seditious outbreaks. He condemned Velid Bey more strongly than the others on the ground of his lukewarmness regarding the republic and his use of religion for political ends. Jahid Bey he admitted to be a true blue Republican, and he asked the court to admit extenuating circumstances in his case. He exonerated the responsible managers of the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar" and the "Ikdam" (one of whom had not been present at the trial at all) and asked for their acquittal. The hearing was adjourned till the 29th December to allow the accused and their lawyers to prepare their defence.

8. The Court of Independence appears to have made one further arrest during the past week. The person arrested, or at any rate placed under surveillance, is one Edhem Hidayet, a young Khoja, accused of having delivered reactionary sermons in the Conqueror's Mosque in Stamboul, and more particularly of having published a pamphlet on "Morals and the Veil in Islam." This man's case was already in the hands of the ordinary judicial authorities, but seems to have been taken over by the Court of Independence. It had not previously come to my notice, and I have not been able to procure a copy of the incriminating pamphlet. It is significant of the rapid progress in free thought in this country that such ideas as that of the veiling of women, advocated by men like Edhem Hidayet, should have come to be associated in the minds of the new rulers of Turkey with political reaction.

9. Some surprise has been occasioned in Constantinople by the acquittal at Adana of Abdul Kadir Kemali Bey, whose arrest at that place was reported in my despatch No. 848 of the 19th December. His acquittal is the more remarkable as, in defending himself, he strongly attacked Ismet Pasha. He was tried by an ordinary court, and it seems probable that his local influence counted for a good deal.

10. During the earlier part of the last week no notable developments were reported from Angora. Within the last three days, however, an acute situation has arisen in the Grand National Assembly. Two Opposition Deputies had lodged a motion that all sentences of the Constantinople Court of Independence should be subject to review by the Assembly. The Committee on Drafts recommended at a sitting, which Ismet Pasha himself attended, that this motion should not be entertained. When the motion came back to the Assembly with this recommendation on the 24th December, there was a debate so violent that the President was compelled to suspend the sitting to prevent the Deputies from coming to blows. The sitting was resumed later in the day. Ismet Pasha practically made the question one of confidence, and, on a division, 100 Deputies supported the Government, while 31 voted against it and 4 refrained from voting. This vote was invalidated by the fact that the total number of Deputies present did not constitute a quorum. The discussion was adjourned to the 26th December. According to telegrams from Angora it was anticipated yesterday that there would again be a hot conflict, but that the Government would win, and that the upshot of the episode might be a purge of the People's party.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[**E 12266/4900/44**] No. 132.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 879.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 26, 1923.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 1153, dated the 14th instant, enclosing a copy of Mr. Leeper's despatch No. 530 relative to the ratification by the Polish Diet of the Turco-Polish Treaty signed at Lausanne on the 23rd July last, I have

the honour to report that, on the motion of Ismet Pasha, the Treaty of Friendship, as well as the Commercial and "Établissement" Conventions, was in turn ratified by the Turkish Assembly on the 12th instant.

2. In presenting the treaty to the Assembly the reporter of the Foreign Affairs Commission drew attention to the old-standing friendship between the two countries. Turkey had never, he said, recognised the partition of Poland, and had never even sent consular officers to Polish areas. These treaties had now been concluded with an independent Poland, containing 200,000 Turks and Moslems, and they would, he hoped, further cement the ancient friendship. On the conclusion of this speech the treaty and conventions were separately submitted to the Assembly and approved, amid cries of "Long live the Polish Republic!" and "Long live Turkey!"

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

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